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LIMITING THE VIEW. CENSORSHIP OF FINE ARTS IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, 1865-1905

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Abstract: *The paper deals with the history of art censorship in the Russian Empire, which started with the reform of 1865 and lasted until the Revolution of 1905, when the restrictive measure was officially abolished. The paper summarises the legislative measures that were taken by the government to control the distribution and display of the works of fine art. The authors point out that the censorship disapproved images that unfavourably represented the Russian monarchy, that glorified nationalist and revolutionary movements as well as those considered as threatening to the Orthodox Church or public morality. The authors conclude that the government attempted to implement a system of screening all the paintings, lithographs, and photographs before they were published or displayed. However, it achieved only limited success.*

Keywords: *Russian Empire, Censorship, Fine Arts, Chief Administration of Press Affairs, Circular Letter, Exhibitions, Peredvizhniki.*

Rezumat: Limitând privirea: Cenzura lucrărilor de artă în Imperiul Rus, 1865-1905. *Lucrarea tratează istoria cenzurii artei în Rusia Imperială care a început cu reforma din 1865 și a ținut până la Revoluția din 1905, atunci când măsura restrictivă a fost oficial abolită. Sunt prezentate rezumativ măsurile legislative adoptate de guvern în vederea controlului distribuției și expunerii lucrărilor de artă plastică. Autorii evidențiază modul în care cenzura a dezaprobat imaginile ce ilustrau monarhia rusă într-un mod nefavorabil, cele care glorificau mișcările naționaliste și revoluționare, precum și cele considerate drept amenințare la adresa Bisericii Ortodoxe sau a moralității publice. Autorii ajung la concluzia că încercările guvernamentale de a implementa un sistem de verificare a tuturor tablourilor, litografiilor sau fotografiilor înainte de a fi publicate sau expuse public au avut un succes limitat.*

Résumé: Limitant le regard: La censure des œuvres d'art dans l'Empire Russe, 1865-1905. *L'ouvrage ci-joint traite l'histoire de la censure de l'art dans la Russie Impériale, qui commença avec la réforme de 1865 et finit avec la Révolution de 1905, lorsqu'on abolit*

officiellement la mesure restrictive. On y présenta en résumé les mesures législatives que le gouvernement adopta en vue du contrôle de la distribution et de l'exposition des œuvres d'art plastique. Les auteurs ont mis en évidence la manière dans laquelle la censure désapprouva les images qui illustraient la monarchie russe d'une manière défavorable, celles qui glorifiaient les mouvements nationalistes et révolutionnaires, ainsi que celles considérées comme une menace à l'adresse de l'Eglise Orthodoxe ou de la moralité publique. Les auteurs arrivèrent à la conclusion que les essais gouvernementaux d'implémenter un système de vérification de tous les tableaux, des lithographies ou des photographies avant d'être publiés ou exposés en public eurent un succès limité.

INTRODUCTION

The invention of book printing, engraving, lithography, and photography influenced the spheres of public communication and fine art dramatically. These inventions and the widespread use of such technologies encouraged the circulation of ideas and knowledge. But it also increased the risks of social disorder. History has shown that the ruling elites were unprepared for such changes. Almost all European governments, at some point, introduced pre-publication censorship. However, over time, the governmental control of information weakened. London abandoned the preliminary censorship as early as in 1695; Paris – between 1789 and 1822; Berlin – in 1850. While the state regulations for the printed word became much more liberal, the censorship of fine arts persisted during 'the long nineteenth century' in almost all countries¹.

The history of the art censorship in the Russian Empire provides an interesting example of how the state officials tried to limit the flow of visual information and why those attempts finally failed. There are a lot of studies devoted to the history of censorship in Russia². The majority of them deal with the

¹ See: R. J. Goldstein, A. M. Nedd eds., *Political Censorship of the Visual Arts in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Arresting Images*. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 271 p.

² Among the most important contributions one may note the following works: М. Лемке, *Очерки по истории русской цензуры и журналистики в XIX веке* [Essays on the history of the Russian censorship and journalism in the 19th c.], Санкт-Петербург, Труд, 1904, 512 с.; И. П. Фут, *Циркуляры цензурного ведомства 1865-1905 гг.* [Circular letters of the censorship administration 1865-1905], in *Цензура в России: история и современность* [Censorship in Russia: history and modernity], Вып. 3, Санкт-Петербург, 2006, с. 106-132; C. A. Ruud, *Fighting words. Imperial censorship and Russian press 1804-1906*. Toronto, University of Toronto press, 2009, 327 p.; Н. Г. Патрушева, *Цензурное ведомство в государственной системе Российской*

censorship of books and periodicals. The authors who touched upon the history of art censorship focused their attention on the period between the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917³. The censorship of fine arts during the last decades of the 19th and early 20th centuries is much less studied. It was a crucial time for the Russian Empire when its ruling elite tried to find a balance between the social demands for liberalisation and the Empire's aspiration to maintain the current political *status quo*.

This paper deals with the practices used by the Russian Imperial censorship to gain control over the distribution of visual information. We examined a wide range of official documents produced by the Russian censorship authorities from the mid-19th to early 20th cc. In this study, we applied a structuralist approach to political history. Within its conceptual framework, we discuss the censorship not as a single entity, but rather as a multilayered structure. It consisted of the interrelated elements, including a state policy shaped by the Imperial ruling elite, higher secular and ecclesiastical censorship authorities, and the local civil servants. They embodied the censorship of visual media, feeling the pressure of different social groups that demanded either weakening or strengthening of the limitations.

Such an approach allowed us to assume that during the discussed period, the Imperial censorship was concerned mainly by the images widely available for the lesser-educated class. The censorship controlled the production, display, and distribution of photographs, post-cards, lithographic works, and other cheap media. Until the early 20th c. the censors paid little attention to the creativity of professional artists whose works had a rather modest influence over the broad layers of the population.

CENSORSHIP OF ART IN THE IMPERIAL RUSSIA

Charles A. Ruud defines censorship as a formal pre-publication prohibition

империи во второй половине XIX – начале XX века [Censorship in the system of state institutions of the Russian Empire in the second half of 19th c. - early 20th c.], Санкт-Петербург, "Северная звезда", 2013, 620 с.

³ Д. А. Северюхин, *Изобразительное искусство и цензурная политика в дореволюционной России* [Visual arts and censorship policy in Tsarist-era Russia], in "Пространство культуры" [Culture space], 2009, №1, с. 44–58; M. B. Betz, A. M. Nedd, *Irony, derision and magical wit: censors as a spur to Russian abstract art*, in R. J. Goldstein, A. M. Nedd eds., *Political Censorship of the Visual Arts in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Arresting Images*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 9–60.

of words that a government finds unacceptable. He stresses that among the screening of written works before or after publication, there were other forms of control such as licensing, official warnings, fines, committees of persuasion, prosecutions, and directives⁴. The Russian Imperial censorship was a highly complicated institution administered by the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as higher ecclesiastical authorities⁵. By the middle of the 19th century, several attempts were made to normalise the censorship laws, particularly in 1804, 1826 and 1828. According to the Statute of 1828, all literary writings, scientific papers, and works of art, including gravures and drawings, were subjected to the preliminary censorship. The censors were empowered to ban artworks that discredited the Orthodox Church or Christian beliefs, the ruling dynasty, the government, and its decisions, morality, and decorum⁶.

New censorship regulations were relatively liberal. However, the gap between the declared principals and actual censorship control remained huge⁷. During the reign of Nicholas I the censorship proliferated. The years afterwards, the Revolution of 1848 became widely known in Russia as the age of ‘censorship terror’⁸. In the field of fine arts, the censorship focused its attention on the *Lubki* – popular prints supplemented with simple graphics and narratives. The law of 1851 prescribed the destruction of all existing *Lubok* prints. Publishing of the new ones had to be approved by censors (See **Figure 1**). The censorship banned this painting and similars that referred to folk beliefs related to Christianity.

In the early 1860s, Alexander II initiated liberal reforms that deeply affected all aspects of Russian social and political life. In April 1865 the “Temporary press regulations” were implemented. They replaced preliminary censorship with an administrative one. Local censorship committees, most of the independent censors in the largest cities, as well as inspectors of publishing facilities were subordinated to a new higher censorship authority (the Chief Administration for Press Affairs). At the same time, the St. Petersburg and Moscow censorship committees, some independent censors as well as the foreign censorship agencies

⁴ C. A. Ruud, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁵ В. Р. Фирсов (ред.), *Цензоры Российской империи. Конец XVIII – начало XX века. Биобиблиографический справочник* [Censors of the Russian Empire. The late 18th – early 20th centuries], Санкт-Петербург, Рос. нац. б-ка, 2013, с. 34-52.

⁶ *Устав о цензуре. Утвержден 22 апреля 1828 г.* [Censorship Statute. Approved on April 22, 1828], Санкт-Петербург, Департамент народного просвещения, 1829, с. 4-5.

⁷ C. A. Ruud, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁸ М. Лемке, *op. cit.*, с. 183-308.

that screened all published materials from abroad, remained under the direct control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. “Temporary press regulations” of 1865 remained unchanged until 1905.



Figure 1. *Lubok* depicting how a magic bird taught the ancestors to bury deceased persons.

Source: А. А. Плетнева, *Лубочная Библия. Язык и текст* [The Lubok Bible. Language and text], Москва, Языки славянской культуры, 2013, с. 63.

By the end of the 19th c., only some 29.3% of males and 13% of females in Russia were literate⁹. That is why the ruling elite considered the illustrated media as a powerful instrument of propaganda. One must note that the censorship liberalisation of 1865 regarded mainly narratives. All “gravures, drawings and other images, whether supplemented by texts or not” remained subject to the preliminary censorship.¹⁰ Further editions of the censorship statutes, including the one adopted in 1890, preserved this norm in general.

POLITICAL CENSORSHIP IN ART: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

The censorship regulations of the 1860s were levelled against those ‘unacceptable’ works of art that could be produced in multiple copies. For a long time, only the works of devotional art were screened by the ecclesiastical censorship. Civil servants paid no or little attention to non-religious paintings, sculptures and other original artworks. There were only some exclusions from this general rule. For example, a few portraits of the Russian military commanders who were involved in the Decembrist uprising of 1825, were exempted from the Military Gallery of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. However, during the reign of Nicholas I, there were no particular regulations concerning the display of artworks. Severiukhin points out that the emperor himself was the main art censor. His opinion on the aesthetic value of one or other artwork could end an artist’s career¹¹.

Until the mid-19th century, Academic art flourished in Russia. Artist’s professional fulfilment largely depended on his education in the Imperial Academy of Arts (established in 1746) as well as on his ability to produce paintings suitable for the tastes of the upper class. That is why the artists preferred politically neutral historical and mythological themes in their work. However, under the influence of the European Realism art movement, things started to change. Since the early 1860s, the artists increasingly referred to both

⁹ *Общий свод по Империи результатов разработки данных Первой Всеобщей переписи населения, произведенной 28 января 1897 года* [Empire-wide summary of results of processing data of the First All-Russian census, held on January 28, 1897], Санкт-Петербург, Паровая типо-литография Н. Л. Ныркина, 1905, Т. 2, с. XXXVII.

¹⁰ *Периодическая печать и цензура Российской империи в 1865-1905 гг. Система административных взысканий: Справочное издание* [Periodicals and censorship in Russia in 1865-1905. System of administrative penalties: Reference book], Санкт-Петербург, Нестор-история, 2011, с. 358-359.

¹¹ Д. А. Северюхин, *op. cit.*, с. 45.

social problems and disputable episodes of Russian history. It was especially true about the *Peredvizhniki* ('Wanderers') – a group of realist artists who neglected traditional Academism and arranged mobile public exhibitions in the largest cities of the Russian Empire. Cheap post-cards with reproductions of some *Peredvizhniki*'s paintings were in great demand. An innovative style of their realistic paintings, the scope of the themes reflected in the artworks as well as the increasing popularity of the public exhibitions deeply concerned the rightist group of the Russian ruling elite.

In February 1885 Ilya Repin, one of the leading realist artists in Russia, presented his painting "Ivan the Terrible and his son Ivan on November 16, 1561" (**Figure 2**) at the 13th annual exhibition of *Peredvizhniki* in St. Petersburg.



Figure 2. Ilya Repin, *Ivan the Terrible and his son Ivan on November 16, 1561*

Source: Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow

The painting referred to the historical episode when psychologically deviant Tsar killed his heir with his own hands. The right-wing politicians immediately labelled the painting as disgusting. Alexander III, who visited the

exhibition personally, prohibited demonstration of the Repin's work elsewhere. Shortly after, the emperor's younger brother Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich banned another painting depicting the cruelty of Ivan the Terrible – "Kudeyar's third trial" by Konstantin Gorsky¹². On April 6, 1885, the Ministry of Internal Affairs introduced the regulations of art exhibitions. According to the document, any exhibition of the artworks had to be held only by approval of the local governor. Before the exhibition opening, all the artworks were to be examined by civil servants who were empowered to ban the displaying of any artworks considered as "harmful because of their biased character".¹³

However, it seems likely that in the years that followed censors tended to ignore the art exhibitions. On May 19, 1901, Nickolai Shakhovskoi, the head of the Chief Administration for Press Affairs, sent out a secret circular letter in which he indicated that "the artworks of harmful and biased character" came into sight at the art exhibitions throughout the Empire. The civil servants were reminded of the need to respect the regulations¹⁴.

Nonetheless, there is no evidence to confirm that the local censors intensified their control over the exhibitions after this proclamation. Rather weak control of the fine arts may be explained by the limited resources of the local censorship agencies. By 1905 all the censorship institutions throughout the Empire had only 141 public servants (including 81 censors) at their disposal. In their routine work, the censors directed their efforts mainly to the screening of the literary works and theatrical performances.

Furthermore, the censors usually disregarded the visual media due to the absence of strict evaluation criteria that would categorise a certain image as "harmful and biased". The local public servants, being apprehensive about their reputation among the educated class, preferred to avoid intrusions into the artistic life. They asked higher censorship authorities to provide more precise recommendations to help them pass judgments on the artworks. For example, in 1893 Nikolai Korchinskyi, the inspector of publishing facilities and book trade in Kyiv, initiated a lawsuit against Martinian Burmistrov, who sold the portraits of Polish national heroes in his bookshop. Korchinsky argued in his report that the Statute of Press (1886) contained no direct regulations concerning printed artworks, including paintings, drawings, and photographs. Korchinsky stressed

¹² Центральний державний історичний архів України, м. Київ [Central State Historical Archive in Kyiv] (**hereinafter: Ts.D.I.A.K.**), Fund 294, register 1, file 4-a, f. 376.

¹³ *Ibid.*, f. 379.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 101.

that although all paintings imported from abroad were to be screened by the foreign censorship, there is no list of approved artworks or stamps of the censorship approval on particular paintings.¹⁵

In practice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs never produced lists of artworks either approved or banned by the censorship. However, it continued to remind local civil servants about their obligation to screen the circulation of published images. In 1902 the Chief Administration for Press Affairs informed in its circular letter about numerous cases of unauthorised trade of illustrated materials throughout the state. It stressed that all sellers are allowed to trade post-cards or other pictures only by permission¹⁶.

There is no doubt that censorship authorities used to screen gravures, lithographs, photographs, and other images in a selective way. When a censor decided that a specific image cannot be approved, he informed other censorship authorities about his decision by a special circular letter¹⁷. The images, which were banned for political reasons, may be divided into two major groups. The first one included inappropriate portraits of the royal dynasty members. The second group included pictures that were considered unacceptable from the ideological point of view.

Since the times of Nicholas I, images depicting the emperor, his family members or his ancestors were in the centre of the censorship's attention. Censors used to evaluate the artistic level of the printed portraits, mainly those that were to be published in significant quantities. Such images were sometimes banned because of their low quality, "unsatisfactory execution", "lack of similarity", inappropriate imaging of decorations, and so on¹⁸. The censorship immediately banned images that unfavourably represented the monarch. For example, it prevented the publishing of a photograph showing Nicholas II in civilian clothes


¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Fund 442, register 624, file 446, f. 13-14.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Fund 294, register 1, file 4-a, f. 392.

¹⁷ It is noteworthy, that the inspectors of publishing facilities and book trade possessed the same power to stop the production and distribution of the unacceptable images as the censors and censorship committees actually possessed. See, i. e.: Державний архів м. Києва [State Archive of Kyiv] (**hereinafter: D.A.K.**), fund 287, register 1, file 56, ff. 79-79b. However, unlike the censors, the inspectors were not obliged to inform their colleagues about their decisions with special circular letters. For this reason, it is almost impossible to clarify a precise number of images banned by the Imperial authorities.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 37, 52, 69, 78.

together with his uncle – German emperor Wilhelm II, who held his hand on the Tsar’s shoulder¹⁹ (see **Figure 3**).



**Figure 3, Photographic portrait of Nicholas II and Wilhelm II
banned by the Russian censorship.**

Source: <https://news.yahoo.com/toasts-tears-joy-germany-started-wwi-031602713.html>

Some circulars prohibited placement of the Royal dynasty members’ portraits on commercial products. For example, in 1899 the St. Petersburg censorship committee disapproved the image of Nicholas II and his daughters printed on the package of the chocolate sweets produced by Vasiliev’s factory as well as the portraits of the emperor and his brother Grand Duchy Mikhail Alexandrovich on the candy wrappers.²⁰ Next year the Moscow censorship committee approved the same decision towards the candy wrappers with the photograph of the Alexander II monument.²¹ At the same time, Odessa and

¹⁹ И. П. Фурт, *op. cit.*, c. 110.

²⁰ Ts.D.I.A.K., Fund 294, register 1, file 4-a, f. 97.

²¹ *Ibid.*, file 354, f. 80.

St. Petersburg censors banned the portraits of Nicholas II and his wife Alexandra on the covers of the pull-off calendars.²²

The group of politically unacceptable images included mainly those, which glorified the national movements throughout the Empire. Particularly, in 1895 the Chief Administration for Press Affairs banned a diptych named “The Soul of Armenia” by an anonymous author. One of its parts depicted a woman crying in the ruins of Ani, the ancient capital of Armenia; another one represented “a woman who shows young Armenia, depicted as a youngster, the source and the goal of the young generation’s unity (with the names of ancient Armenian towns inscribed on ruins)”. The censorship authority stated that such “exceptionally biased” artworks as well as similar paintings, gravures and photographs could not be allowed for publishing²³. However, in most cases, the local authorities had to identify politically unacceptable images on their responsibility. For example, in 1903 the inspector of publishing facilities and the book trade in Kyiv prevented the duplication of an image “depicting the Finnish woman carrying the Code of Laws in her hands and the two-headed eagle tearing it”.²⁴ As matters stand, the inspector had no idea about the origin and authorship of the image. But it seems clear that the issue referred to the reproduction of “Hyökkäys” (“The Attack”) by Edvard Isto (1865-1905) – an iconic image for the Finnish nationalism.²⁵



Figure 4. Edvard Isto, “Hyökkäys” (“The Attack”), 1899.

Source: National Museum of Finland, Helsinki.

In most cases, the censorship restrictions concerned the portraits of historical figures that were once important for certain national movements. On May 15, 1898, the Chief Administration for Press Affairs asked the local censors to


²² *Ibid.*, file 4-a, f. 52, 71.

²³ *Ibid.*, f. 71.

²⁴ D.A.K. [State Archive of Kyiv], fund 287, register 1, file 49, ff. 27-27b.

²⁵ M. Valkonen, *The golden age: Finnish art, 1850 to 1907*, Helsinki, Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1992, p. 74.

pay special attention to all published materials devoted to the jubilee of the famous poet Adam Mickiewicz who was a symbolic figure for the Polish nationalism (See **Figure 5**). The document banned any portraits of Mickiewicz that could be distributed among the population for lower prices either separately or as a decoration of goods (such as packs of cigarettes, candies, etc.)²⁶. In the



following year, Saint-Petersburg's censorship committee prohibited the printing of Mickiewicz's portrait as well as the image of a monument erected in his honour in Warsaw printed on the packs of cigarettes "Shapshal"²⁷. In 1903 the St. Petersburg censorship committee, in its circular letter, banned the publishing of the portraits of "the former Polish kings Jan Zamoyski and Jan Sobieski", as well as the drawings of some scenes from Maxim Gorky's play "The Lower Depths" on packs of pencils²⁸

Figure 5. Portrait of Adam Mickiewicz published by Vezenberg & Co in St. Petersburg.

Source: Private collection.

Other circulars touched upon the portraits of contemporary political opponents to the monarchy. Specifically, the censorship banned the portraits of Mykhailo Drahomanov, one of the leading Ukrainian political activists, Alexander Herzen, "the father of Russian socialism" as well as some left-wing political figures, such as Karl Kautsky, Ferdinand Lassalle, and August Bebel²⁹.

To some extent, such restrictions were caused by the activity of the Russian nationalists and monarchists. For example, in 1905 the Governor-General of Kyiv, Podolia, and Volhynia received a letter from certain "Little Russian patriots" who were incensed by the fact of displaying "the post-cards in Polish revolutionary spirit" in the bookstore located on the central street of Kyiv. Stating that such images "abuse the heart of a Russian man" and threatening to use violence against the store, "the patriots" asked the police to take away the post-cards³⁰.

²⁶ Ts.D.I.A.K., Fund 294, register 1, file 4-a, f. 89.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 20.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 189b.

²⁹ Ts.D.I.A.K., Fund 294, register 1, file 354, f. 90; *ibid.*, Spr. 297, Ark. 221, 267, 283.

³⁰ D.A.K., fund 287, register 1, file 57, ff. 192-193.

Sometimes the censors considered the images that touched upon the Empire's internal or foreign policy unacceptable. Shortly before the war with Japan, when Russia attempted to master Manchuria, the censorship authorities banned some pictures with specific names: "Horrors of war", "Current events in China", "Chinese wurst", etc.³¹

On June 15, 1905, the Chief Administration for Press Affairs issued probably the last ban of a particular politically unacceptable artwork. It concerned the monumental painting "The Bloody Sunday in Petersburg, January 5, 1905" by the Polish artist Wojciech Kossak. The painting, created in Vienna, depicted the dragoon attack on a peaceful manifestation in St. Petersburg. It was an event that triggered the revolution of 1905-07³².



Figure 6. Wojciech Horacy Kossak, "The Bloody Sunday in Petersburg, January 5, 1905", 1905.

Source: Kirovograd Regional Art Museum, Kropyvnytskyi.

Soon after that, in October 1905, Nicholas II officially abolished censorship.

STANDING FOR PUBLIC MORALITY

As it was mentioned above, one of the aims of censorship was to protect the Orthodox religion and public morality. In the late 19th century, the ecclesiastical censorship dealt with religious literature and images almost

³¹ *Ibid.*, ff. 50, 71.

³² *Ibid.*, f. 279.

exclusively. However, civil censors had to consult with the Most Holy Synod on the issues concerning religious matters. From time to time, the ecclesiastical censorship banned the printing of images that represented the religious symbols, Orthodox church interiors, etc.³³ Sometimes, such bans were partial. For example, in 1903 the Chief Administration for Press Affairs approved the publishing of an album of Nickolai Ge's paintings that included some images criticised by the church authorities. At the same time, it restricted the reproduction of these images in any other books and periodicals³⁴. In general, there were only sporadic cases when censorship banned images for religious reasons. In the field of public "morality and decorum," it tended to act more vigorously.

During the 19th century public authorities of all European states more or less actively tried to prevent the distribution of pornography. In this way, the Russian censorship was in no case different from any other similar institution. While depicting a naked human body was allowed and even encouraged by the Academic art, it was rather a complicated task for censors to distinguish artistic erotic images from pornography. For example, in 1871 the Committee of Foreign Censorship sends out a circular letter concerning thirty imported "photographic cards depicting persons in obscene poses". It restricted the distribution of fifteen images, "either in colour or in the original form". The circular contained a list of the titles of banned images, i. e. «La Douche», «L'Art de nager», «Le Bain en fleuve», «Qui est dans ma chambre?», «Avant», «Après», «Cancan», etc. The local censors had to use this list to prevent the distribution of all similar images³⁵. To avoid further discussions, the Chief Administration for Press Affairs in July 1889 reminded censors that they should prohibit the publishing of all images depicting the naked female body.

From 1864 the local magistrates investigated all the cases of "public display and distribution of obviously tempting products and images". The local authorities were empowered to set a fine of no more than 25 rubles or imprison a guilty person for seven days or less. However, such measures did not prevent the trading of erotic images. It seems clear that the production of pornography was an important source of income for many professional photographers. For example, Alexander Kuprin, who worked as a journalist in Kyiv during 1895-1900, argued in his novels that the production of pornography was a highly profitable business

³³ Ts.D.I.A.K., Fund 294, register 1, file 4-a, f. 162, 169, 185.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 384.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Fund 293, register 1, file 552, f. 59-60.

for the local photographers who were ready to pay their models 5 rubles for each negative³⁶.

On the other hand, there is only one documented evidence of the legal prosecution of a photographer charged with distributing erotic materials in Kyiv. In 1899 inspector of publishing facilities and book trade Alexander Nikolskyi received a denunciation from a local inhabitant who accused photographer Dmitri Markov of producing pornographic images and keeping a bagnio right in his studio. The police officer who examined the Markov's studio found twenty-seven negatives of "the obviously tempting and immoral images". Markov claimed that he bought all the negatives from a bookstore. He aimed to produce photographic cards for sale to the local artists. Since no other evidence was presented, in June 1899 the magistrate adjudged Markov to pay a fine of 15 rubles³⁷.

CONCLUSIONS

One may note that there was a significant gap between the theory and practice of the art censorship in the Russian Empire. The law listed numerous cases when certain images were to be prohibited from printing, displaying and distributing. However, the censorship authorities applied such limitations only from time to time. Most of the restrictions concerned cheap and widely available visual media, such as lithographs, photographs, and post-cards. The censorship used to ban any images that glorified national movements or left-winged political activists as well as the portraits of the Royal family members made inappropriately. The distribution of the erotic images was restricted as well. However, such measures were rather ineffective. In any case, the scale and effectiveness of the art censorship in Imperial Russia was not even close to the one that existed in the Soviet Union later.

Two main reasons caused this situation. Firstly, the censors had to pay almost all their attention to screening the literary works, including books, plays, and periodicals. Having rather limited resources at their disposal, they considered examination of the works of fine art a less important duty. The higher censorship authorities failed to make a complete list of banned images, whereas the local

³⁶ А. Куприн, *Полное собрание сочинений* [A complete collection of works], Т. 6, Москва, Воскресенье, 2007, с. 112.

³⁷ D.A.K., fund 287, register 1, file 37, ff. 170-175b, 206-207b.

censors preferred to avoid intrusions into the artistic life. The second reason was the self-censorship of publishers, who unwillingly invested in the production of illustrative materials that could be potentially banned.

Finally, it should be stressed that until the early 20th c., most of the artists were hardly interested in political issues. Things started to change only after the revolution of 1905-07. During the following decade, the Imperial authorities had to develop new approaches to control the fine arts and distribution of visual information.

MYKHAILO HRUSHEVSKY IN CZECH HISTORIOGRAPHY (THE FIRST THIRD OF THE 20th CENTURY)

Vitalii TELVAK , Viktoriia TELVAK 

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Abstract: *The article deals with the study of the reception of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's scientific heritage in the Czech researches of the first third of the 20th century. It focuses on the peculiarities of the reception of the scholar's ideas at the beginning of the 20th century, during the First World War and the interwar period. It has been highlighted that the Czech scientists were generally objective and produced favourable reviews on Hrushevsky's works. Their positive reaction was related to the absence of mutual historical claims, the similarity of the imperial oppression experience, traditionally strong Czech-Ukrainian cultural ties, and Mykhailo Hrushevsky's friendly relations with many contemporary Czech scholars. The article summarises the variety of Czech-Slavic studies, dedicated to the analysis of Hrushevsky works.*

Keywords: *Hrushevsky, Czech Slavic studies, historiography, 20th century, perception, journalism.*

Rezumat: *Mihail Hrușevski în istoriografia cehă (prima treime a secolului XX).* Articolul este dedicat cercetării modalităților de receptare a operei științifice a lui Mihail Hrușevski în lucrările apărute în Cehia în prima treime a secolului al XX-lea. Sunt evidențiate particularitățile receptării ideilor cercetătorului ucrainean la începutul secolului al XX-lea, în anii Primului Război Mondial, precum și în perioada interbelică. Autorul demonstrează că abordările specialiștilor cehi privind creația științifică a lui Hrușevsky au fost, în linii generale, obiective și au rezultat în recenzii favorabile. Această reacție pozitivă s-a datorat absenței unor pretenții istorice reciproce, experiențelor similare acumulate sub opresiunea imperială, relațiilor culturale ucraineano-cehe tradițional puternice, relațiilor personale de prietenie ale lui Hrușevski cu mulți cercetători cehi contemporani. Articolul rezumă diversitatea studiilor slavo-cehe privitoare la opera lui Hrușevski.

Résumé : *Mykhailo Hrushevsky dans l'historiographie tchèque (le premier tiers du XX^e siècle).* On consacre l'article ci-joint à l'étude des manières d'apercevoir l'œuvre scientifique de M. Hrushevsky dans les ouvrages tchèques du premier tiers du XX^e siècle. On y met en évidence les particularités de la réception des idées du chercheur ukrainien au début

du XX^e siècle, pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, ainsi que pendant l'entre-deux-guerres. L'auteur y démontra que les abords des spécialistes tchèques concernant la création scientifique de Hrushevsky furent, en général, objectifs et favorables. L'absence de prétentions historiques mutuelles, les expériences similaires sous l'oppression impériale, les relations culturelles bilatérales entre l'Ukraine et la République Tchèque, traditionnellement fortes, les relations personnelles et amicales de M. Hrushevsky avec de nombreux contemporains tchèques ont favorisé cette réaction positive. L'article ci-joint résume la diversité des études slaves tchèques regardant l'œuvre de M. Hrushevsky.

INTRODUCTION

1894 was, to some extent, a significant year in the history of Galician Ukrainians under the Austro-Hungarian empire rule. That year, another successful attempt was made to sign the Polish-Ukrainian agreement, called "New Era", which brought numerous important results for the Ukrainian community. The most important one was opening of the first in the history of Ukrainian science Ukrainian History Department. After several years of negotiations, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a young talented student from Kyiv Documentary School, was appointed to this responsible post (1866-1934). This decision was purely political. The applicant had not even obtained his Master's degree at that moment of being appointed by the Emperor's rescript. However, the given position turned out to be extremely successful, despite Hrushevsky's young age. Not only was he Volodymyr Antonovych's, the leader of Kyiv Ukrainianophiles, ambitious student but also, he an unprecedentedly active participant of Ukrainian cultural-scientific and socio-political life.

The results of his activity became soon visible. He was an initiator and the main force of many initiatives, for instance: the transformation of the narrow-specialized party institution of T. Shevchenko Scientific Society into the actual Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the writing of the first scientific synthetic work the "History of Ukraine-Rus", the creation of Lviv Historical School, political apparatus reforms in Galicia, etc. These remarkable joint efforts of M. Hrushevsky, his colleagues and students caused the rapid modernisation of all aspects of the Dniester Ukrainians, who fell significantly behind the Dnieper compatriots' and other Slavic peoples of the Danube monarchy.

Such rich and diverse work drew the attention of the Ukrainian life observers, first of all, the Ukrainian Slavic neighbours, who lived in the Habsburg and the Romanov monarchies. At the same time, the Russian and Polish intellec-

tuals regarded M. Hrushevsky's activity as a threat for their prolonged domination in the Ukrainian ethnic territories. The majority of them, with few exceptions, formed the opposition to his cultural and public activity. On the background of the united Polish-Russian opposition, the activity of the leader of the Ukrainian movement attracted a rather interesting and objective (with the willingness to understand the essence of the processes) reception in the circle of the Czech intellectuals.

While the Polish and Russian Hrushevsky studies have repeatedly been the subject of independent historiographical analysis,¹ the research of the perception of the Ukrainian scientist's activity by his Czech counterparts lacks a more profound analysis and is not equal to the heuristic potential of the problem. Moreover, a stereotyped view of "the lack of links between the Ukrainian and Czech scholars during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" in contemporary literature is still widespread.² As the first step of the reconsideration of such a statement, we suggest a comprehensive analysis of the numerous sources to reconstruct the reception of M. Hrushevsky's diverse activity by his Czech contemporaries. We will concentrate on the period of the end of the nineteenth – the first third of the twentieth century, that period which M. Hrushevsky witnessed and actively participated.

TWENTY YEARS IN LVIV

M. Hrushevsky was first mentioned in the last years of the nineteenth century on the pages of the Czech scientific periodicals. At that time, diversified activities aimed at modernising of the Ukrainian cultural and public space of Galicia

¹ More precisely in Віталій Тельвак, *Наукові погляди Михайла Грушевського в історіографічних дискусіях у Російській імперії кінця XIX - початку XX ст.* [Scientific views of Mykhailo Hrushevsky in historiographical discussions in Russian empire at the end of XIX – beginning of XX centuries], in "Студії з архівної справи та документознавства" [Studies from Archive field and documentology], Київ, 2008, № 16, с. 42-57; Віталій Тельвак, *Польська грушевськіана кінця XIX – початку XX ст.: постаті та ідеї* [Polish Hrushevsky studies at the end of XIX – beginning of XX centuries: personalities and ideas], in "Studia polsko-ukraińskie" [Polish-Ukrainian studies], Warszawa, 2016, № 3, s. 49-68.

² Тарас Романюк, Любор Нідерле і розвиток чеської славістики та археології у контексті українського національного поступу [Lyubor Niederle and the development of the Czech Slavic studies in the context of Ukrainian national development], in "Матеріали і дослідження з археології Прикарпаття і Волині" [Materials and research on archaeology of Transcarpathian and Volhynian regions], Львів, 2017, № 21, с. 50.

gave first results. The Czech scholars were approvingly commenting on the scientific level of the periodicals, headed by Lviv professor of Shevchenko Scientific Society, the articles of "The Notes of the SSS" in particular. As an example, a respected periodical in the Slavic circles "Český Časopis Historický" described unfavourable conditions for the development of the Ukrainian science in its native language within the Russian Empire and pointed out that despite all the obstacles, the task of the Ukrainian culture development was greatly accomplished by Lviv scientists, united by M. Hrushevsky at the SSS. An employee of Prague journal, a philologist and folklorist Jiří Polívka stated that even having less than modest finances, the journal thoroughly implemented its scientific program that justly deserved to be awarded the title of the Academy of Sciences. He emphasised on the importance of scientific publications of the SSS in promotion of the Ukrainian culture and scientific achievements.³

Following the development of "The Notes of the SSS", the Czech observers of the Ukrainian cultural life repeatedly noted that the periodical had exemplary bibliographical and scientific chronicle sections. The Czech colleagues wrote about that in their reviews⁴ as well as in the letters to the chief editor. For example, after receiving "The Notes of the SSS" as a present, the director of the Czech Ethnographic Museum, Lyubor Niederle, wrote to M. Hrushevsky: "I consider it to be my duty to express my genuine admiration for the excellent and rich scientific chronicles and bibliography in the "The Notes...". Nothing like this would appear in any magazine in the nearest future".⁵ The Polish, German and Russian reviewers, like their Czech colleagues, also appreciated the high quality of the periodicals

³ J. P. [Jiří Polívka], *Zprávy* [News], in "Český Časopis Historický" [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XI, Praha, 1905, s. 468–469.

⁴ For further details, see *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Ševčenko. Sv. XIII* [Notes of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Vol. XIII], in "Český Časopis Historický" [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook III, Praha, 1897, s. 122; František Pastrnek, [Review] *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Ševčenko* [Notes of the Shevchenko Scientific Society], in "Listy filologické" [Filological sheets], Yearbook XXVII, Praha, 1900, s. 308–310; J. P. [Jiří Polívka], *Zprávy* [News], in "Český Časopis Historický" [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XI, Praha, 1905, s. 468–469; *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Ševčenko. Roč. XV, Lvov 1906* [Notes of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Yearbook XV, Lvov 1906], in "Český Časopis Historický" [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XIV, Praha, 1908, s. 120; Ml. [Jan Máchal], [Review] *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Ševčenko. Roč. XXII, 1913* [Notes of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Yearbook XXII, 1913], in "Časopis českého museum" [The Journal of the Czech Museum], Yearbook LXXXVIII, Praha, 1914, s. 358–359.

⁵ Всеволод Наулко, *Листи Любора Нідерле до Михайла Грушевського* [Letters of

edited by M. Hrushevsky.⁶

The scientific works of M. Hrushevsky were mentioned by the representatives of the Czech scientific world after the publication of the first volume of "History of Ukraine-Rus" in 1898. The magazine "Český Časopis Historický" emphasised that M. Hrushevsky's book was written on a truly professional level and that it was the first thorough study of the early period of Ukrainian history.⁷ Even more exalted were the assessments of the Czech humanitarians expressed in the letters to the author. For example, while expressing gratitude for the gift, L. Niederle described the book as an "excellent"⁸ one.

Founded by L. Niederle, the Prague magazine "Věstník Slovanských Starožytosti", informed its readers about the appearance of the first volume of "History", written by M. Hrushevsky, and promised to publish a detailed review of the book.⁹ Interestingly, the editor of "Věstník" contacted the author himself with a request to choose a possible reviewer from the circle of his acquaintances.¹⁰ Following the advice of M. Hrushevsky, L. Niederle turned to the young student of the Lviv professor Myron Korduba. To please the author, L. Niederle agreed to publish a comprehensive review, written by M. Korduba in the Ukrainian language,¹¹ on the pages of his journal. M. Hrushevsky noticed this friendly gesture of the editorial board and in his review in the Prague journal, he pointed out "the progress that the editorial staff made, finally placed the Ukrainian language equally among

Lyubor Niederle to Mykhailo Hrushevsky], in "Український археографічний щорічник. Нова серія" [Ukrainian archeographic yearbook. New series], Київ, 2006, № 10/11, с. 632.

⁶ Віталій Тельвак, *Творча спадщина Михайла Грушевського в оцінках сучасників (кінець XIX – 30-ті роки XX століття)* [Creative heritage of Mykhailo Hrushevsky in assessments of his contemporaries (the end of 19th century – 30's of 20th century)], Київ–Дрогобич, 2008, с. 44–52.

⁷ *Zpráva* [News], in "Český Časopis Historický" [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook V, Praha, 1899, s. 392.

⁸ Всеволод Наулко, *op. cit.*, p. 635.

⁹ *Грушевський Мих. Історія України–Руси. Т. I. У Львові, 1898* [Hrushevsky Mykh., History of Ukraine-Rus. Vol. I. Lviv, 1898], in "Věstník Slovanských Starožytosti" [The Slavonic Antiquities Journal], Yearbook II, Praha, 1899, s. 54. The review was submitted without mentioning authorship.

¹⁰ See: Всеволод Наулко, *op. cit.*, p. 634–635.

¹¹ Мирон Кордуба, [Review] *Грушевський Михайло. Історія України–Руси. Т. 1. У Львові, 1898* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus, Vol. 1. Lviv, 1898], in "Věstník Slovanských Starožytosti" [The Slavonic Antiquities Journal], Yearbook II, Praha, 1899, s. 63–67.

other Slavic languages".¹²

In Western European and the Czech scientific circle, the real interest in the Lviv professor's work emerged with the first publication in German, called "History of the Ukrainian people", which was written by M. Hrushevsky. This work was, in fact, an authorised translation of the second Ukrainian edition of the first volume of "History of Ukraine-Rus". The Czech historians responded to the publication of this book with concise bibliographic notes.¹³ as well as with two informative reviews.

K. Kadlec, the professor at Karl University, wrote a profound, critical review on "The History of the Ukrainian People" for the Prague magazine "Sborník Věd Právních a Státních". In his review, K. Kadlec conducted a thorough analysis of the content of the work, demonstrating his profound knowledge of the subject. At the beginning of his review, the Czech researcher introduces the author to the readers. He stated that M. Hrushevsky remained an unknown scholar for the Czechs: "although he belongs to the most interesting and the most distinguished Slavic authors".¹⁴ Idealising to a certain extent the personality of M. Hrushevsky, the reviewer compared M. Hrushevsky's contribution to the development of the Ukrainian culture with the importance of František Palacký's contribution to the Czech culture. As K. Kadlec claims, M. Hrushevsky "...raised awareness among his people with the help of his scientific and journalistic activity. M. Hrushevsky proved that the Ukrainians have the right to be recognised as an independent nation, distinct from the Great Russians (the Velykorosy – the people, who inhabited the ethnic Russian lands in the Russian Empire)". It should be noted that since that review of K. Kadlec, such comparison of František Palacký and M. Hrushevsky, as well as their influence on their people, gained popularity in the Czech Hrushevsky studies.

¹² М. Г. [Михайло Грушевський], [Review] *Věstník slovanských starožitnosti...* [Věstník slovanských starožitnosti...], in "Записки НТШ" [Notes of the SSS], Yearbook XLII, Львів, 1901, с. 1-2.

¹³ Čeněk Zibrt, [Review] *Hruševikj Michael. Geschichte des Ukrainischen (Ruthenischen) Volkes. 1906* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky. History of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) people. 1906], in "Časopis Musea Království Českého" [The Journal of the Czech Kingdom Museum], Yearbook LXXX, Praha, 1906, s. 483-484.

¹⁴ Karel Kadlec, [Review] *Hruševskýj Mychajlo, Istorija Ukrainy-Rusy* (6. svazek, Lvov, 1907) a *Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes* (I sv. Lipsko, 1906) [Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus (6. vol, Lviv, 1907) and History of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) people (I vol., Lipsk, 1906)], s. 298.

K. Kadlec notes that "The History of the Ukrainian People" was essentially a significant contribution to the national revival. The Czech researcher paid particular attention to the introduction of the first volume, which outlines the conceptual foundations of the entire "History of Ukraine-Rus". The reviewer fully agrees with the basic theoretical foundations of the Ukrainian scientist, calling them "heretical"; as compared to those, who were generally accepted by the Slavic studies of that time. K. Kadlec considers the author's emphasis on the history of culture and socio-economic life to be an appropriate accent, which suggests the continuity of the historical process of the Ukrainian people that caused its independent political life only in the earliest period of its existence. According to K. Kadlec, M. Hrushevsky's statement about the heredity and continuity of the Ukrainian state tradition from the times of Kyiv Rus and the emphasis on the importance of the Old Rus heritage in the formation of Eastern European culture was especially courageous. Highly appreciating the scientific level of the work, the reviewer did not overlook its debatable points. For example, he observed the insufficient arguments of M. Hrushevsky's hypothesis on the Antes as direct ancestors of the Ukrainians, as well as the excessive confidence in its defence, which was rather dissonant given the general scarcity of the available historical sources to back it up.

The thorough review of the historian and publicist Jan Slavík in "Český Časopis Historický" was noticeably more critical towards the "History of the Ukrainian people". The reviewer begins with his credo concerning the very essence of the Ukrainian – or in the reviewer's terms – the "Little Russian" question. J. Slavík claims that he does not support those scholars who, "in the Great and Little Russians discussions, take an extremely negative position, most clearly manifested in Petro Valuev's (the Russian Minister during the 1860s) words: "there was no Ukrainian nation, there is no and there cannot be". Next, the reviewer admitted that "this part of the dispute, when the very existence of the Little Russians as a separate ethnographic unit was seriously questioned, is already left in the past. The Little Russian people exist and will always exist".¹⁵

At the same time, the Czech scholar raised the question of whether the nation had existed for a long time or was distinguished at the beginning of Slavic

¹⁵ Jan Slavík, [Review] *Hruševskýj Michael, Geschichte des ukrainischen (ruthenischen) Volkes. Leipzig: Teubner, 1906. I Band* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) people. Leipzig: Teubner, 1906. I vol.], in "Český Časopis Historický" [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XIV, Praha, 1908, s. 214.

history. Jan Slavik doubted Mr Hrushevsky's positive answers to these questions. The Ukrainian scientist's theses, as Jan Slavik emphasised, "are significantly different from our generally accepted view". Making clear the generally accepted view, the reviewer said: "for us, the Ukrainians [...] are the part of the Russian (ruského) tribe, the product of a secondary, special development, which the Russian (ruský) people made during the historic period mainly".¹⁶

Jan Slavik criticised M. Hrushevsky's Anti-Normanist theory, which was substantiated in a special appendix to the first volume. The reviewer himself called this appendix "a good review on the history of controversy", though J. Slavik admired the author's exhaustive analysis of the literature. At the same time, he said: "M. Hrushevsky's intention to undermine the Norman theory failed as well the efforts of his predecessors to undermine it. And the «Slavic» hypothesis about the origin of the Kyiv principality obviously lacks objectivity".¹⁷ It should be noted that the remarks mentioned above of the Czech historians on the first volume of "History of Ukraine-Rus" were generally typical of Western-European criticism on that book: The Polish, German and Romanian reviewers were almost unanimous in their assessments of M. Hrushevsky's historiographical approach.¹⁸

The debate around the first volume of "History of Ukraine-Rus" in German and the increasingly active work of Shevchenko Scientific Society brought respect and popularity to M. Hrushevsky among the Czech colleagues. They became more and more interested in his works written in Ukrainian. Most of the Czech researches were excited by volumes of the so-called "Cossack cycle" of "History of Ukraine-Rus". A review of the seventh volume, devoted to the study of an important issue of the genesis of the Ukrainian Cossacks, was written by J. Slavik, whom we mentioned above. He considered his critical response to be a continuation of the discussion initiated by the German review of the first work made by his Ukrainian colleague. In the introduction, the Czech scientist pointed out that M. Hrushevsky traced back the origins of the Ukrainian people to the beginnings

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 217.

¹⁸ Віталій Тельвак, *Перший том "Історії України-Руси" Михайла Грушевського в оцінках сучасників* [The first volume of "History of Ukraine-Rus" in assessments of his contemporaries], in "Історіографічні дослідження в Україні" [Historiographical research in Ukraine], Вип. 17, Київ, 2007, с. 16-38; Vitalii Telvak, Vasyl Illytskyi, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Nicolae Iorga: scholars' struggle over the national history*, in "Codrul Cosminului", Vol. XXIV, 2018, no. 1, p. 53-64.

of the ancient Rus state. The ethnonym “the Ukrainians”, as in reviews as mentioned earlier, was usually written in quotation marks. J. Slavik admitted that the peer-reviewed volume is better than the previous one in a range of aspects. “The research gets rid of prejudices”, the reviewer emphasised, “and it is not biased anymore. The presentations about the origin of the Cossacks are based on, I believe, convincing sources and, perhaps, I will not be mistaken if I say in advance that here we have for a long time the product of the main ...”.¹⁹

More accomplished and comprehensive reviews on the Cossack volume of “History of Ukraine-Rus” were published in two parts in Russian translation under the title “The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks”, in the magazine “Sbornik Věd Právních a Státních” by K. Kadlec. Having received these books as a gift from the author, the Czech scientist expressed his admiration for the scientific prolificacy of his Ukrainian counterpart: “I am your great debtor. My review of your «Kyiv Rus» has not come out yet, and I have already received the work of greater value”.²⁰

In the reviews on the Cossack volumes of “History of Ukraine-Rus”, which K. Kadlec called “the work of the whole life of Prof. Hrushevsky”, special attention was devoted to acquainting the Czech reader with the content richness of the research. The reviewer pointed at the diligence of the sources and literature by his Ukrainian colleague, and also emphasised his critical approach towards common myths and stereotypes. K. Kadlec noted a daring historiographical construction of the past of the Ukrainian Cossacks, the entirely original hypotheses concerning the origin and evolution of this social strata.²¹ A similar logic was marked by an overview of the second part of “The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks”: K. Kadlec

¹⁹ Jan Slavik, [Review] *Hruševskij Michajlo, Istorija ukrainskoj Kozaččini. T. I. do roku 1625. Kijev–Lvov, 1909* [Hrushevsky Mykhailo, The History of Ukrainian Cossack Era. Vol. I until 1625. Kyiv-Lviv, 1909], in “Český Časopis Historický” [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XVI, Praha, 1910, s. 335.

²⁰ Центральний державний історичний архів України у Києві [Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv] (**hereinafter ЦДІАУК**), Collection 1235, Entry 1, Case 508, Sheet 35.

²¹ K. K. [Karel Kadlec], [Review] *Грушевський М., Історія українського козацтва до єдинення з Московським государством. Том I. до начала XVII века...* [Hrushevsky M. The History of Ukrainian Cossacks until the merging with Moscow state. Vol. I. Until the beginning of XVII st...], in “Sbornik Věd Právních a Státních” [The Journal of legal and public sciences], Yearbook XIII, Praha, 1913, s. 442.

dedicated the majority of his text to an overview of the work.²² It should be noted that K. Kadlec's words of praise were similar to the Russian assessments of Hrushevsky's works on the Cossack's studies.²³ However, the Polish researchers of the Ukrainian Cossack studies were much more critical towards them.²⁴

The publications, dedicated to the commemoration of the decade of Hrushevsky's migration to Galicia (1904), were a peculiar achievement of the Czech Hrushevsky studies at the beginning of the 20th century. This event was the first commemoration on behalf of his contemporaries and became a turning point in the Ukrainian journalism as well as in the life of the Galician Ukrainians. In numerous publications, the professor was unanimously recognised as the leader in scientific and public life.

The Czech observers also shared such assessments of the importance of M. Hrushevsky's cultural work for the Galician Ukrainians. For example, in 1904 Rudolf Broz in his essay *The Awakening of Little Russian People* sincerely admired vitality and diversity of the national service of Lviv Professor: "The return to scientific work marked Rusyn revival in recent years. The breakthrough in Rus-Ukrainian thought led to the creation of the «Shevchenko Scientific Society» in Lviv, headed by M. Hrushevsky, the professor of history at Lviv University, who is a person of great knowledge, energy and endurance. M. Hrushevsky united all the Rusyns, who wanted to work for the revival of their people. With a pedagogical courtesy, he led young people to scientific work, and this group achieved great results, clearly under his leadership".²⁵

The students and friends of M. Hrushevsky presented to him the magnificently published volume of the scientific works.²⁶ This great gift to M. Hrushevsky once again attracted the attention of the Czech observers to the figure of the

²² К. К. [Karel Kadlec], [Review] *Грушевский М., История украинского козачества до соединения с Московским государством. Том II* [Hrushevsky M. The History of Ukrainian Cossacks until the merging with Moscow state. Vol. II], in "Sborník Věd Právních a Státních" [The Journal of legal and public sciences], Yearbook XV, Praha, 1915, s. 60.

²³ Віталій Тельвак, *Наукові погляди Михайла Грушевського...*, с. 42-52.

²⁴ Віталій Тельвак, *Польська грушевськіана...*, с. 52-53.

²⁵ Rudolf Brož, *Probuzení maloruského národa* [Awakened by the little-Russian nation], in "Slovansky Přehled" [Slavic review], Praha, 1904. Yearbook VI. S. 397.

²⁶ *Науковий Збірник присвячений професорови Михайлові Грушевському учениками і прихильниками з нагоди Його десятилітньої наукової праці в Галичині (1894-1904)* [Scientific Collection dedicated to professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky by his students and admirers to commemorate the anniversary of his scientific activity in Galicia (1894-1904)], Львів, 1906.

Ukrainian scientific life leader. Recognising the emergence of the “Scientific Collection”, the Czech observers noted that the output of such a magnificent book indicated that: “M. Hrushevsky has a respectful academic school around him”.²⁷

The anniversary mentioned above and the publication of the “Scientific Collection” gave impact to the presentation of M. Hrushevsky to the Czech audience in the Prague journal “Slovansky Přehled”. K. Kadlec was the one to represent the versatile personality of M. Hrushevsky on the journal’s pages.²⁸ According to the Czech scholar, his Ukrainian colleague: “...belongs to the most prolific and most profound Slavic scholars”.

In 1911 M. Hrushevsky was elected a member of the Czech Academy of Sciences. This fact of being elected was the recognition of M. Hrushevsky's achievements in the study of the history and culture of the Slavic peoples by the Czech academic community. K. Kadlec firstly reported the event.²⁹ The author of “The History of Ukraine-Rus”, and both his relatives and colleagues treated this news with a significant upsurge as evidence of the recognition of many years of the scientific work and considerable efforts to popularise the achievements of modern Ukrainianity. However, the joy turned out to be premature, as the political intrigues intervened: due to the imperial status of the Academy, the approval of this appointment had to be made by the Emperor. But it was delayed. In the last pre-war years, the opposition to the Ukrainian movement, the Polish journalism, consistently created the image of M. Hrushevsky as a separatist, which made the choice of the Czech academic community completely vetoed.

As a compensation for this refusal, the Czech intellectuals elected M. Hrushevsky a member of the oldest scientific institution – the Czech Scientific Society, which did not need any governmental approval for its choices. The initiator of this election, L. Niederle, informed the Ukrainian scientist in his letter of January 8, 1914: “I have the honour to inform you that the Czech Scientific Society (Česká královská společnost nauk) elected you yesterday as a foreign member, taking into account your enormous and outstanding activity in the

²⁷ *Na oslavu desítiletého působení ... Michala Hruševského ve Lvově* [Lvové Commemoration of 10 years' anniversary ... of Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Lviv], in “Český Časopis Historický” [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XIV, Praha, 1906, s. 503–504; *Rozhledy a správy* [Perspectives and news], in “Slovansky Přehled” [Slavic review], Yearbook VIII, Praha, 1906, s. 338–339.

²⁸ Karel Kadlec, *Mychajlo Hruševskýj* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky], in “Slovansky Přehled” [Slavic review], Yearbook XI, Praha, 1909, s. 163–167.

²⁹ *ЦДІАУК*, Collection 1235, Entry 1, Case 508, Sheet 32.

Slavic science”.³⁰ Later, M. Hrushevsky received an official announcement signed by Joseph Zubatý, in which he said: “The Royal Scientific Society of the Czech Republic, recognising your merits to science, has decided to elect you as our current member”.³¹

AMID WAR AND UPRISING

The rapid events of World War I and the Ukrainian Uprising complicated the scientific communication to a great extent, and the decline in the intensity of the scientific work by M. Hrushevsky, his exile to the Russian hinterland, and subsequently an active immersion in the creation of the state as the chairman of the Central Rada influenced the reception of his works in all national historical schools, including the Czech one. However, the individual works of the Ukrainian scientist, which appeared in the Czech book collections, certainly became the subject of discussion. Thus, on the pages of the magazine “Český Časopis Historický”, the popular science publications of M. Hrushevsky were noted, despite the complicated scientific communication.³²

It should be noted that during the war some popular essays by M. Hrushevsky were translated into Czech, some of them were treated with curiosity by critics. In 1918 in Prague, the Czech translation of “Ukraine and the Ukrainians” was published³³. The following year in the series “Discover Ukraine” there was published the collection of historical and journalistic articles “Ukraine and Russia”³⁴. Traditionally, the Czech observers have been upholding the scientific and literary features of the reprinted books, emphasising that new editions, exempted from the censorship, had a larger number of carefully collected and talentedly interpreted materials about the Ukrainian national movement from the middle of the nineteenth century to the times of the Central Rada.³⁵

³⁰ Всеволод Наулко, *Листи Любора Нідерле до Михайла Грушевського* [Letters of Lyubor Niederle to Mykhailo Hrushevsky], c. 638.

³¹ ЦДІАУК, Collection 1235, Entry 1, Case 29, Sheet 46.

³² *Zprávy* [News], in “Český Časopis Historický” [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XXV, Praha, 1919, s. 156.

³³ Mychajlo Hruševskýj, *Ukrajina a Ukrajinci* [Ukraine and Ukrainians], Praha, 1918.

³⁴ Mychajlo Hruševskýj, *Ukrajina a Rusko* [Ukraine and Russia], Praha, 1919.

³⁵ For further details, please refer to: V. Brtník, [Review] *M. Hruševskýj, Ukrajina a Ukrajinci. Praha, 1918* [M. Hrushevsky, Ukraine and Ukrainians. Prag, 1918], in “Lipa” [Linden], Praha, 1917/1918, № 1, s. 799–800.

Being the head of the Central Rada, M. Hrushevsky had an opportunity to get closer to Tomas Masaryk, who, from May 1917 to March 1918, was in a revolutionary Russia, and, in particular, for more than four months in Ukraine, in Kyiv. Along with the formation of the Czech-Slovak Legion from the captivated soldiers and officers, T. Masaryk conducted active social and political activities, cooperated with the activists of the Ukrainian Central Rada and the Ukrainian Republic: M. Hrushevsky, V. Vynnychenko, S. Petliura, O. Shulgin, actively spoke on the political goals. There was signed an agreement between the Central Rada and the National Council of Czechoslovakia on the legalisation of the Czechoslovak regiment placement on the territory of Ukraine – the status of the legion was defined as extraterritorial, and the Ukrainian government granted it weapons.

However, the leaders of the Ukrainian and Czech liberation movements had different points of view on the foreign policy guidelines: M. Hrushevsky sought for assistance from Germany against the Bolshevik forces; Instead, T. Masaryk advocated for a strong united Russia, in which the Ukrainians would only have broad autonomy. In the end, these differences did not influence the good relationship between the two intellectuals in subsequent years, which was important for the fate of many exiled Ukrainians during the interwar period.

EMIGRATION

After the defeat of the Central Rada, M. Hrushevsky was forced to leave Ukraine in April 1919. Together with his family, he travelled to Prague. In the Czech capital, M. Hrushevsky met with T. Masaryk several times, as well as with Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Stepanko and a well-known English publicist Seton-Watson. Nowadays the content of these talks is known from the records of the Czech President.³⁶ According to these notes, the Ukrainian colleague raised the question of supporting the idea of an independent Ukraine on behalf of the victorious states. However, the interlocutors unanimously pointed at the complete desperateness of such hopes. The records state that T. Masaryk, understanding the complexity of M. Hrushevsky's migration between countries of Western Europe with documents of the non-existent state (the Ukrainian Repub-

³⁶ *Інститут Рукопису Національної бібліотеки України імені Володимира Вернадського* [Volodymyr Vernadsky Institute of the Manuscript of the National Library of Ukraine], Collection 357, № 64, Sheet 1.

lic), informed the Ukrainian colleague about the decision to grant him, if necessary, a diplomatic passport.³⁷

M. Hrushevsky made a trip to other countries of Western Europe, hoping, in vain, to find support for his political projects. Considering such a desperate situation, the scientist soon abandoned political activity and began to look for opportunities to resume systematic scientific work. He connected his scientific plans with the establishment of the Ukrainian Sociological Institute (hereinafter – USI), which was relocated to Prague from Geneva in April 1920. While building the structure of the USI, its founder paid a lot of attention to the establishment of its own publishing house. Later the Institute achieved the greatest success, particularly in publishing. The publication of M. Hrushevsky's works in European languages, within the framework of the USSR publishing activity, revived the discussion of his creative ideas in the environment of Western European and Czech intellectuals. Also, after Czechoslovakia won the state independence, the Czech colleagues of M. Hrushevsky restored the Ukrainian scientist's membership in the Czech Academy of Sciences and Arts at the end of 1919.

Among the published books of USI, there were a few works of M. Hrushevsky, and the Czech Slavic periodicals noted their publication. The observers pointed at the importance of Institute in promotion of the achievements of the Ukrainian culture and science in European languages. This fact was a significant recognition, taking into account the decay of the Ukrainian cultural life in Soviet Ukraine and the difficulty in restoring its normal rhythm in Galicia. For example, K. Kadlec wrote a review on the French-language essay of Ukrainian history by M. Hrushevsky.³⁸

J. Bidlo noted the appearance of the next Ukrainian reprint of “Illustrated History of Ukraine” on the pages of “Český Časopis Historický”. Paying attention to the content value of the study, the reviewer pointed out that the new edition differed from the previous one. M. Hrushevsky, as an active participant of the mentioned events, presented the unknown history of the Ukrainian Uprising in the last section of the book. As J. Bidlo wrote: “The book of Hrushevsky is among

³⁷ *Листування Михайла Грушевського* [The correspondence of Mykhaylo Hrushevsky], т. 1, Київ – Нью-Йорк – Париж – Львів – Торонто, 1997, с. 257.

³⁸ K. K. [Karel Kadlec], [Review] *Hrushevsky, Abrégé de L'histoire de L'Ukraine. Paris, Genève, Prague 1920* [Hrushevsky, An essay on Ukrainian history. Paris, Genève, Prague 1920], in “Sborník Věd Právních a Státních” [The Journal of legal and public sciences], Yearbook XX, Praha, 1920, s. 296-297.

the best works in the aspect of the professional research”.³⁹ It is interesting to note, that the Ukrainian reviewers of the book mentioned above, written by M. Hrushevsky, were much more critical than their Czech colleagues, claiming that M. Hrushevsky highlighted the events of the Ukrainian Uprising from his political party point of view⁴⁰.

THE LAST DECADE

M. Hrushevsky faced numerous difficulties of an economic and personal character in the organisation of the scientific work in emigration. Those difficulties made him think of the idea of returning to Ukraine, where the Soviet government had already firmly established its authority. Thus, when the Kyiv Communists, aiming at splitting the Ukrainian emigration in Western Europe, offered M. Hrushevsky the title of the academician and provided guarantees of personal security, he decided to return to Ukraine in March 1924.

Those were the significant results in the scientific and organisational work of a newly elected academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (hereinafter – UAS) that attracted the attention of the Czech researchers one more time. In particular, the Czech colleagues were impressed by how “Nestor of Ukrainian history”, as he was referred to by one of the Czech observers, established a wide publishing activity, which quickly brought visible results⁴¹.

The Czech observers were contented with the restoration of M. Hrushevsky’s magazine “Ukraine” – according to their unanimous assessment – the most outstanding publication of the Ukrainian studies. For example, in reviewing the

³⁹ J. B. [Jaroslav Bidlo], *Zprávy* [News], in “Český Časopis Historický” [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XXV, Praha, 1919, s. 156.

⁴⁰ Віталій Тельвак, *Творча спадщина Михайла Грушевського...*, с. 215.

⁴¹ For further details, see A. F., [Review] *Науковий збірник за рік 1925. Том XX під редакцією голови історичної секції Всеукраїнської Академії Наук Михайла Грушевського* [Scientific collection for 1925. Volume XX edited by the head of historical section of All-Ukrainian Academy of Science of Mykhailo Hrushevsky], in “Slovanský Přehled” [Slavic review], Yearbook XVIII, Praha, 1926, s. 643; *Zprávy* [News], in “Český Časopis Historický” [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XXXIII, Praha, 1927, s. 677; *Zprávy* [News], in “Český Časopis Historický” [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XXXV, Praha, 1929, s. 224; V. Charvat, [Review] *За сто літ. Матеріали з громадського і літературного життя України XIX і початків XX століття, за редакцією академіка Михайла Грушевського. Р. 1928* [In one hundred years. Materials from civic and literary life of Ukraine. 1928], in “Slovanský Přehled” [Slavic review], Yearbook XXI, Praha, 1929, s. 142–143.

first issues of the revived "Ukraine", J. Bidlo drew attention to the difficult conditions in which the Ukrainian scientist had to realise his creative plans in the Soviet state. Therefore, the peer-reviewed publication is believed by the Czech observer to be a clear testimony to M. Hrushevsky's thorough organisational talent.⁴² The Ukrainian reviewers in emigration had similar assessments, while Marxist reviewers in the Soviet state sternly criticised the publishing work of M. Hrushevsky.⁴³

Particular attention was paid to the contributions of M. Hrushevsky to the investigations of the Czech-Ukrainian cultural relations. The scholar's "Influences of the Czech national movement of the 15th century on the Ukrainian life and culture, as a problem of experimentation. A few notes", which were prepared by the author during the work on the fifth volume of "History of Ukrainian Literature", were especially warmly welcomed by the Czech critics.⁴⁴ Its content was introduced to readers of the magazine "Slovanský Přehled" by a well-known journalist and politician Vincent Charvat. First of all, he emphasised the importance of the appearance of "this short but extremely interesting studio of the most prominent Ukrainian historian, since M. Hrushevsky's more voluminous work is inaccessible to wider circles of the Ukrainian and Slavic public".⁴⁵ The Ukrainian researcher provided a significant amount of the material about the Czech influence in Ukraine and Belarus in the 14th and 15th centuries, as well as systematised views of the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian scholars on this issue and "clearly, briefly described the penetration of the Czech culture to the Eastern Europe in the late 14th and

⁴² Jaroslav Bidlo, [Review] *Ukraina, naukovyj tr'õchmisjačnyk ukraïnoznavstva za rok 1924* [Ukraine, scientific three month review of Ukrainian studies for 1924], in "Časopis národního musea" [The Journal of the National Museum], Yearbook XCIX, Praha, 1925, s. 83-87.

⁴³ Віталій Тельвак, *Творча спадщина Михайла Грушевського...*, с. 251.

⁴⁴ Михайло Грушевський, *Впливи чеського національного руху XIV–XV вв. в українськiм життiю i творчостi, як проблема дослiду. Кiлька замiток i дезидерат* [Influences of Czech national movement in 14th – 15th centuries in Ukrainian life and art as a problem of experience. Some notes and desiderata], in "Записки НТШ" [Notes of the SSS], Т. CLI–CLIII, Львiв, 1925, с. 1-13.

⁴⁵ V. Charvat, [Review] *Михайло Грушевський: Впливи чеського національного руху XIV–XV вв. в українськiм життiю i творчостi, як проблема дослiду. Кiлька замiток i дезидерат* [Influences of Czech national movement in 14th – 15th centuries in Ukrainian life and art as a problem of experience. Some notes and desiderata], in "Slovanský Přehled" [Slavic review], Yearbook XIX, Praha, 1927, s. 546.

early 15th century where it was significantly spread in the Polish administrative and church circles”.

The Czech critics met the continuation of M. Hrushevsky's work on “The History of Ukraine-Rus” with numerous reviews. On the pages of the Prague “Časopis národního musea”, the two parts of the ninth volume were immediately reviewed by J. Bidlo, an old friend of the Ukrainian Scientist. Describing M. Hrushevsky as “the indefatigable and fruitful creator of modern historiography (and to a large extent, the uprising history) of Ukraine or, better, of the Ukrainian people”, the reviewer emphasised the importance of continuing the immense scientific activity after returning from the emigration.⁴⁶

Quoting excerpts from the work of M. Hrushevsky, the observer drew attention to the conceptual aspects of the work in question, fully agreeing with the author. J. Bidlo provided numerous examples that illustrated the originality of the author's approach in solving many scientific problems, demonstrated his unbridled erudition and professional skills in the analysis of different sources and significant historiographical literature. The reviewer also noted the stylistic skills of the author, arguing that the artistic value of “History of Ukraine-Rus” is steadily increasing so much that: “in the latter one can see the skills of a virtuoso writer”.

Alongside with the review of J. Bidlo, the newspaper “Prager Presse”, an informal speaker of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, also responded with the review of the “The Rise and Decline of Ukraine”. The ninth volume was called a new brick, which M. Hrushevsky put into the structure of a holistic synthesis of the Ukrainian history that he had been building for decades. The reviewer emphasised the significance of the events described in the new work not only from a historical point of view, since the last years of Khmelnytsky were marked by a powerful upsurge of the Ukrainian struggle for independence, but also given their social resonance – the resemblance with the recent Ukrainian Independence Uprising of one of the largest Slavic peoples. Considering the solid historiographic tradition of the Cossack era in the writings of the Ukrainian, the Polish and the Russian researchers, M. Hrushevsky managed to express his significant and original concept not only in the source-related aspect (involving a huge

⁴⁶ Jaroslav Bidlo, [Review] *Mychajlo Hruševs'kyj, Istorija Ukraïny-Rusy. Tomu devjatoho perša polovyna (Chmelnyččyny roky 1650–1653)... – Tomu devjatoho druha polovyna (Chmelnyččyny roky 1654–1657)...* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky. History of Ukraine-Rus. The first half of the ninth volume (years of Khmelnytsky Era 1654 – 1657) ... – The second half of the ninth volume (years of Khmelnytsky Era 1654 – 1657)], in “Časopis národního musea” [The Journal of the National Museum], Yearbook CV, Praha, 1931, s. 130–131.

number of newly discovered documents) but also in an attempt to reconsider largely mythologised historical facts and personalities by the previous tradition.⁴⁷ The Polish historians in their reviews supported the views of their Czech colleagues on the ninth volume, which was the evidence of normalisation of the Polish-Ukrainian historiographical dialogue. However, the Soviet reviewers presented nothing but ungrounded criticism.⁴⁸

In the second half of the 1920-is another multivolume studio of M. Hrushevsky "The History of Ukrainian Literature" was in the public eye of the Czech observers. This work, although special reviews did not mark it, was repeatedly mentioned on the pages of the Czech scientific journals when reviewing the novelties of the Ukrainian science. In these reviews, "The History of Ukrainian Literature" was unanimously attested to as a fundamental synthetic work – the organic addition to "History of Ukraine-Rus".⁴⁹

A peculiar result in the perception of M. Hrushevsky by his contemporaries was the widespread celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of his birthday and the fortieth anniversary of the scientific and organisational activity in 1926. Among many letters addressed to Hrushevsky, there were also the congratulations from his Czech counterparts. M. Hrushevsky received the congratulations from the President of the Czech Academy of Sciences J. Zubaty⁵⁰, and from the Czech Scientific Society, signed by J. Polivka and J. Yanko. Also, on behalf of the Historical Society in Prague Vaclav Novotny congratulated the famous historian and a leader of the fraternal people. In its turn, under the signature of Matviy Murko, the editorial office of the philological magazine "Slavia" congratulated the "Honoured historian of Ukraine" prof. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who enriched the Slavic philology with his cultural-historical and literary-historical works".⁵¹

Responding to the celebration of M. Hrushevsky's anniversary, his Czech friends also informed the country about it. The pages of the "Prager Presse" presented a letter, written by J. Bidlo, printed with a portrait of M. Hrushevsky. In this

⁴⁷ М. Н., *Der Ukraine Glanz und Niedergang (M.Hruševs'kyj: Geschichte der Ukraine)* [Rise and Fall of Ukraine (M. Hrushevsky; The History of Ukraine)], in "Prager Presse" [Prager Presse], Praha, 1931, № 99, s. 8.

⁴⁸ Віталій Тельвак, *Творча спадщина Михайла Грушевського...*, с. 322-325; 337-341.

⁴⁹ For further details, see *Zprávy* [News], in "Český Časopis Historický" [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XXXIII, Praha, 1927, s. 677.

⁵⁰ *Ювілей академіка М.С.Грушевського. 1866–1926. I. Ювілейні засідання. II. Привітання* [The Anniversary of M. Hrushevsky. 1866 – 1926. I Anniversary sessions. II. Greeting], Київ, 1927, с. 138.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

essay, for the first time in the Czech literature, the rich scientific, literary and political activities of the scientist were thoroughly characterised. Turning to the public activity of M. Hrushevsky for his people, J. Bidlo pointed at the immutability of his progressive aspirations, which allowed the author to notice the similarity of M. Hrushevsky with another prominent Czech, T. Masaryk.

The Czech Slavic magazine "Slovanský Přehled" also responded with an informative article on the anniversary of M. Hrushevsky. The author of the essay, a philosopher-ukrainist František Tichý, accurately stated that after the death of Lesia Ukrainka and Ivan Franko, it was M. Hrushevsky, who became "an indisputable spiritual mentor of a cultural Ukraine". Briefly depicting the life and a creative path of the scientist, he called him "one of the most outstanding and the most prominent representatives of the modern Slavs", the Czech researcher investigated the Lviv period in detail, as at that time the scientist launched a "worthwhile surprise of diverse activities".⁵² F. Tichý described the "History of Ukraine-Rus" as an epoch-making work, which, together with a productive scientific and organisational work, gave M. Hrushevsky an honoured place in the pantheon of European science.

The relationship between M. Hrushevsky and his Czech counterparts were violently interrupted by Stalin's repressions against the Ukrainian science and one of its leaders, which unfolded at the turn of the 1920-es and 1930-es. From 1931, the scientist was in an "honourable" exile in Moscow. In autumn of 1934, he and his family left for vacation to Kislovodsk, where he fell ill with carbuncles and died, during the unsuccessful surgical operation, on November 24.

HONOURING MEMORY

The premature death of M. Hrushevsky was perceived by the scientific community with great concern, in particular, by his Czech counterparts and became the reason for "an outburst" of the publications about the scientist. The first information about the tragic news from Kislovodsk was sent to the Czech audience by the Prague Radio on November 26, 1934, and the evening newspapers circulated this news. The next day, obituaries appeared in the authoritative Prague newspaper "Lidové noviny"⁵³ and other editions. In these writings, M. Hrushevsky was

⁵² František Tichý, *Michajlo Hrušovskýj* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky], in "Slovanský Přehled" [Slavic review], Yearbook XVIII, Praha, 1926, s. 643.

⁵³ Dr. V. V., *Michajlo Hrušovskýj zemřel* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky was dead], in "Lidové noviny" [People's News], Praha, 1934, 27 listopada, s. 4.

portrayed as a true patriarch of the Ukrainian culture and science; he was compared with František Palacký, a great Czech personality.

In Czechoslovakia, during the interwar period, there lived the largest Ukrainian cultural emigration among the countries of Western Europe, whose representatives responded to the death of M. Hrushevsky by numerous memorials. Occasionally, the Czech officials and scientists also took part in them. Thus, at the commemoration of M. Hrushevsky, Professor Janko, who arranged an international committee in the Czechoslovak Republic on December 29, 1934, in Prague at the Gusovy Dom, delivered a speech on behalf of the Czech Academy of Sciences together with the leaders of the Ukrainian institutions.⁵⁴ Apart from this, on January 20, 1935, the Czechoslovak Ukrainian Association organised the commemoration event in the concert hall of the Masaryk Studio House in Brno, which was attended by the city officials, the rectors of the Masaryk University and the Forest Academy, the representatives of the Czechoslovak-Russian and Czechoslovak-Bulgarian unions.⁵⁵ On January 27, 1935, the Ukrainian Academic Committee organised the commemoration event at Karl University, where J. Bidlo complemented the speeches of the Ukrainian representatives with his memories of the deceased.

Along with the daily press, the academic journals also reacted to the death of M. Hrushevsky with the memorial notes. In the obituary on the pages of the Prague “Český Časopis Historický” Z. Hájek called M. Hrushevsky the most prominent Ukrainian scholar and a public figure, whose influence reached far beyond the borders of his Motherland: “His works had a tremendous pivotal significance, as well as the Ukrainian national movement was largely under his influence”.⁵⁶

J. Slavik responded to the death of M. Hrushevsky with a brief obituary note on the pages of the “Slovanský Přehled” magazine. By referring an interested reader to the previous reports about the Ukrainian scientist that appeared in the journal during the past decades, the Czech scientist summarised the achievements of the Soviet decade of the Kyiv academician’s life. Speaking about the persecution of M. Hrushevsky by the communist authorities, J. Slavik accurately noted: “The

⁵⁴ М.-н., *Поминки по Михайлі Грушевськім у Празі* [The Wake of Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Prague], in “Діло” [Business], Львів, 1935, № 7, с. 3-4.

⁵⁵ *Свято в пам’ять акад. Михайла Грушевського у Брні* [The memorial event to commemorate Mykhailo Hrushevsky in Brno], in “Діло” [Business], Львів, 1935, № 7, с. 4-5.

⁵⁶ Z. H. [Z. Hájek], *Zprávy* [News], in “Český Časopis Historický” [The Czech Historical Review], Yearbook XL, Praha, 1934, s. 671.

fate of M. Hrushevsky during the World War, when he became a victim of the tsarist government, repeated in the worst form".⁵⁷

Another vast obituary on the death of M. Hrushevsky was written on the pages of the Prague "Slavische Rundschau" by an old friend of the deceased J. Bidlo. In the beginning, the Czech scholar noted with dismay that instead of the anniversary article about the seventy years' jubilee of M. Hrushevsky, he was forced to write an obituary on M. Hrushevsky's premature death, which became "an irreparable loss to the whole historical science". Schematically outlining the main facts of the biography of a Ukrainian colleague, the author focuses on the characterisation of his creative heritage, calling it a fundamental one.

J. Bidlo was the first among the non-Ukrainian authors, who also wrote a general work, devoted to the life and activity of M. Hrushevsky, which was published by a separate booklet in Prague in 1935. The Czech scientist, having reacted with plenty reviews on the main works of the scholar, was well acquainted with the circumstances of the activity of his Ukrainian colleague during different periods of his life, and the long-standing correspondence with M. Hrushevsky made him aware of numerous unknown facts of his biography.⁵⁸

The Ukrainian, the Polish, the German and the French reviewers fully shared the evaluations of the Czech intellectuals.⁵⁹ Instead, the Soviet historians were forced to silence this tragic event by the party leadership.

CONCLUSIONS

Summing up the Czech Hrushevsky studies of the first third of the twentieth century, we draw attention to a certain symbolism of the favoured by Czech intellectuals' comparison of Mykhailo Hrushevsky to František Palacký. They pointed out that both scholars played a similar role in the development of their nations. It was Hrushevsky who, through his numerous works, in which he skilfully united the love for his people and positivist objectivity, introduced Ukraine and the Ukrainians to the world.

In comparison with the emotionality of the reports of the Polish and the Russian observers of the Ukrainian scientist activities, the Czech assessments of the various M. Hrushevsky's works were in an overall objective and, in general, quite favourable. The absence of mutual historical conflicts, the similarity

⁵⁷ Jan Slavík, *Michajlo Hruševskýj* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky], in "Slovanský Přehled" [Slavic review], Yearbook XXVI, Praha, 1934, s. 311.

⁵⁸ Jaroslav Bidlo, *Michal Hruševs'kyj* [Mykhailo Hrushevsky], Praha, 1935.

⁵⁹ Віталій Тельвак, *Творча спадщина Михайла Грушевського...*, с. 356-405.

of the experience of a foreign oppression, the traditionally strong Czech-Ukrainian cultural relations, the personal friendships between the scientist and the foremost representatives of the scientific world of Bohemia created a favourable atmosphere for building a fully-fledged international historiographical dialogue, not burdened with the imperial heritage or mutual claims, as in case with Russia or Poland. In this dialogue, M. Hrushevsky played a leading role on the Ukrainian side.

Finally, we would like to state the richness of the reconstructed Czech Hrushevsky studies. The research could be continued in various chronological and thematic aspects, e.g. the clarification of the features of M. Hrushevsky's reception in the Czech Slavic studies (the second half of the 20th century – the beginning of the 21st century), integration of the Czech-Ukrainian intellectual relationships and visions, etc.

POLISH RESEARCH ON BUKOVINA

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Abstract: *The article is dedicated to the presentation of Polish historical, ethnological, linguistic and sociological, generally interdisciplinary scientific research of the Bukovina region, separated from Moldova after 1774. For political reasons, these studies could start as fully professional, after the fall of communism, when obstacles to accessing Romanian and Ukrainian archives and travelling from Poland to both sides of Bukovina disappeared. The article describes the reasons for Poles' interest in Bukovina, which results from the multiculturalism of the region and the phenomenon of tolerance. The starting point for the research was the Polish minority in Bukovina, which migrated to this region like other ethnic groups after 1774. Currently, the topics best approached by Poles are referring to the dialect of Poles in Bukovina, the culture and identity of the Polish Highlanders in Romanian Bukovina and re-migration from Bukovina in Poland, migration and political history of Poles in Bukovina. The folklore festivals in Jastrowie, Poland and the "Polish Culture Days" in Suceava, Romania also play an important role in the research of Bukovina by Poles. Unfortunately, there is little professional Polish research on problems not related to the Polish minority.*

Keywords: *Polish research, Borderlands, Bukovina, Poles, Historiography, Romania, Ukraine.*

Rezumat: *Cercetări poloneze despre Bucovina.* Articolul este dedicat prezentării cercetărilor istorice, etnologice, lingvistice și sociologice poloneze, în general interdisciplinare, științifice din regiunea Bucovinei, despărțite de Moldova după 1774. Din motive politice, aceste studii ar fi putut începe într-un mod profesionist, după căderea din comunismul, atunci când dispăruseră obstacolele în accesarea arhivelor românești și ucrainene și în călătoria din Polonia către ambele părți ale Bucovinei. Articolul descrie motivele interesului polonezilor pentru Bucovina, care rezultă din multiculturalitatea regiunii și fenomenul de toleranță. Punctul de plecare al cercetării l-a reprezentat minoritatea poloneză din Bucovina, care a migrat în această regiune, asemenea altor grupuri

etnice, după 1774. În prezent, subiectele cele mai bine abordate de polonezi se referă la dialectul polonezilor din Bucovina, cultura și identitatea polonezului muntean din Bucovina română și re-migranții din Bucovina în Polonia, migrația și istoria politică a polonezilor din Bucovina. De asemenea, un rol important în cercetarea Bucovinei de către polonezi îl au festivalurile de folclor din Jastrowie, Polonia și „Zilele Culturii Polone” din Suceava, România. Din păcate, există puține cercetări profesionale poloneze cu privire la problemele care nu au legătură cu minoritatea poloneză.

Résumé : Recherches polonaises sur la Bucovine. On dédia l'article ci-joint à la présentation des recherches historiques, ethnologiques, linguistiques et sociologiques polonaises, en général interdisciplinaires scientifiques de la région de la Bucovine, séparée de la Moldavie après 1774. Par raisons politiques, ces études auraient pu commencer de manière professionnelle, après la chute du communisme, lorsque les obstacles concernant l'accès aux archives roumaines et ukrainiennes se sont évanouis et apparut la possibilité de voyager de Pologne vers les deux parties de la Bucovine. L'article ci-joint décrit les motifs de l'intérêt polonais pour la Bucovine, qui résulte de la multi culturalité de la région et le phénomène de tolérance. La minorité polonaise, qui migra dans cette région, semblable aux autres groupes ethniques, après 1774, représenta le point de départ de la recherche ci-jointe. De nos jours, les sujets les mieux abordés par les Polonais font référence au dialecte polonais de la Bucovine, la culture et l'identité du Polonais montagnard de la Bucovine roumaine et les re-migrants de la Bucovine en Pologne, la migration et l'histoire politique des Polonais de la Bucovine. De plus, les festivals de folklore de Jastrowie, Pologne et "Les Jours de la Culture Polonaise" de Suceava, Roumanie jouent un rôle important dans les recherches des Polonais sur la Bucovine. Malheureusement, il y a peu de recherches professionnelles polonaises concernant les problèmes qui n'ont pas liaison avec la minorité polonaise.

INTRODUCTION

Why Bukovina?

Not only in Poland, but in other countries the borderland issue often had and has an emotional dimension, due to its association with the border conflicts. That is why in many publications about these areas, the political and nationality problems dominated. Frequently, it was rather about justifying the historical or ethnographic rights to such a border territory. An example is Upper Silesia, the historical Polish-Czech-German borderland, which in the past was the subject of sharp disputes between Poland, Germany, and the Czech State. It was also reflected in the literature and played a propaganda role. Unfortunately, until 1989

most of the historians focused on the study of national, political and border conflicts. However, the borderlands are areas where the geographical, historical and political boundaries meet, and the nations, ethnic groups, cultures, languages, religions collide and penetrate each other. Therefore, the borderlands can be a subject of not only historical but also interdisciplinary research. A diverse view on social, political and cultural processes in the borderlands was proposed in Poland before 1989 by Stanisław Ossowski (1897-1963) and Józef Chlebowczyk (1924-1985), but many years had to pass before they were appreciated.¹

Bukovina was and is also a borderland, a mosaic of languages, cultures, religions, and nationalities. Perhaps in many respects, it is more complicated than Upper Silesia. As it turns out, it is also the subject of research of Polish scientists. Why? Apart from the fact that Bukovina is a beautiful tourist region with painted monasteries unknown in Poland, perhaps the answer to this question lies in its past. Compared to the majority of borderlands in Poland, especially Upper Silesia or former Galicia, there were fewer ethnic conflicts in Bukovina and many researchers and tourists from Poland associate it with tolerance. Also, most Poles live in Poland in national, uniform areas, hence the Bukovina mosaic is still attractive to them. For tourists, it is also like a living open-air museum of the multicultural past, which in Poland ended after World War II, as a result of changing the state borders. For the Polish historians, Bukovina was a part of the former Duchy of Moldavia, which from the fourteenth century bordered the Polish Kingdom.

Another factor of historical relevance is the interwar Polish-Romanian alliance and the fact that no territorial disputes between these two countries were recorded after 1918. In Bukovina, a Polish minority lives today, some of whose families left for Poland as re-migrants after World War II. This reality also aroused interest, but it was only the fall of communism in 1989 that enabled Poland and Poles to contact this group and Romania in general. Moreover, there were no sharp Polish-German (Upper Silesia) or Polish-Ukrainian (Galicia) conflicts in Bukovina, and this fact was also important for the Polish researchers. Finally, the year 1989 allowed new research on Bukovina without censorship and political problems. Romanian and Ukrainian borders and archives became accessible for the Poles. The possibility for Polish scientists to confront

¹ See Stanisław Ossowski, *O ojczyźnie i narodzie* [About Homeland and Nation], Warszawa, 1984; Józef Chlebowczyk, *On small and young nations in Europe. Nation-forming processes in ethnic borderlands in East - Central Europe*, Wrocław, 1980.

experiences from border research in Poland could be used in Bukovina. There is also a group of Polish researchers who have Bukovinian roots and study this region because of their sentiments.

Of course, the Poles were still mainly interested in the Polish minority in Bukovina. Research groups and students can come to Bukovina without any problems, although the road is long and complicated. It was also important that Poles in Bukovina in the 90s still lived in certain isolation; there was little migration so that their culture was as if preserved. There was also an older generation who remembered the pre-war times. We can say that this was an ideal situation for the research.

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS UNTIL 1989

Until 1918, the Poles wrote about Bukovina – mostly about the Polish inhabitants – because this region was close to Galicia, the land that also belonged to Austria after the liquidation of the Polish State by three powers: Russia, Prussia, and Austria, finally in 1795.² Poles came to Bukovina like many other nationalities from the end of the 18th century. There were three main groups: the first – miners from around Krakow to build a salt mine in Cacica. The second – so-called Czadca (Slovak: Čadca) Highlanders from the Polish-Slovak border, around Cernăuți and Storojineț, then near Gura Humorului and Cacica (Poiana Micului, Pleșa, and Solonețu Nou). The third-wave was represented by the settlers from Galicia, peasants and intelligentsia (engineers, officials, teachers). In total, in Austrian times, it was about 4.5% (36 000 in 1910) of the population.³ It is worth mentioning that for many years the Pole Antoni Kochanowski (1817-1906) was the mayor of Cernăuți and the administrator of the Duchy of Bukovina, and he also built the power of this wonderful city.

Paradoxically, the Polish researchers became interested in Bukovina for

² See for example: Grzegorz Cicimirski, *Polacy na Bukowinie i zadania oświatowe T.[owarzystwa] S.[zkoły] L.[udowej]* [Poles in Bukovina and Educational tasks of the Society of People's School], Kraków, 1907; Otton Żukowski, *Bukowina pod względem topograficznym, statystycznym i historycznym ze szczególnem uwzględnieniem żywiołu polskiego* [Bukowina in Terms of Topography, Statistics and History, with a special emphasis on the Polish Element], Czerniowce, 1914.

³ Constantin Ungureanu, *Bucovina în perioada stăpânirii austriece 1774-1918* [Bukovina during the Austrian rule 1774-1918], Chișinău, 2003, p. 261.

political reasons. In the 30s, there was a Polish-Czechoslovak conflict in Poiana Micului, when a Slovak teacher came from Czechoslovakia to Poiana, claiming that the Highlanders are not Poles but Slovaks because they arrived in Bukovina from the Slovak territories. A Slovak school was established in Poiana, with over 30% of children from the Polish school. This situation worried the Polish diplomacy; accordingly, a geographer from Krakow – Marian Gotkiewicz (1901-1972) was sent to Bukovina to observe the situation and to write the history of the Polish Highlanders. The conflict in Poiana Micului ended in March 1938 when the Romanian authorities liquidated the Slovak school⁴. The effect of Gotkiewicz's stay in Bukovina was reflected in numerous publications describing the Polish villages' history. Before the outbreak of World War II, he determined that, in reality, these Highlanders came from the Slovak region of Czadca, but they spoke Polish not Slovak because their ancestors were refugees from Silesia and Lesser Poland (*Małopolska*, later Galicia) from the 16th-18th centuries. The first group came to Bukovina in 1803. Over the next 30 years, Gotkiewicz also described their customs and post-war re-emigration to Western Poland. Also, the Polish geographer studied the Czadca region, comparing the languages, customs, and names. He criticised the opinions of some historians, who claimed that these people were Slovaks because they came from Slovakia, as long as their language and national identification decided⁵. To this day, their Romanian neighbours call this group *Slovaçi*, which is wrong, even if it is already accepted. Gotkiewicz can be called "the discoverer of the Polish Highlanders in Bukovina"; on the other hand, he was not a historian and acted under political pressure. We cannot call these Highlanders Poles in Slovakia, in the 18th century, because their modern national identification did not yet exist, so we can only talk about the Polish ethnic

⁴ Krzysztof Nowak, *O dusze górali bukowińskich. Polsko-czechosłowacki konflikt na Bukowinie po I wojnie światowej* [For the Souls of Bucovinian Highlanders. Polish-Czechoslovak conflict in Bukovina after World War I], in *O Bukowinie. Razem czy oddzielnie?* [About Bukovina. Together or Separately?], ed. Kazimierz Feleszko, Warszawa 2000, p. 221-233.

⁵ See the list of works on Bukovina wrote by Marian Gotkiewicz edited by his son: Marek Gotkiewicz, *Bibliografia publikacji dr Mariana Gotkiewicza poświęconych góralom czadeckim* [Bibliography of Publications of Dr. Marian Gotkiewicz devoted to the Czadca Highlanders], in *Polacy z Bukowiny. Ich losy i kultura - źródłem tożsamości narodowej* [Poles from Bukovina. Their Fate and Culture - a Source of National Identity], ed. Czesław Osękowski, Żary, 2002, p. 167-171.

group. This group obtained the Polish national identification only in Bukovina. However, those who remained in the Czadca region, despite using the Polish dialect, now identify themselves as Slovaks.⁶

For many years, no one but Gotkiewicz wrote in Poland about Bukovina. Yet, Gotkiewicz had not seen Bukovina after World War II. Besides this, he only described the Polish Highlanders including their re-migration to postwar Poland, because they are to this day the most active Polish Bukovinians. There was no information about the descendants of peasants from Galicia, popularly called *Masurians*. It was only in the first half of the 70s that truly scientific publications appeared. These were the linguistic works of Stanisław Gogolewski (1939-2007) from Łódź about the dialect of the trilingual village of Cacica.⁷ In 1973, Emil Biedrzycki (1890-1975), a roman-philologist from Krakow, born in Dumbrăveni-Bukovina, published the book *Historia Polaków na Bukowinie* (The History of Poles in Bukovina), in which he synthetically described the history of the Polish settlement until 1945, emphasising not only the Highlanders but also other groups and their political, social or cultural life. Although Biedrzycki did not examine the Ukrainian or Romanian archives, his book is still valid and should be used to start searching for information about Poles in Bukovina.⁸ In 1981, a small book of Małgorzata Willaume – *Polacy w Rumunii* (Poles in Romania) – was published, with fragments about the “former Bukovina”.⁹ In 1985, Alicja Sowińska-Krupka’s book analysed the first post-war years of the Polish-Romanian relations, underlying the problem of the Polish minority and

⁶ See and compare: Krzysztof Nowak, *Problem ludności „słowackiej” na Bukowinie w XIX i XX wieku*. [The Problem of the „Slovak” Population in Bukovina in the 19th and 20th centuries], in Zbigniew Kowalski, Helena Krasowska, Jurij Makar, Władysław Strutyński (ed.), *Bukowina. Tradycje i współczesność* [Traditions and the Present Day], Piła-Czerniowce-Suczawa, 2006, p. 213-222. Compare Jozef Jurašek, *Život a osud. Rudolf Kovalik 1902-1938* [Life and Destiny. Rudolf Kovalik 1902-1938], Bratislava, 2002.

⁷ Stanisław Gogolewski, *Polska gwara trójjęzycznej wsi Kaczyki w Rumunii* [Polish Dialect of the Trilingual Village of Cacica in Romania], Wrocław, 1972. His Romanian collaborator in research Elena Deboveanu from București wrote a book: *Polska gwara górali bukowińskich w Rumunii* [Polish Dialect of Bukovinian Highlanders in Romania], Wrocław, 1971, translated from Romanian language by Gogolewski.

⁸ Emil Biedrzycki, *Historia Polaków na Bukowinie* [The History of Poles in Bukovina], Kraków, 1973.

⁹ Małgorzata Willaume, *Polacy w Rumunii* [Poles in Romania], Lublin, 1981.

the re-migration issues.¹⁰ Apart from the Polish problem, no other topics related to Bukovina were raised in Poland.

Nothing new appeared in the next few years. Not without significance was the fact that in the 80s Romania and Poland began to move away from each other for political reasons. It was getting harder and harder to get from Poland to Bukovina. Despite this, some Polish students and lecturers sometimes went there. For example, ethnology students from Wrocław came to Bukovina from the end of the 70s. Among them was Eugeniusz Kłosek, a lecturer at that time, and now the head of ethnology at the University of Wrocław. There was also the author of tourist guides Stanisław Figiel, who in 1984 published a report on his stay in the Highlander's villages.¹¹ However, for most scholars in Poland, Bukovina was almost an exotic country. Re-migrants from Poland also rarely visited Bukovina to meet their families. On the other hand, re-migrants organised their folk groups in Poland.¹²

AFTER 1989

The situation changed after the fall of communism. At the end of the 80s, an ethnologist from the Cultural Center in Piła (north from the town Poznań) Zbigniew Kowalski and a linguist from the University of Warsaw, Kazimierz Feleszko (1939-2001) gathered the Bukovinian emigrants scattered around Poland and created, since 1992, the festival "Bukowińskie Spotkania" [The Bukovinian Meetings] in Jastrowie, near Piła. Subsequent editions were organised in Cernăuți (Ukraine), Câmpulung Moldovenesc (Romania), Bonyhád (Hungary), and Turčianske Teplice (Slovakia). New researchers, working mostly at universities, appeared: the ethnologists Magdalena Pokrzyńska from Zielona Góra and Ewa Kocój from Krakow, the linguist Helena Krasowska from Panka near Storojineț (student of K. Feleszko in Warsaw), the historians Michał Keller from

¹⁰ Alicja Sowińska-Krupka, *Stosunki polsko-rumuńskie 1945-1949* [Polish-Romanian relations 1945-1949], Warszawa, 1985.

¹¹ Stanisław Figiel, *Polskie osadnictwo na rumuńskiej Bukowinie- historia i stan dzisiejszy* [Polish Settlement in Romanian Bukowina – History and Present State], "Wierchy", Krakow, 1984, p. 203-218.

¹² See Magdalena Pokrzyńska, *Bukowińczycy w Polsce. Socjologiczne studium rozwoju wspólnoty regionalnej* [Bukovinians in Poland. A Sociological Study on the Regional Community Development], Zielona Góra, 2010.

Ruda – Vicșani, living in Warsaw, Michaela Oanea from Moara-Bulai, living in Rzeszów, Maria Ostrovschi from Solonețul Nou (student of S. Gogolewski), and Krzysztof Nowak from Katowice, the philologists Joanna Gorzelana from Zielona Góra and Władysław Strutyński from the Yuriy Fedkovych University in Cernăuți. We should also mention the historian Jan Bujak from Krakow, and the philologist and a member of the Bukovinian folk group in Poland Jadwiga Parecka, Elżbieta Wieruszewska from Western Poland who were also interested in the Bukovinian issue. Therefore, it happened that a multidisciplinary Polish team for the study of Bukovina was established at a time when this region was not affected by the migration wave, which included Poland, Romania, and Ukraine in the second decade of the 21st century. Thanks to this, many interesting field studies could be conducted. These people made contact with Kowalski and Feleszko and began to participate in the “Bukovinian Meetings”. Every few years, scientific conferences are organised during the festival in Jastrowie. The results are the publications with articles of Polish, Ukrainian, Romanian, German, Austrian, Jewish researchers.¹³ The reactivation of Związek Polaków w Rumunii (Union of Poles in

¹³ Kazimierz Feleszko, J. Molas (ed.), *Bukowina - wspólnota kultur i języków* [Bukowina – a Community of Cultures and Languages], Warszawa, 1992; Kazimierz Feleszko, J. Molas, W. Strutyński (ed.), *Bukowina. Blaski i cienie “Europy w miniaturze”* [Bukowina. The Glows and Shadows of “Europe in Miniature”], Warszawa, 1995; Kazimierz Feleszko (ed.), *Bukowina po stronie dialogu* [Bukovina on the Dialogue Side], Sejny, 1999; Kazimierz Feleszko (ed.), *O Bukowinie, Razem czy oddzielnie?* [About Bukovina. Together or Separately], Warszawa, 2000; Helena Krasowska, Eugeniusz Kłosek, Magdalena Pokrzyńska, Zbigniew Kowalski (ed.), *Bukowina. Integracja społeczno-kulturowa na pograniczu* [Bukowina. Social and Cultural Integration on the Border], Warszawa, 2010; Radu F. Bruja, Helena Krasowska, Magdalena Pokrzyńska (ed.), *Bukowina: inni wśród swoich* [Bukowina. Others among their own], Zielona Góra-Piła-Warszawa, 2017. From the Polish articles there see, for example: Jadwiga Parecka-Seul, *Cechy gwary górali bukowińskich w gminie Brzeźnica (województwo zielono-górskie) jako ilustracja ich szlaków migracyjnych* [Features of the Dialect of Bukovinian Highlanders in the Brzeźnica Commune (Zielona Góra province), as an illustration of their migration routes], in *Bukowina- wspólnota...*, p. 63-66; Agnieszka Wołoszczuk, *Paralele południowo-słowiańskie w polszczyźnie bukowińskiej* [South-slavic Parallels in the Bukovinian Polish Language], in *Bukowina. Blaski...*, p. 167-174; Kazimierz Feleszko, *Integracja językowa Polaków bukowińskich* [Language Integration of Bukovinian Poles], in *Bukowina. Blaski...*, p. 67-73; Kazimierz Feleszko, *O legendzie bukowińskiej-prozą (czyli kilka pojęć socjologicznych)* [On the Bukovinian Legend – by prose (means several sociological concepts)], in: *Bukowina po stronie...*, p. 49-64; Eugeniusz Kłosek,

Romania) in 1990 also helped a lot. In Zielona Góra – Western Poland, re-migrants from Bukovina formed the organisation “Wspólnota Bukowińska” (Bukovina Community) led by Wilhelm Skibinski.

In 2000, the Museum of Beskid in Wisła (on the Polish-Czech-Slovak borderland) organised an international conference and exhibition “Czadecka Ojcowizna” (Czadca’s Fatherland), in which E. Kłosek, M. Pokrzyńska, H. Krasowska, J. Parecka, K. Nowak, M. Delost took part. A book with articles written by these researchers was published on this occasion and represented a kind of “first summary” of the Polish research on Bukovina.¹⁴ In 2003 in Wisła there was an exhibition dedicated to the 200th anniversary of the Polish Highlanders’ arrival in Bukovina. In the same year, a plaque dedicated to the 200th anniversary of this event was unveiled in the Catholic Church, in the village Crăsnioara Veche, near Storojineț.

What was new and important in these studies? Apart from historical research, which now could be based on the archival material, we can say that, after 1989, the Polish scholars began to look differently at the borderlands – not only as an area of conflicts but also as an area of meetings and interference of languages and cultures, so this problem about that Ossowski and Chlebowczyk previously wrote. They also began to study the problem of national identification and consciousness as well as the issues of assimilation, stereotypes, problems of integration, inter-ethnic relations, small Homelands, relations between language

O niektórych elementach świadomości i kultury Polaków we wsiach południowej Bukowiny [About some Elements of Poles’ Awareness and Culture in the Villages of Southern Bukovina], in *Bukowina po stronie...*, p. 153-163; Tadeusz Dubicki, *Próby odnowienia życia polonijnego na Bukowiźnie w latach 1945-1950. Organizacja repatriacji* [Attempts to renew the Polish Diaspora Life in Bukovina in 1945-1950. Organization of Repatriates], in *O Bukowinie...*, p. 106-138; Helena Krasowska, Magdalena Pokrzyńska, *Strukturalne konsekwencje Międzynarodowego Festiwalu Folklorystycznego „Bukowińskie Spotkania” (na podstawie opinii polskich uczestników)* [Structural Consequences of the International Folk Festival „Bukovinian Meetings” (on basis of the Polish participant’s opinions)], in *Bukowina. Integracja...*, p. 23-36; Rafał Józwiak, *Autorytety narodowe i lokalne Polaków z Bukowiny ukraińskiej* [National and Local Authorities of Poles from Ukrainian Bukovina], in *Bukowina. Integracja...*, p. 175-180; Joanna Gorzelana, *Swojsko czy obco- o nazwach zespołów bukowińskich w Polsce* [Familiar or Not – about Names of Bukovinian Ensembles in Poland], in *Bukowina. Inni wśród swoich...*, p. 131-140.

¹⁴ *Czadecka ojcowizna* [Czadca’s Fatherland], ed. Krzysztof Nowak, Lublin, 2000.

and nationality and foreign influences in Polish dialects and culture in Bukovina. During the conferences E. Kłosek informed about his way to the ethnographic synthesis of the Polish Highlanders, K. Nowak drew attention to the need to take into account the specifics of borderlands, H. Krasowska presented the first effects of new dialectological studies, and M. Pokrzyńska explained the integration of re-emigrants from Bukovina.

In 2002, a large Polish conference popularising the topic of Bukovina took place in Żary, in Western Poland, where the immigrants live¹⁵. In 2002- 2003, the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw published two volumes of the book entitled *Bukowina moja miłość* (Bukovina, My Love). It was a collection of linguistic texts of Kazimierz Feleszko, which includes a dictionary of Polish dialect in Bukovina.¹⁶

In 2005, the University of Yuriy Fedkowycz in Cernăuți organised a Ukrainian-Polish conference about Bukovina and dedicated it to the memory of Kazimierz Feleszko, during which K. Nowak, E. Kłosek, H. Krasowska, M. Pokrzyńska, and E. Wieruszewska presented the Polish achievements in the field of regional history, ethnology, sociology, linguistics and also the activity of the Union of Poles in Romania.¹⁷

Except for the meetings in Jastrowie, from 1999 an important role in the Polish research about Bukovina is played by the conferences, which are a part of the "Dni Polskie" (Polish Days) in Romania, organised by the Union of Poles in Romania, especially the "Dom Polski" (Polish House) in Suceava. The first conference was devoted to the role of Romania in helping the Polish authorities, the Polish army, and the Polish civilian refugees in 1939 and its title was "The Second World War against the Background of Polish-Romanian Relations". The texts of speeches were edited by the Polish teacher Elżbieta Wieruszewska and the activist of the Union of Poles in Romania, Stanisława Iachimovschi, and published in print the following year.¹⁸ Kazimierz Jurczak, a Romanian philologist

¹⁵ See *Polacy z Bukowiny...* .

¹⁶ Kazimierz Feleszko, *Bukowina moja miłość. Język polski na Bukowinie Karpackiej do 1945 roku* [Bukovina, My Love. Polish Language in Carpathian Bukovina up to 1945], vol. 1, ed. Andrzej Żor, Warszawa, 2002; vol 2, *Słownik* [Dictionary], ed. Ewa Rzetelska-Feleszko, Warszawa, 2003.

¹⁷ See *Bukowina. Tradycje i współczesność...*

¹⁸ Stanisława Iachimovschi, Elżbieta Wieruszewska (ed.), *Druga wojna światowa na tle stosunków polsko-rumuńskich. Materiały z sympozjum / Al doilea război mondial pe*

and the Polish consul in Romania, also gave a lot of help to the organizers of the first conferences in București.

Other historians who came to Suceava after 1999 did not deal directly with Bukovina as a topic, but broader with the Polish-Moldovan and Polish- Romanian relations, because this was (and is) the idea of these conferences. For example, Ilona Czamańska from Poznań (specialist in the pre-1918 epoch), Wojciech Rojek from Krakowa (period 1918-1945), Henryk Walczak from Szczecin (period 1918-1939), Agnieszka Kastory from Krakow (period 1918-1945), Aleksander Smoliński from Toruń (military history), Tadeusz Dubicki from Łódź (period 1939-1945), Waldemar Remzer from Toruń (military history). The Romanian scientists who attended these conferences were Constantin Rezachevici, Veniamin Ciobanu (died in 2015), Florin Anghel, Daniel Hrenciuc, Florin Pintescu, Radu F. Bruja, Harieta Sabol, Nicolae Mareș, Ion Constantin, Bogdan-Alexandru Schipor, Vasile Schipor, Olimpia Mitric, Adrian Vițalaru and from the Republic of Moldova: Lilia Zabolotnaia, Alina Felea, Constantin Ungureanu. Also, there were Romanian – Polish philologists such as Stan Velea, Mihail Mitu, Constantin Geambașu. The sessions take place in Polish and Romanian, and if necessary, speeches and discussions are translated into one or the other language. Papers sent by the authors are edited and published by the Union of Poles in Romania the following year. The conferences are sometimes accompanied by a vernissage of historical or cultural exhibitions. For example, the exhibition at the Bukovina Museum in Suceava during the “Polish Days” in 2017 was dedicated to the 150th anniversary of the birth of Józef Piłsudski and his connections with Romania. Speeches and publications are divided into thematic sections, for example: “In the circle of history”, “In the circle of literature and ethnography”, “In the circle of literature and culture”, “In the circle of literature and art”, “In the circle of issues of national minorities”, “In the circle of culture and Bukovinian issues” etc. Sometimes, the organisers proposed some leading topics, most often associated with anniversaries of important events in the history of both countries or the Polish Bukovinian communities. In 1999 it was the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, in 2003 the 200th anniversary of the arrival of the Polish Highlanders in Bukovina. In 2007, several papers were devoted to the 60th anniversary of the re-emigration of Poles from Bukovina to Poland, and the 165th anniversary of the

fondul relatiilor polono-române. Materialele simpozionului. [The Second World War against the Background of Polish-Romanian Relations. Materials of the Symposium], Suceava, 2000.

settlement of Poiana Micului village. A year later, a part of the conference was devoted to important events for both nations year 1918, and in 2009 the 70th anniversary of the arrival of Polish refugees in Romania. In 2015, several papers were dedicated to the battles of Polish legionnaires in Bukovina and the Carpathian mountains (1914-1915), in 2018 the 100th anniversary of Polish independence and Romanian unification. All conference topics from 1999 and 19 publication titles of the post-conference books can be found on the websites of the Union of Poles in Romania. There are also published online post-conference publications since 2013.¹⁹ Earlier ones are available in the “Polish House” in Suceava and in the most important libraries of Bukovina, Poland, and Romania.

Of course, an important place at these conferences is also occupied by the issues of Bukovina, which covers both the history and the present day. The Polish researchers presented in Suceava mainly the topics of the Polish minority in this region, especially of the Czadca Highlanders, which was a continuation, extension, and verification of the “old” works of earlier authors (Gotkiewicz, Biedrzycki, Deboveanu, Gogolewski). Topics related to Bukovina cover the entire historical region and the activity of Bukovinian re-emigrants in Poland. It is worth adding that the first conference presentations of field interviews by Eugeniusz Kłosek regarding national stereotypes in the Polish villages of Bukovina were a certain cognitive shock for some listeners from Romania because the Romanian scientists have not conducted similar research, while in Poland they enjoyed considerable interest.²⁰ The subject of Bukovina also appears in papers devoted to broader Polish-Romanian relations.²¹ Meetings in Suceava have become the largest forum

¹⁹ See the information about these conferences and the publications since 2013: <https://dompolski.ro>.

²⁰ See Eugeniusz Kłosek, *Wokół stereotypów Polaków i Rumunów w polskich wsiach południowej Bukowiny* [Around Stereotypes of Poles and Romanians in the Polish Villages of Southern Bukovina], in *Kontakty polsko-rumuńskie na przestrzeni wieków. Materiały z sympozjum/Relații polono-române de-a lungul timpului. Materialele simpozionului*, [Polish-Romanian Contacts over the centuries. Materials of the Symposium], ed. Stanislava Iachimovschi, Suceava, 2001, p. 212-223; „*Nie taki diabeł straszny jak go malują*”, czyli o stereotypowych obrazach Ukraińców, Niemców, Cyganów i Żydów w polskich wsiach Bukowiny rumuńskiej [„Not so Terrible as the Devil is painted”. or about the Stereotypical Images of the Ukrainians, Germans, Gypsies, and Jews in the Polish Villages of Romanian Bukovina], in *Relacje polsko-rumuńskie. Relații polono-române* [Polish-Romanian Relations], ed. Stanislava Iachimovschi, E. Wieruszewska, Suceava, 2004, p. 25-41.

²¹ See www.dompolski.ro/.

for the authentic dialogue of Polish and Romanian humanists. Hundreds of papers were presented in Suceava, most of which were published. Quite a large variety of them are best testified to the richness of Polish-Romanian relations in the past and today, which, together with new thematically new proposals contribute and encourage them to further discovering and deepening. New, also young researchers appeared, and during the conference and other events accompanying it many new, also difficult, dividing problems were undertaken, filling in these almost twenty years valuable "white spots" in the history of mutual contacts between the two countries and nations, getting to know their rich culture, breaking down stereotypes associated with it and building a common present even in everyday interpersonal relations. During the "Polish Days" people from Romania, Poland, Moldova, and Ukraine integrate, discuss, compare their research, and correct their opinions. In Suceava, the Poles from Bukovina meet members of other minorities from both parts of the region. Friendships made during these meetings pay off with further initiatives in the field of scientific and cultural contacts in Poland or Romania. The meetings in Suceava popularised the knowledge of Bukovina in Poland. The tourist attractions and the Polish villages have become an authentic intercultural bridge between two or more nations, which is not always possible on other borderlands.²²

THE MOST IMPORTANT RESEARCH RESULTS

We must say that in the case of typical historical, scientific works, Emil Biedrzycki's book remains the most extensive Polish work on the history of Poles in Bukovina, although it is based on a small amount of foreign archival sources.²³ The smaller monographs include works of J. Bujak about the Saint

²² More see about these conferences: Krzysztof Nowak, *Polsko-rumuńskie konferencje w Suczawie (1999–2017). Kształtowanie się ważnego forum polsko-rumuńskiej wymiany myśli naukowej* [Polish-Romanian Conferences in Suceava (1999–2017). Formation of an Important Forum for the Polish-Romanian Exchange of Scientific idea], „Balcanica Posnanensia”, vol. XXIV, 2017, p. 171-195.

²³ Paradoxically, more historical syntheses were made thanks to Romanian historians, for example: Marius Petraru, *Polacy na Bukowinie w latach 1775-1918. Z dziejów osadnictwa polskiego* [Poles in Bukovina in 1775-1918. From the History of Polish Settlement], Kraków, 2004; Daniel Hrenciuc, Florin Pintescu, *Din istoria polonezilor în Bucovina (1774-2002)* [From the History of the Poles in Bukovina (1774-2002)], Suceava, 2002; Daniel Hrenciuc, Florin Pintescu, *Istoria și tradițiile minorității poloneze*

Anna Church in Storojineț and about the Polish press; bilingual works Polish-Ukrainian, by Helena Krasowska also about the church of Saint Anna and the Polish-Romanian-Ukrainian village Pătrăuții de Jos in the Northern Bukovina, but in the contemporary socio-cultural context; bilingual works by Polish priest Alfons-Eugen Zelionca born in southern Bukovina (currently in Poland) about the villages Solonețu Nou and Pleșa.²⁴ A Bukovinian with Polish roots, Franz Pieszczoch, wrote about the Poles in the community of Siret.²⁵ A valuable publication is *Polacy w Rumunii mówią o sobie* (Poles in Romania speak about themselves) from 2000, edited by a former teacher from Poland, Anna Mamulska, containing interviews with Poles from the Romanian Bukovina.²⁶ Krzysztof Nowak described and compared the integration processes of the Polish and Romanian borderlands after 1918, the place of Bukovina in the

[History and Traditions of the Polish Minority], Suceava, 2004, Daniel Hrenciuc, *Un destin pentru istorie. Polonezii în Bucovina (1774-2008)* [A Destiny for History. The Poles in Bukovina (1774-2008)], Iași, 2008; *Polonezii din România (1918-1990). De la regat la republică socialistă*. [The Poles in Romania (1918-1990). From the Kingdom to the Socialist Republic], vol. 1, București, 2015. Books of D. Hrenciuc and F. Pintescu bases only on sources from Romania.

²⁴ Jan Bujak, *Święta Anna. Kościół i parafia Storozyniec - Strózeniec (1864-2005. Przypomnienie ludzi, rzeczy i zdarzeń w 100-lecie konsekracji neogotyckiego kościoła parafialnego i w 140-lecie erygowania parafii* [Church and Parish Storojineț - Strózeniec (1864-2005). Reminder of people, things and events on the 100th anniversary of the consecration of the neo-Gothic parish church and on the 140th anniversary of the erection of the parish], Kraków, 2005; *Zaczyny dziennikarstwa polskiego na Bukowinie: „Bratek”, „Ogniwo”, „Osa”, „Przedświt”, „Przegląd Czerniowiecki”, „Diablica”* [The beginnings of Polish Journalism in Bukovina: „Bratek”, „Ogniwo”, „Osa”, „Przedświt”, „Przegląd Czerniowiecki”], Kraków, 2006; „Gazeta” Polska 1883-1914, Kraków, 2013; *Kronika bukowińskich Polaków 1911-1914* [Chronicle of Bukovinian Poles 1911-1914], Suceava, 2017; Helena Krakowska, *Bukowina - żywa historia Kościoła* [Bukovina - the Living History of the Church], Kraków 2006; *Bukowina. Mała ojczyzna - Pietrowce Dolne / Буковина. Мала батьківщина - Нижні Петрівці* [Bukovina. A Small Homeland - Pătrăuții de Jos], Pruszków, 2002; Alfons Eugen Zelionca, *Nowy Sołonec. Dzieje wsi i parafii/Solonețu Nou: istoria satului și a parohiei* [Solonețu Nou. History of the Village and Parish], Suceava, 2014; *Pleșa. Dzieje wsi i parafii/ Pleșa. Istoria satului și a parohiei* [Pleșa. History of the Village and Parish], Suceava, 2016.

²⁵ Franz Pieszczoch, *Polonezii în istoria orașului Siret* [Poles in the history of city Siret], Suceava, 2008.

²⁶ Anna Mamulska, *Polacy w Rumunii mówią o sobie* [Poles in Romania speak about themselves], Leszno, 2000.

Polish-Romanian relations and the Polish policy, as well as the re-emigration of Poles from Bukovina to Poland.²⁷

In the scientific ethnological research of Romanian Bukovina, Eugeniusz Kłosek showed most activity with his students from Wrocław. His work resulted in a book from 2005: *Świadomość etniczna i kultura społeczności polskiej we wsiach Bukowiny rumuńskiej* (Ethnic Awareness and Culture of the Polish Community in Villages of Romanian Bukovina).²⁸ Nobody else before him and nobody else after him did something similar in the ethnology of Poles in Southern Bukovina, and will not do because of the time of migration and changes in everyday life of the inhabitants.

In the language studies of Bukovina, Maria Ostrovschi did the most after H. Deboveanu, who wrote (but not published) a dissertation about some dialect features²⁹. In 2006, Helena Krasowska wrote a book about the dialects of the Polish Highlanders in Bukovina: *Górale polscy na Bukowinie karpackiej. Studium socjolingwistyczne i leksykalne* (The Polish Highlanders in the Carpathian Bukovina. Socio-linguistic and Lexical Study). She is also a co-author of the publication *Słownik górali polskich na Bukowinie* (Dictionary of the Polish Highlanders in Bukovina), from 2008. The summary of the Highlanders' dialect

²⁷ See, for example, Krzysztof Nowak, *Bukowina w opiniach polskich służb dyplomatycznych, konsularnych i wojskowych w Rumunii (1918-1939)* [Bukovina in the Opinions of Polish Diplomatic, Consular and Military services in Romania (1918-1939)], in *Kontakty polsko-rumuńskie na przestrzeni...*, p. 87-105; *Dyplomacja polska a Polacy w Rumunii po roku 1945* [Polish Diplomacy and Poles in Romania after 1945], in *Bliżej siebie. Polacy i Rumuni a historyczne i kulturalne dziedzictwo Europy. Materiały z sympozjum/Mai aproape unii de alții. Polonezii și românii raportați la patrimoniul istoric și cultural al Europei. Materialele simpozionului* [Closer to each other. Poles and Romanians and the Historical and Cultural Heritage of Europe. Materials of the Symposium], ed. S. Iachomovschi, E. Wieruszewska, p. 271-283; *Kolejne archiwalia na temat reemigracji Polaków z Bukowiny*. [Further Archives on the Re-emigration of Poles from Bukovina], in *Związki polsko-rumuńskie w historii i kulturze. Legături istorice și culturale polono-române* [Polish-Romanian Relationships in History and Culture], ed. Karina Stempel-Gancarczyk, Elżbieta Wieruszewska-Calistru, Suceava, 2018, p. 455-467.

²⁸ Eugeniusz Kłosek, *Świadomość etniczna i kultura społeczności polskiej we wsiach Bukowiny rumuńskiej* [Ethnic Awareness and Culture of the Polish Community in the Villages of Romanian Bukovina], Wrocław, 2005.

²⁹ Maria Ostrovschi, *Słotwórstwo rzeczownika i przymiotnika gwary górali bukowińskich w Rumunii*, praca doktorska [Word Formation of the Noun and Adjective of the Dialect of Bukovinian Highlanders in Romania, PhD work], Łódź, 2004.

issues is the publication *Świadectwo zanikającego dziedzictwa. Mowa polska na Bukowinie. Rumunia-Ukraina* (A testimony to a vanishing heritage. The Polish language of Bukovina. Romania-Ukraine).³⁰ These works cover both parts of Bukovina, and it can be said that the dialect of the Polish Highlanders has been saved from oblivion. We can also mention a popular book edited by Jadwiga Parecka about the dialect of Czadca Highlanders living after 1945 near Zielona Góra in Western Poland³¹.

On the other hand, for many years the Polish researchers were not interested in the Poles in Bukovina coming from Galicia, so-called *Masurians*, who still live in such villages as Bulai-Moara, Ruda-Vicșani, Siret, Cacica. Only recently the scientific study of this group was undertaken by Karina Stempel-Gancarczyk who in 2019 finished her dissertation on this subject.³² From sociological, geographical and demographic works, one can point to the publication of Magdalena Pokrzyńska who synthesises her studies about the integration processes among re-migrants in Poland in a book *Bukowińczycy w Polsce. Socjologiczne studium rozwoju wspólnoty regionalnej* (Bukovinians in Poland. A sociological study of regional community development). In 2007 Janusz Górecki from Krakow published a book *Świadomość regionalna Polaków na Bukowinie* (Regional awareness of Poles in Bukovina)³³. Adam Rosmanith from Krakow presented many interesting demographic materials from his research in Polish villages in Bukovina³⁴.

³⁰ Helena Krasowska, Magdalena Pokrzyńska, Lech Aleksy Suchomłynow, *Świadectwo zanikającego dziedzictwa. Mowa polska na Bukowinie. Rumunia-Ukraina* (A Testimony to a Vanishing Heritage. The Polish Language in Bukovina. Romania-Ukraine), Warszawa, 2018.

³¹ Jadwiga Parecka, *Słownik gwary bukowińskiej z lubuskiej Brzeźnicy i jej okolic* [Dictionary of Bukovinian Dialect from Brzeźnica Lubuska and its Surroundings], Żagań, 2019.

³² Karina Stempel-Gancarczyk, *Procesy zanikania języka na podstawie badań gwar polskich na Bukowinie rumuńskiej, praca doktorska* [The Processes of Disappearing of the Language, based on Research Regarding Polish Dialects in Romanian Bukovina, PhD thesis], Warszawa, 2019.

³³ Janusz Górecki, *Świadomość regionalna Polaków na Bukowinie* [Regional Awareness of Poles in Bukovina], Kraków, 2007.

³⁴ See, for example, Adam Rosmanith, *Migracje w skupiskach mniejszości polskiej na południowej Bukowinie w latach 1990-2011* [Migrations in the Clusters of the Polish Minority in Southern Bukovina, in the years 1990-2011], in *Polsko-rumuńskie związki historyczne i kulturowe. Materiały z sympozjum/Legături istorice și culturale polono-române. Materialele simpozionului* [Polish-Romanian Historical and Cultural Relationships.

When it comes to research not concerning the Polish minority, but broader issues of Bukovina, some can only be recommended. First is the book of the ethnologist Ewa Kocój from Krakow about the painted monasteries in Bukovina.³⁵ Next are articles of Longin Graczyk from Warsaw, dedicated to Armenians in Bukovina and of Mirosław Sikora from Katowice about the resettlement of Bukovinian Germans to the area of Żywiec in Lesser Poland, in 1940.³⁶ We can also add that there are several interesting tourist guides about Bukovina, published in Poland, the best of which was written by Michał Jurecki from 2001 *Bukowina-kraina łagodności* (Bukovina – the Land of Gentleness).³⁷

CONCLUSIONS

It can be stated that Polish researchers treat Bukovina as a historical whole. The most common approaches in Polish publications underline the language of the Polish Czadca Highlanders (also in the Ukrainian part of the region) and the

Materials of the Symposium], ed. Stanisława Iachimovschi, Elżbieta Wieruszewska-Calistru, Suceava, 2013, p. 505-520.

³⁵ Ewa Kocój, *Świątynie, postacie, ikony. Malowane cerkwie i monastypy Bukowiny Południowej w wyobrażeniach rumuńskich* (Temples, Characters, Icons: Painted Churches and Monasteries of South Bukovina in Romanian Images), Kraków, 2006.

³⁶ See, for example, Longin Graczyk, *Wirtualna Bukowina – czyli ormiańska tożsamość poza terytorium i czasem* [Virtual Bukovina - meaning Armenian Identity beyond Territory and Time], in *Bliżej siebie. Polacy i Rumuni a historyczne i kulturalne dziedzictwo Europy. Materiały z sympozjum/Mai aproape unii de alții. Polonezii și românii raportați la patrimoniul istoric și cultural al Europei. Materialele simpozionului*. [Closer to Each Other. Poles and Romanians and the Historical and Cultural Heritage of Europe. Materials of the Symposium], ed. Stanislava Iachimovschi, Elżbieta Wieruszewska, Suceava, 2007, p. 54-65; Mirosław Sikora, „Siedlungsaktion Buchenland”. Niemcy z Bukowiny w akcji kolonizowania ziem polskich wcielonych do III Rzeszy na przykładzie prowincji śląskiej/górnośląskiej (1940-1944) [„Siedlungsaktion Buchenland”. Germans from Bukovina in the Colonization of Polish Lands incorporated into the Third Reich, on the Example of the Silesian/ Upper Silesian Province (1940-1944)], in *Relacje polsko-rumuńskie w historii i kulturze. Materiały z sympozjum. Relații polono-române în istorie și cultură. Materialele simpozionului* [Polish-Romanian Relations in History and Culture. Materials of the Symposium], ed. Stanislava Iachimovschi, Elżbieta Wieruszewska, Suceava, 2009, p. 225-250.

³⁷ Michał Jurecki, *Bukowina. Kraina łagodności. Przewodnik turystyczny* [Bukovina. A Land of Gentleness. Tourist Guide], Kraków, 2001.

cultural, social, religious, demographic, regional and national identity issues of this group in Romania and Poland (after re-migration). We can say that these cases could be saved because, due to current migrations, faster assimilation processes and dying out of the older generation, similar research can no longer be carried out. On the other hand, there is no equivalent of E. Kłosek's ethnological work on the subject of the Polish Highlanders in the Ukrainian Bukovina and on the subject of language studies of *Masurians* there and in Poland after 1945, not to mention about describing their culture and history. Work is still ongoing on the historical reconstruction of the Polish fate in Bukovina during the Austrian and communist times, which would be the result of archival queries not only in Poland or Romania but also in Ukraine, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, and Germany. It is better in this respect with the interwar period. There is also a lack of Polish research on matters not related to the Poles in Bukovina. On the other hand, it is important that most Polish studies about Bukovina also contain a Romanian and Ukrainian summary, and some of them are published in two languages. Therefore, cooperation with foreign partners should also be important for the possibility of broader Polish research in Bukovina.

DEVELOPMENT OF MUNICIPAL SELF-GOVERNMENT OF CHERNIVTSI IN THE LATE 18TH – EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

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Abstract: *The article deals with local self-government in Chernivtsi. At the time of joining Austria, Chernivtsi was a small settlement, the centre of the region. The decisive role in the fate of the city was played by the Austrian administration, which made the city the capital of Bukovina. This fact contributed to the rapid development of the city. In 1786, Chernivtsi was granted the first Charter governing the city administration. An important step in the development of local self-government took place in 1832 when Chernivtsi received the Magdeburg rights. However, the city government remained still limited in its powers.*

The status of Chernivtsi has significantly increased after the separation of Bukovina from Galicia. The city received a separate Charter in 1864, which substantially expanded the community's self-governing rights. The disadvantage of such status was the restriction imposed on the general population to participate in the elections for the city's local administration.

Chernivtsi developed as a multinational city. The Jewish, German, Ukrainian, Romanian and Polish communities were the largest ones. Following the general processes of democratisation in the empire and Bukovina, in particular, that took place in the early 20th century, the matter of updating the status of Chernivtsi arose. The Bukovina Diet adopted a draft project in 1912 according to which all voters were divided into national curiae. However, it was not authorised by the emperor before the outbreak of World War I.

Keywords: Municipal self-government, Chernivtsi, Bukovina, Austria-Hungary, city council, city Charter, burgomaster.

Rezumat: *Dezvoltarea autonomiei municipale a Cernăuțiului la finele secolului al XVIII-lea – începutul secolului XX. La momentul aderării la Austria, orașul Cernăuți era o mică așezare, centru al ținutului omonim. Administrația austriacă a jucat un rol decisiv în soarta orașului, transformând urbea în capitala Bucovinei. Acest fapt a contribuit la dezvoltarea rapidă a orașului. În anul 1786 Cernăuțiul a primit primul Statut, care a stabilit normele de administrare a orașului. Un pas important în dezvoltarea autonomiei locale a*

fost făcut în anul 1832, când oraşului Cernăuţi i s-au aplicat normele dreptului de Magdeburg. Cu toate acestea, autonomia urbană a continuat să fie destul de restrânsă.

Statutul Cernăuţiului s-a îmbunătăţit semnificativ după separarea Bucovinei de Galiţia. Oraşul a dobândit un Statut distinct în anul 1864, act care a extins puternic drepturile autonome ale comunităţii. Punctul slab al acestui statut a constatat în restricţionarea dreptului întregii populaţii de a participa la alegerile organismelor municipale.

Oraşul Cernăuţi s-a dezvoltat ca oraş multinaţional. Cele mai mari comunităţi au fost de evrei, germani, ucraineni, români şi polonezi. În contextul general al fenomenului de democratizare în imperiu şi, în special, în Bucovina, la începutul secolului XX-lea, s-a manifestat necesitatea adaptării statutului oraşului Cernăuţi la noul cadru democratic. În anul 1912 Dieta Bucovinei a aprobat un proiect conform căruia toţi alegătorii au fost împărţiţi în curii naţionale. Totuşi, până la izbucnirea Primului Război Mondial, proiectul de lege nu a fost autorizat de împărat.

Résumé: Le développement de l'administration autonome municipale de Tchernivtsi à la fin du XVIII-e - le début du XX-e siècles. L'article ci-joint souligne qu'au moment du rattachement à l'Autriche, la ville de Tchernivtsi était une petite localité, centre de la contée homonyme. L'administration autrichienne joua un rôle décisif dans la destinée de la ville, celle-ci transforma la ville dans la capitale de la Bucovine. Cela contribua à l'évolution rapide de la ville. L'année 1786, Tchernivtsi reçut le premier Statut, qui détermina la gestion de la ville. La concession à la ville en 1832 des normes de droit de Magdeburg marqua un pas important dans le développement de l'administration autonome locale, bien qu'à cette époque-là elle demeurât très limitée.

L'importance de Tchernivtsi augmenta considérablement après la séparation de la Bucovine de la Galicie. En 1864, la ville obtint un statut particulier qui élargit fortement les droits d'administration autonome des citoyens. Pourtant, le défaut du statut consista dans la restriction du droit de la population toute entière des participer aux élections des organismes locaux.

Tchernivtsi se développa comme une ville multinationale. Les communautés juive, allemande, ukrainienne, roumaine et polonaise furent les plus importantes. Au début du XX-e siècle, dans le cadre du processus général de la démocratisation de l'Empire autrichien et en Bucovine, en particulier, apparut la nécessité d'adapter le statut de la ville de Tchernivtsi au nouveau cadre démocratique. La Diète bucovinienne adopta en 1912 un projet selon lequel on partagea tous les électeurs en curies nationales. Pourtant, jusqu'au début de la Première guerre mondiale, l'empereur n'approuva pas le projet de loi.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the city of Chernivtsi during the Austrian period has never been deprived of attention. There is still a lot of literature on the city, which continues to grow. It particularly speaks about the city as a multinational centre of public

relations and mutual cultural enrichment, about the development of the city and its architecture etc.¹ The collective work of the international team of historians such as Harald Heppner, Oleksandr Masan, Oleksandr Dobrzahanskyi, Mihai-Stefan Ceașu, Kurt Rein, David Shaari, Kazimierz Feleszko, Stefan Purici, edited by Harald Heppner and published in 2000 is characteristic in this regard.² It analyses individual pages of the past and present of the capital of Bukovina, the history of Ukrainians, Romanians, Germans, Jews, and Poles in the city, the development of infrastructure and architecture, and the importance of the city for the history of Bukovina and so on. It can be said without exaggeration that such a description pattern of history and modern times of Chernivtsi has become almost traditional.

Surprisingly, but historians have not often written about the formation and development of Chernivtsi self-government during the Austrian period. One of the first matters was raised by Franz Wickenhauser³ and Johann Polek⁴, who drew the attention to the first steps in the formation of the city self-government in Chernivtsi in the late 18th – to the early 19th century. Raimund Kaindl made a significant contribution to the study of this matter in his *History of Chernivtsi*⁵, a work dedicated to the 500th anniversary of the first documented mention of the city where he analysed the creation of the first city Charter, the Magdeburg Law that granted Magdeburg rights to the city. Isiu Gronich⁶, Constantin Loghin⁷,

¹ Irma Bornemann, Paula Tiefenthaler, Rudolf Wagner (Hrsg.), *Czernowitz: Eine Stadt im Wandel der Zeit mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihres deutschen kulturellen Lebens*, München-Stuttgart, Verlag "Der Südostdeutsche", 1988; Helmut Braun (Hrsg.), *Czernowitz: Die Geschichte einer untergegangenen Kulturmetropole*, Berlin, Ch. Links Verlag, 2005; Марія Никирса, *Чернівці. Документальні нариси з історії вулиць і площ* [Chernivtsi. Documentary Essays on the History of Streets and Squares], Чернівці, Золоті литаври, 2008; Ion Lihaciu, *Czernowitz 1848-1918. Das kulturelle Leben einer Provinzmetropole*, Kaiserslautern, 2012; Gregor Gatscher-Riedl, *K. u. K. Sehnsuchtsort Czernowitz – "Klein-Wien" am Ostrand der Monarchie*, Berndorf: Kral-Verlag, 2017.

² Harald Heppner (Hrsg.), *Czernowitz. Die Geschichte einer ungewöhnlichen Stadt*, Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2000.

³ Franz Wickenhauser, *Bochotin oder Geschichte der Stadt Czernäuz und ihrer Umgebung*, Wien, 1874.

⁴ Johann Polek, *Historische Skizze von Czernowitz*, in *Czernowitz. Statistische Bericht über die wichtigsten demographischen Verhältnisse*, Wien, 1888, S. 1-8.

⁵ Raimund Kaindl *Geschichte von Czernowitz von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart*, Czernowitz, 1908.

⁶ Isiu Gronich, *Un album al Cernăuțului*, Cernăuți, Tipografia Luceafărul, 1925.

⁷ Constantin Loghin, *Cernăuții*, Cernăuți, Tipografia Mitropolitului Silvestru, 1936.

Oleksandr Masan, Ihor Chekhovskiy⁸, Mykhailo Nykyforak⁹, Vasyl Botushanskyi¹⁰ wrote about some aspects of the city administration. Nevertheless, the Chernivtsi administration was mentioned in their works only casually due to the connection with other historical narratives. Meanwhile, many interesting pages deserve close attention in the history of the Chernivtsi city self-government development during the Austrian period, such as the Bukovinian "Ausgleich" (Accord) of 1910, which has gained considerable attention over the past decades.

It is also important to note that the changes in the city self-government of Chernivtsi were carried out in the general direction of municipal reforms that took place in many European countries and the US at that time¹¹. Against this background, it becomes possible to better determine both general patterns and the features of the municipal self-government formation in Chernivtsi.

The topicality of the article is connected both with the general trends at the European Union level, in deepening the level of local self-government and giving communities as much authority as possible in terms of solving local issues, and with the introduction of the administrative-territorial reform in Ukraine (and in particular in the Chernivtsi oblast).¹² To implement successful changes in the

⁸ Олександр Масан, Ігор Чеховський, *Чернівці: 1408-1998: нариси з історії міста*, [Chernivtsi: 1408-1998: Essays on the History of the City] Чернівці, Місто, 1998.

⁹ Михайло Никифорак, *Буковина в державно-правовій системі Австрії (1774-1918 рр.)* [Bukovina in State and Law System of Austria], Чернівці, Рута, 2004.

¹⁰ Василь Ботушанський, *Місто в період австрійського правління* [City During the Austrian Rule], in В. М. Ботушанський (ред.), *Чернівці. Історія і сучасність. Ювілейне видання до 600 – річчя першої писемної згадки про місто* [Chernivtsi. History and Present Time. Special Edition to 600th Anniversary of the First Written Mention of City], Чернівці, Зелена Буковина, 2009, с. 79-154.

¹¹ Martin J. Schiesl, *The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America, 1880-1920*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 259 p.; Jacob C. Ruppenthal, *Election Reforms: The Trend toward Democracy*, in "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", Vol. 28, Municipal Problems (Nov., 1906), pp. 53-83; Clinton R. Woodruff, *The Movement for Municipal Reform*, in "The North American Review", Vol. 167, No. 503 (Oct., 1898), pp. 410-417; Theodore R. Weeks *Nationality and municipality: reforming city government in the Kingdom of Poland, 1904-1915*, in "Russian History", 1994, No. 1, p. 23-47; Timothy B. Smith, *In defense of privilege: the city of London and the challenge of municipal reform, 1875-1890*, in "Journal of social history", Vol.27, Issue 1, Fall 1993, p. 59-83.

¹² Закон України "Про добровільне об'єднання територіальних громад" [Law of Ukraine "On the Voluntary Association of Territorial Communities"], <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/main/157-VIII>.

modern local administration, the study of the achievements, shortcomings and long-term consequences of the functioning of the municipal authorities during the Austrian times is necessary both for scientific and practical terms.

The objective of the article is to analyse the formation of Chernivtsi self-government, the development of the main principles of municipal governance, the proposals of some public figures of that Bukovina time on the reorganisation of the city Charter and the electoral law for elections to the City Council in 1909-1914.

FORMATION OF CHERNIVTSI SELF-GOVERNMENT IN 1775-1849

At the time of joining Northern Moldavia to Austria, Chernivtsi was the centre of the *province* (district), a small settlement that was repeatedly devastated during various wars. According to the census of 1774, carried out during the Russian-Turkish war by the Russian military administration, there were 388 households.¹³ Almost the same number (366) of households was in Suceava, the former capital of the Moldavian Principality.¹⁴ If we take into account that, at that time, an average of five people lived in a household, then there were about two thousand inhabitants in Chernivtsi at that time.

The decisive role in the future of the city was played by the Austrian authorities, which officially named the annexed territory Bukovina and made Chernivtsi the administrative centre of the region, set up military units, and then the district government.

However, this issue had been discussed for several years. Gabriel von Spleny, the first military leader of the region, considered it necessary to raise Sadagura and make it the centre of the military district between the Dniester and Siret, while Suceava would become the centre of the military district between Siret and Transylvania.¹⁵ However, this idea never came true. Karl von Enzenberg, his successor, thought that Suceava should be the centre of the region. Finally, the Royal Military Council in Vienna decided to leave the military administration in Chernivtsi in 1778.¹⁶ This decision, of course, has contributed to the rapid growth

¹³ Молдавия в эпоху феодализма [Moldova in the Era of Feudalism], Кишинев, Штиинца, 1975, Т. VII, Ч. 1, *Переписи населения Молдавии 1772-1773 и 1774 гг.* [Moldova Population Census of 1772-1773 and 1774], с. 370-374.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

¹⁵ Gabriel Spleny, *Beschreibung des Bukoviner Districts*, in *Bucovina în primele descrieri geografice, istorice, economice și demografice*, Cernăuți, 2019, p. 106.

¹⁶ В. Ботушанський, *Місто в період австрійського правління...* с. 83.

of the number of residents, the development of the city and put on the agenda the formation of the city government.

Spleny noted that Chernivtsi had neither special privileges nor other attributes of ordinary municipal administration at the time of annexation to Austria¹⁷. During the first years after the annexation, previously appointed Moldovan officials were in charge of the administration of Chernivtsi, but under the supervision of Austrian officers. However, in 1775, Gabriel Spleny proposed to establish a magistrate in Chernivtsi. Spleny's successor, General Karl Enzenberg, took the same initiative several times. However, the case had dragged on for more than a decade. Only on February 8, 1786, Chernivtsi received the city Charter, signed by the leaders of the military administration. According to this Charter, the city was governed by a public (city) court, which consisted of a city judge and four assistant deputies. They were elected for a term of 3 years. Also, a syndic position with knowledge of the law and local language, a clerk, a police officer, a magistrate's clerk, four court clerks, and two overnight security guards positions were provided for the city administration.¹⁸

All residents of the city, according to the Charter, formed a single community, but only residents of the Christian faith had active and passive suffrage.

The biggest drawback of the first city Charter of Chernivtsi was that the municipal administration was completely subordinated first to the regional military leadership, and then to Galicia viceroyalty and local district government. It is worth noting that in August 1786, Emperor Joseph II signed the imperial patent on the accession of Bukovina to Galicia as a separate district.¹⁹

The limited powers of the magistrate were demonstrated by the fact that it had the right to decide on the costs of no more than 10 florins. If the amount was higher, permission from the district' administration was needed. Without the permission of the district' administration, it was impossible to start any construction in the town. In practice, the district' administration considered the magistrate as one of its divisions.

¹⁷ Gabriel Spleny, p. 52; Al. Bocăneț, *Istoria orașului Cernăuți pe timpul Moldovei* [History of Chernivtsi city during Moldova], Studiu introductiv: prof. univ. dr. Ștefan Purici, Notă asupra ediției și indice de nume: Rodica Iațencu, Cernăuți, Editura „Zelena Bukovyna”, 2010.

¹⁸ Raimund Kaindl, *Geschichte...*, S. 103-104.

¹⁹ Johann Polek, *Die Vereinigung der Bukowina mit Galizien im Jahre 1786*, Czernowitz, 1900, S. 52.

According to the Austrian classification of that time, the Chernivtsi administration belonged to the so-called unregulated magistrates. In 1792, at the insistence of the Galician viceroyalty, such magistrates were to be called "community courts," the burgomaster was called "the judge of the community," and the adviser was called the "lay assessor of the community."²⁰ This name also emphasised that the municipal government had no autonomous rights. The same year, changes regarding elections to the community court were introduced. They became two-stage. Only the Chernivtsi residents of the Christian faith participated in the election campaign. First, they elected the so-called burgher committee, which consisted of at least 12 people, and then that committee elected the president of the court and the lay assessors of the community.

However, the development of Chernivtsi required an improved local administration system. It is important to know that in the early 19th century, a considerable number of Chernivtsi residents understood the need for change. During the visit of the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph I to Chernivtsi in 1823, a delegation of Chernivtsi residents asked him to approve the regulated magistrate, that is, to enforce the Magdeburg Law.²¹ The residents of Chernivtsi appealed to various authorities several times on the issue of local self-governance improvement.

Finally, on September 2, 1832, Chernivtsi was granted the Magdeburg Rights²². This privilege was an important step in the development of local self-government. After that, the importance of the burgomaster, magistrate and petty-bourgeois committee significantly increased, and the opportunities to solve urgent city problems expanded. However, the autonomous rights of Chernivtsi should not be exaggerated. The dependence on the district government was quite substantial. As R. Kindle wrote: "...too much influence of the district and regional authorities and the small importance of the petty-bourgeois committee remained in the future a brake on the development of the city".²³

The area belonging to Chernivtsi was finally prepared in the middle of the 19th century. First, they dealt with the suburban villages of Rosha, Gorecha, Kalichanka and Klokuchka. In 1847, by a decree of the Galician viceroyalty, all four

²⁰ Raimund Kaindl, *Geschichte...*, S. 107.

²¹ О.Масан, І. Чеховський..., с. 23.

²² Raimund Kaindl, *Geschichte...* S. 110.

²³ *Ibid.*, S. 118.

urban villages became suburbs, and their inhabitants were granted the same petty-bourgeois right as the residents of Chernivtsi.²⁴

The revolution of 1848-1849 became a new milestone date for Chernivtsi. In the Constitution of March 4, 1849, signed by Emperor Franz Joseph under the pressure of revolutionary events, Bukovina was separated from Galicia and proclaimed a separate crown land of the Empire, with the status of a duchy. Chernivtsi became the capital of one of the 15 lands of Cisleithania, which significantly increased the status of the city.

The same Constitution proclaimed several innovations in the local governance of the Empire. In particular, paragraph 33 guaranteed the right to elect community representatives to self-government bodies, independently accept new community members and manage community activities, openly carry out financial activities, hold public meetings of their representatives etc.²⁵ These provisions were developed in a separate temporary community act of March 17, 1849. The introductory part of this law, in particular, specified that "the basis of a free state is free communities."²⁶ A wide range of powers, which were divided into natural and delegated ones, was granted to the communities. However, this law was not put into effect, because on December 31, 1851, the Constitution of 1849 was abolished. The empire established a neo-absolutist order.

THE 1864 CHERNIVTSI CHARTER: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Further changes took place in Austria after the publication of the October Diploma of 1860 and the February Patent of 1861, which restored the constitutional system in the state. On March 5, 1862, a law was passed that laid down the basic rules for governing local communities.²⁷ It defined the powers of local communities. According to this law, the communities were responsible for the security of individuals and property, the development of local roads, bridges, supervision of standards of weights and measures, health care, supervision of official order, supervision of morals, caring for the needy, supervision of construction and fire safety, founding and maintaining public schools, resolving disputes between

²⁴ Johann Polek, *Historische Skizze...*, S. 2.

²⁵ *Allgemeines Reichs-Gesetz-und Regierungsblatt für das Kaiserthum Österreich. Jahrgang 1849*, Wien, 1850, S. 154.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, S. 203.

²⁷ *Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Österreich. Jahrgang 1862*, IX. Stück, Wien, 1862, S. 36-41.

members of the community in connection with the election of community representatives, voluntary public auctions of movable property etc.

The law stated that any property had to be registered in the communities.

Article 22 of the law of 1862 on local communities stipulated that the capital cities of the crown lands, as well as other important cities and resorts, would receive separate charters based on regional laws that must be approved by the emperor.²⁸

Based on the general imperial law on local communities and public self-government on November 14, 1863, the "Public Order for the Dukedom of Bukovina" was approved.²⁹ It stated that every community with its own governing bodies in a city, town or village is considered a local community. It was stressed that several communities could unite, but only voluntarily.

The imperial law of March 5, 1862, and the regional law of November 14, 1863, became the legal basis for the development of local self-government in Bukovina. Based on these laws, the Bukovina Diet adopted a law approved by Emperor Franz Joseph on March 8, 1864, which granted Chernivtsi a separate public Charter.³⁰ Since that time, Chernivtsi appeared in statistical and other documents as a city with a separate Charter. There were 33 cities with separate charters in the early 20th century in Austria.³¹ It was only Chernivtsi in Bukovina, while in Galicia –Lviv and Krakow.

The Charter of Chernivtsi consisted of three sections and had 109 articles. The first section, called "On the territory of the municipal community and members of the community", stated that the community of Chernivtsi consisted of Chernivtsi and the suburbs – Roshia, Klokuchka, Kalichanka and Gorecha³².

The community made a distinction between community members and outsiders. Members of the community were divided into those who belong to the community and the bourgeois. The first were the indigenous inhabitants of Chernivtsi. The bourgeois status was granted to those who took an oath. This right was granted only to men who had their own household, were eligible for voting and suffrage, and paid a direct tax of at least 20 guilders annually for three years.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, S. 41.

²⁹ *Gesetz und Verordnungs Blatt für das Herzogtum Bukowina. Jahrgang 1863*, VII. Stück, S. 21-54.

³⁰ *Gesetz und Verordnungs Blatt für das Herzogtum Bukowina. Jahrgang 1864*, II. Stück, S. 3-33.

³¹ Werner Ogris, *Elemente europäischer Rechtskultur: rechtshistorische Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1961-2003*, Wien, Böhlau Verlag, 2003, S. 698.

³² *Gesetz und Verordnungs Blatt für das Herzogtum Bukowina, Jahrgang 1864*, II. Stück, S. 5.

The second section of the Charter explained the management of the community.³³ A community council and magistrate governed the city community. The community council was the administrative and supervisory body, and the magistrate was the administrative and executive body. Both the community council and the magistrate were led by the burgomaster (mayor).

Male members of the Chernivtsi community elected the community council. The bourgeois and honorary citizens had the right to participate in the elections, as well as everyone who paid at least 5 guilders, for house or land in the town centre and 3 guilders in the suburbs, and at least 10 guilders of direct taxes in the town centre, and 6 guilders in the suburbs.

Officers in military service, women, persons under guardianship, hired workers, assistants of artisans, people of no regular income, those who did not pay the due tax etc. were deprived of the right to vote. Those held responsible for criminal offences and vagrancy also lost their right to vote.

All male members of the community who were 24 years old had the right to vote. Officials and community servants were deprived of such rights, except for those who were deprived of eligibility to vote, persons found guilty of immorality, and exempted from service for disciplinary offences.

Generally speaking, it can be stated that the suffrage under this Charter was traditional for Austria and the vast majority of residents of Chernivtsi was deprived of the opportunity to influence in any way the election of the leadership of the city. For example, in 1897, only 2.2 thousand people had the right to vote (5%) of 60 thousand inhabitants (including 45 thousand above 24 years of age).³⁴

The Chernivtsi community was divided into three constituencies. The first constituency was the central part of Chernivtsi. Forty-five members of the community council were elected there. The suburb of Rosha was the second constituency. Three members of the community council were elected there. The suburbs of Kalichanka, Klokuchka and Gorecha made the third constituency. Two members of the community council were elected there.

It is easy to see a large disparity between Chernivtsi and the suburbs in the number of community council members. In 1869, 33,884 people lived in Chernivtsi. Of them, 23,360 (69%) people lived in the centre and 10,524 (31%) – in the suburbs.³⁵ At the same time, 90% of deputies were elected in the city centre

³³ *Ibid.*, S. 6-20.

³⁴ Василь Ботушанський, *Місто в період австрійського правління...*, с. 88.

³⁵ *Orts-Repertorium des Herzogtums Bukowina*, Czernowitz, 1872, S. 3.

and only 10% in the suburbs. This situation took place due to the number of taxpayers: the poorer Chernivtsi citizens lived in the suburbs (unlike today, where the wealthier Chernivtsi citizens live), of which few paid taxes more than 3 or 6 guilders, respectively.

In the first constituency, voters were divided into three electoral curiae. The voters of each curia ensured the payment of a third of the direct taxes. Fifteen deputies were elected from each curia. The second and third districts were not divided into electoral curiae.

Each voter had to vote in person. To do this, the voter had to arrive at the appointed time at the appropriate place of the election commission, where he was recorded in the register of voters. Each voter wrote as many names on the card among those elected to the community council in his curia or constituency.

A person elected to the community council had no right to refuse the choice without a good reason. In case of refusal, the city council had the right to impose a fine of one hundred guilders.

The community council was elected for four years. Half of the members of the community council were re-elected every two years. This half was re-elected by lot the first time. The community council elected a burgomaster from its members. At least three quarters from the members of the city council were to participate in the elections. Whoever obtained the absolute number of votes was considered elected. The burgomaster was elected for four years, and the vice-burgomaster for two years. The emperor approved the election of the burgomaster. Members of the community council worked voluntarily, the burgomaster and vice-burgomaster received salaries.

As already noted, the magistrate was the administrative and executive body of the community. The magistrate consisted of the burgomaster, vice-burgomaster, four city councillors, as well as a certain number of officials and staff.

The third section of the charter described the competence of the urban community and its self-government bodies³⁶.

As in the laws on local self-government of 1862 and 1863, the sphere of authorities of the municipal community was divided into independent and transferred. The independent sphere included urban utilities management, supervision of security of person and property, maintenance of roads, squares, bridges, safety of road traffic and waterways, the monitoring of trade, standards of weights and measures, health care, supervision of servants and workers, supervise

³⁶ *Gesetz und Verordnungs Blatt für das Herzogtum Bukowina. Jahrgang 1864*, II. Stück, S. 20-33.

the construction, fire protection, the development of primary (popular) and secondary schools, arrangement of disputes on the election of the members of the community representatives, the police, the maintenance of charitable institutions, of the bourgeois hospital etc.³⁷

The transferred sphere included supervision over the observance of general imperial and regional laws and the affairs of political management.³⁸

The community (city) council was responsible for protecting the interests of the community. It had to take care of the movable and immovable property of the community, form the revenue and expenditure parts of the city budget, take care of covering the shortfalls, and publish the budget. The community council had the power to impose additional taxes on direct and income taxes.

The community sphere of authorities also included the election of the burgomaster, his deputy and city councillors, the provision of property rights, granting the right to the middle class and the title of honorary citizen, the determination of the number of officials and public servants and their salaries, the submission of petitions on behalf of the community. The community council had the right to establish its execution orders, and their violators were to be fined up to 25 guilders or arrested for up to 5 days.³⁹

The meetings of the community council had to be conducted by the burgomaster or his deputy. They were supposed to be conducted in public, but in some cases, by the decision of the burgomaster or by the proposal of five council members, they could be held behind closed doors.

Regarding the magistrate, it was specified that it had to comply with all decisions of the community council. The magistrate was responsible for preparing the draft budget of the city and submitting it to the community council for consideration three months before the beginning of the administrative year. The magistrate oversaw the community funds, charitable institutions, controlled the trade and the implementation of instructions for its conduct, monitored the receipt of community income, maintained the police.⁴⁰

The magistrate consisted of several departments, in particular economics, trade and industry, police department, which were divided into smaller divisions. The general trend was the increase in the number of departments and divisions.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, S. 20-21.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, S. 21-22.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, S. 24-25.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, S. 29-30.

All magistrate officers were paid according to rank. In the late 19th century, the staff list looked like this. The highest first rank went to the Director of the magistrate with a salary of 2600 FL a year. The councillors of the magistrate, the councillor for construction, with a salary of 1800 FL, and an accounting adviser with a salary of 1400 FL belonged to the second rank. The third rank included magistrate secretaries and civil engineers with a salary of 1400 FL and a municipal doctor with a salary of 1200 FL. The fourth rank – police inspector (salary 1200 FL), construction assistant, magistrate's commissioners, city cashier (salary 1100 FL) and the first municipal doctor (salary 1000 FL). The fifth rank included the positions of draftsman (900 FL), municipal doctors and a doctor for the poor, forester (600 FL), the sixth rank included two officials – 900 FL, one official – 800 FL, a cashier's controller and an account officer with an annual salary of 800 FL, fire safety commander – 700 FL, municipal veterinarian – 600 FL. Seventh rank – magistrate assistants, magistrate clerks with an annual salary of 600 FL and the eighth rank – accounting interns with an annual salary of 500 FL.⁴¹

City self-government bodies were under the control of higher authorities. In particular, the regional Diet, through its executive body, looked after the city estate and the community property to be in good condition. The Diet executive body had the right to demand a report from the city authorities on the state of affairs and send its commissioners to study these issues. Some issues, such as the sale of real estate worth more than 10 thousand guilders, obtaining a loan if it exceeded the city revenues, could be solved only by permission of the Bukovina Diet.

The regional authorities had to ensure that the municipal authorities did not go beyond their powers and did not violate existing laws. The regional government had the right to amend the Charter.

The government had the right to dissolve the city council. In the event of the city council dissolution, new elections were to be held within six weeks. A temporary magistrate was appointed, together with five city councillors led by the Chairman.⁴²

Thus, the Charter of 1864 significantly expanded the rights of the local government of Chernivtsi. This self-government worked on a democratic basis, but

⁴¹ Листування з міністерством внутрішніх справ про зміну штатного розпису магістрату [Correspondence with the Ministry of the Interior on Changing the Magistrate Staffing], in "Державний архів Чернівецької області (ДАЧО)" [State Archives of Chernivtsi Oblast (SACO)], ф. 39, Чернівецький міський магістрат, оп. 1, спр. 1858, p. 1-7.

⁴² Gesetz und Verordnungs Blatt für das Herzogtum Bukowina. Jahrgang 1864, II. Stück, S. 35.

the electoral system was based on the amount of taxes paid, as well as on certain privileged social groups. This limited large layers of the poorer population of Chernivtsi to access to local self-government.

The city council and the city magistrate led by the burgomaster had extended powers, but some matters were under the control of the Bukovina Diet, the regional President and the regional government.

Nevertheless, the Charter opened wide opportunities for the implementation of municipal self-government and provided the solution to economic and social development issues. The fact that in the late 19th – early 20th century the city quickly grew, developed infrastructure and intensive construction of administrative and residential buildings could be the confirmation of those opportunities. During 1869-1910, the population of Chernivtsi grew from 33,884 to 85,458 people, that is, more than 2.5 times.⁴³ In 1895, the first phase of water supply and sewerage was functional in the city, the next year – a power plant and electric street lighting, and in 1897, the first tram line was launched. Many elegant buildings were built in the city, including a theatre, a railway station, the house of justice, the house of the regional government etc. Anton Kochanowski was one of the most famous leaders of the city as mayor from 1866 to 1874 and from 1887 to 1905. He received many awards, including the title of Baron and the title of Honorary Mayor for his services to the city and the state.

There were also many issues in the development of the municipal economy. The most painful among them was the lack of funds, the gradual growth of the city budget deficit. Therefore, in 1907, the total annual income of Chernivtsi amounted to more than 2 million 150 thousand crowns, and expenses exceeded more than 2 million 300 thousand crowns.⁴⁴ That is, the deficit was more than 150 thousand crowns. Besides this, the city government was to take out significant loans, which placed a heavy burden on the citizens of Chernivtsi.

IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS: MODERNIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SELF- GOVERNMENT IN CHERNIVTSI IN THE LATE 19TH – EARLY 20TH CENTURY

The amendments to the Charter of Chernivtsi was made only twice until the late 19th century. The first time the Charter was amended in 1868, due to the adopted

⁴³ *Orts-Repertorium des Herzogtums Bukowina. Auf Grundlage der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1869 bearbeitet*, Czernowitz, 1869, S. 3; *Mitteilungen des statistischen Landesamtes des Herzogtums Bukowina*, Czernowitz, 1913. Heft XVII, S. 56-57.

⁴⁴ Raimund Kaindl, *Geschichte...* S. 163, 165.

law of September 20, 1868, which stipulated that strangers (community outsiders) began to be called partners of the community (Gemeindegenossen). They were granted eligibility to vote and suffrage in elections to the community council on the same principles as the community members.

Depending on tax payment or existing privileges, they were included in one of the three electoral curiae in the centre of Chernivtsi.⁴⁵

The second amendment took place following the law of March 1, 1874, which introduced the position of second vice-burgomaster.⁴⁶ One could only become a member of the magistrate when he replaced the burgomaster.

However, the situation changed in the early 20th century. Austria was experiencing a period of deep democratisation of state structures. The issue of reforming the electoral law to the Austrian Parliament, the introduction of general, equal and direct elections and vote by secret ballot was discussed quite vigorously. The Emperor approved this law on December 1, 1906. He assigned a defined number of seats in Parliament to each nationality. Some innovations were successfully implemented in the crown lands of Austria-Hungary. Some Diets cancelled stage elections and made them direct. The other ones introduced additional curiae where all voters of low-income backgrounds participated in the voting. In particular, in 1898, reforms were carried out by Lower Austria and Carinthia, 1901 – Czech Republic, 1902 – Upper Austria, 1904 – Styria.

However, the most radical changes were carried out by the Trieste and Moravian Diets. The former added to the existing curiae a new one, where the voters were only those who did not vote in the other curia. In November 1905, the Moravian Diet arranged a general electoral curia and introduced a national register for Czechs and Germans.⁴⁷

Bukovina did not lag behind other lands. Some reforms have been carried out in the land, in particular, the electoral law on elections to the Bukovina Diet was

⁴⁵ *Gesetz und Verordnungs Blatt für das Herzogtum Bukowina. Jahrgang 1868*, XII. Stück, S. 31-32.

⁴⁶ *Gesetz und Verordnungs Blatt für das Herzogtum Bukowina. Jahrgang 1874*, V. Stück, S. 9-12.

⁴⁷ Ульяна Уская, *Законы о "национальном уравнении" в Моравии 1905 г., на Буковине 1910 г. и в Галиции 1914 г.: сравнительная характеристика* ["The National Equalization" Laws in Moravia (1905), Bukovina (1910) and Galicia (1914): Comparative Characteristics], in "Codrul Cosminului", XXII, 2016, No. 2, p. 329-334.

changed based on the national register.⁴⁸ The new community Charter and the new electoral law for community self-government, adopted in 1909, were of great importance for the management of rural and urban communities. According to these laws, the system of local government was significantly democratised.

All that has fostered the debate on the need to amend the Charter of Chernivtsi. Ukrainians and Romanians were especially active in this endeavour. The majority of Chernivtsi residents of these ethnic groups belonged to the poor layers of the population and therefore had little representation in the community council of Chernivtsi. Meanwhile, the number of Ukrainians, Romanians and Poles among the inhabitants of Chernivtsi gradually grew. The population of Chernivtsi in 1900 was 67,622 inhabitants, among them, Germans and Jews – 34,441 people, Ukrainians – 13,030, Romanians – 9400, and 8896 Poles⁴⁹. Thus, Germans and Jews made up 50.9% of the population, Ukrainians – 19.2%, Romanians – 13.9%, and Poles – 13.1%.

For a long time, Ukrainians had no representation at all in the City Council and then had two council members. It was not until 1909 that Ukrainians won four seats (8%) for their representatives. Romanians won five seats (10%) that year.⁵⁰ Such low representation did not influence the decision-making process and caused discontent, which was repeatedly stated by the Ukrainian and Romanian representatives.

Therefore, Ukrainians, Romanians and some representatives of other ethnic groups, demanded to change the Charter of Chernivtsi, introducing the proportional system of elections to the City Council, or national curiae, like the electoral law to the Bukovina Diet, as well as to introduce universal suffrage. That issue was discussed a lot in the newspapers during the city Council elections of 1909.

At the Bukovina Diet meeting on October 15, 1909, a Romanian member of the Diet, Aurel Onciul, made an urgent proposal to draft a new electoral law and a new Charter of Chernivtsi and present them at the next Diet meeting. The Diet supported this proposal and instructed the standing commission responsible for the development of the reform of the electoral law to the Bukovina Diet, to prepare the necessary documents to consider this issue to the next meeting that was to begin on December 29.⁵¹ The city administration did not object to the changes but demanded coordination of offered reforms with it.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Gemeinde Lexikon der Bukowina. Bearbeitet auf Grund der Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1900*, Wien, 1907, S. 1.

⁵⁰ *Die Konstituierung frage*, in "Bukowiner Post", 1909, 2. März.

⁵¹ *Bukowiner Landtag*, in "Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung", 1909, 17. Oktober.

At the end of 1909, five versions of the new election law for the Chernivtsi city council were proposed for consideration by the Bukovina Diet. The Josef Wiedmann's draft, which proposed the introduction of universal, equal suffrage and secret voting was among those versions.⁵² However, it was said in Vienna that the Emperor would not approve the proposed project. The draft by Heinrich Kiesler provided for the division of the city into polling stations with a significant benefit for the downtown.⁵³ However, that draft was not supported by Ukrainian, Romanian and Polish members of the Diet. The third one, the so-called Diet draft, was developed by Aurel Onciul. Its main principle was proportional suffrage, participation of all men who reached 24 years of age in the election, arrangement of 4 constituencies, division of all voters into three curiae. The first curia included 3/12, the second – 4/12 and the third – 5/12 part of all voters. Each Curia had to elect 20 members of the council.

Nevertheless, this project did not receive the proper support. The fourth draft was proposed by the city council. The proposed draft left everything as before, only the tax qualification was reduced and an additional fourth general curia was introduced.⁵⁴ And, finally, the fifth draft, the so-called compromise variant, was also proposed by Aurel Onciul. This project was based on the national register and in general, it repeated the electoral law to the Bukovina Diet taking into account local features.⁵⁵

The first version of the compromise draft presented by Aurel Onciul provided that the city council would consist of 67 deputies. Of these, Germans and Jews in the city centre would have 27 deputies, Ukrainians, Romanians and Poles – 6 deputies each group. In the suburbs, Germans and Jews would have 13 deputies, and Ukrainians, Romanians and Poles – 3 for each national group. Thus, Germans and Jews would have 40 members of the council, while Ukrainians, Romanians and Poles – 9 deputies each.⁵⁶ However, during the discussions, each of the Nations sought to increase its representation. It was decided to increase the representation of the Germans and the Jews to 42, Ukrainians – 10, Romanians – 9 and Poles – 9 seats.

⁵² *Зміна громадського статуту і громадського виборчого закону в Чернівцях* [Changing the Public Charter and Public Election Law in Chernivtsi], in “Буковина”, 1909, 28 грудня.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Kompromissvorschlag für die Czernowitzer Gemeindewahlordnung*, in “Bukowiner Post”, 1909, 25 Dezember.

⁵⁶ *Die Gemeindewahlreform*, in “Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung”, 1910, 5. Januar.

However, discussions continued after that. The final version after the proposals of Alexander Hurmuzaki and Benno Straucher stated that 42 seats belonged to Germans and Jews and for Romanians, Ukrainians and Poles – 10 seats for each group. The total number of city council members (deputies) was 72. This decision was made on February 1, 1910.⁵⁷

The decision of the Diet did not satisfy some Ukrainian politicians, as well as the representatives of the Chernivtsi City Council – Germans and Jews. They were active in Vienna, so that the bill did not receive Imperial approval, criticised the state of affairs in the city council.

In particular, on May 22, 1910, the Ukrainian political society Ruska Rada convened an assembly in the Ukrainian People's House, where they discussed the weaknesses in the Chernivtsi administration. Ostap Luzkyj, secretary of the society, made a great speech. He accused the city council of wasting large sums of money on unnecessary things; the city did not keep records of real estate and land, the budget for the next year was not published on time, too much money was allocated for the maintenance of the administrative structures etc.⁵⁸

After those events, the draft city statute and election law were returned to the city council for revision.

It is necessary to pay tribute to deputies of Diet, they didn't delay reconsideration of the city Charter for a long time, made the necessary amendments and on October 18, 1912, Bukovina Diet ratified a new Charter of Chernivtsi⁵⁹ and a separate new electoral law on municipal self-government in Chernivtsi.⁶⁰ Thirty-one deputies voted for this bill, and nine were against it. The Jewish and German deputies opposed it because they were dissatisfied with certain provisions of the Charter, as well as a decrease in their influence on the magistrate.⁶¹

The Charter said that suffrage was extended to all segments of the city population, but property curiae (electoral districts) were preserved. There were 4 in the downtown, and 2 – in the suburbs. The community council would establish an executive committee (magistrate), which included the burgomaster, four vice-burgomasters and nine councillors. Each of the major nationalities had to have one

⁵⁷ *Cernăuți in 2 Februarie 1910*, in "Patria", 1910, 6 Februarie.

⁵⁸ *Віче чернівецьких русинів* [Chernivtsi Rusyn Meeting], in "Народний голос" (Чернівці), 1910, 25 травня.

⁵⁹ *Stenographische Protokolle des Bukowiner Landtages der zweiten Session der elften Wahlperiode. 1912*, Czernowitz, 1912, Beilage 266, S. 2-37.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, S. 38-56.

⁶¹ *Die Gemeindewahlreform für Czernowitz*, in "Czernowitzer Tagblatt", 1912, 23 Oktober.

vice-burgomaster. As for the councillors, six of them represented the German-Jewish curia, and the rest of the national curiae had one representative each in the magistrate. Proportional suffrage was introduced in national curiae and constituencies.⁶² That is, the members of the Diet tried to adopt the most democratic law possible and therefore considered it necessary to take into account both the social aspects of the voters and the relative proportion of ethnic groups in the total number of voters.

It is worth noting that a significant part of the city council deputies opposed the amendments to the Charter. A sharp debate broke out around the issue of updating the Charter at a meeting of the city council on October 22, 1912, after which 25 deputies protested against the steps of the Bukovina Diet.⁶³ Perhaps that influenced the central government because until the beginning of World War I, the new Charter of Chernivtsi was not approved by the Emperor.

CONCLUSIONS

The history of Chernivtsi self-government development from the late 18th to early 20th century shows that during the mentioned period many gradual changes took place. The major discourse focused on the expansion of the powers of municipal authorities, attracting the general population to those processes, reducing all kinds of restrictions for voters, a phenomenon that was characteristic to the entire Austrian part of the Empire.

We can distinguish several periods in the development of Chernivtsi local self-government. The first – the period from the accession of the region to Austria and early 1860s, was marked by the elimination of the Moldovan medieval principles of the local administration organisation and the gradual transition to European forms of municipal administration, the introduction of the Magdeburg Law, the arrangement of the city territory, and establishment of bourgeois rights.

The second period – from 1860s to 1909 – was marked by the adoption of a new City Charter approved by the Emperor. The Charter opened wide opportunities for the development of the municipal governance based on the democratic principles, though the legal advantage of the wealthy city inhabitants and separate privileged groups of inhabitants of the city over the less wealthy ones was maintained. At that

⁶² *Stenographische Protokolle des Bukowiner Landtages der zweiten Session der elften Wahlperiode. 1912*, Czernowitz, 1912, Beilage 266, S. 7-11.

⁶³ *Aus dem Rathause*, in "Czernowitzer Tagblatt", 1912, 24 Oktober.

time, Chernivtsi achieved significant success in the development of infrastructure, the development of the central part of the city, and the formation of European standards in the functioning of the municipal services.

The development of the city as a multinational centre put on the agenda the needs of each national group. Therefore, in 1909, a new period of the city self-government development began when national curiae were proposed to be introduced in the election of the city council. The bill adopted by the Bukovina Diet in 1912, in general, opened up good prospects for municipal self-government development and the expanding of the city autonomy. However, it was not approved by the emperor until the outbreak of World War I, which halted the gradual development of self-government in Chernivtsi.

THE THESSALONIKI FRONT: THE POSITION OF ROMANIA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE RUSSIAN PRESS OF AUTUMN 1915

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Abstract. *The article discusses the Russian press covering the events on the Thessaloniki (Macedonian) front during the First World War. It is noted that at the beginning of the twentieth century the press became a noticeable phenomenon in the political life of Russia. Massive press campaigns accompanied all major international conflicts of the pre-war period. During the First World War, the press played an extremely important role; it was not only the main source of information but also turned into a powerful means of ideological and political influence. For example, by analysing the perspective of the Russian press on the position of Romania during the First World War and taking into account both the domestic political situation and its relationship with Entente and the Central Powers, the authors demonstrate that the Russian press was an independent and multifaceted source, perfectly capable to accurately portray important events of the international life. For this article, the authors have made use of materials from famous and influential Russian newspapers, such as “Русское Слово” (Russian word), “Новое Время” (New Time), “Речь” (Speech) and the social-political journal “Вестник Европы” (Bulletin of Europe).*

Keywords: First World War, Thessaloniki, Romania, Russian press, front, Balkans.

Rezumat. Frontul din Salonic: poziția României în lumina presei ruse din toamna anului 1915. *Articolul pune în discuție materialele presei ruse care acoperă evenimentele de pe frontul de la Thessaloniki (Macedonia) în timpul Primului Război Mondial. Se notează că la începutul secolului al XX-lea, presa a devenit un fenomen remarcabil în viața politică a Rusiei. Toate conflictele internaționale majore ale perioadei dinaintea războiului au fost acompaniate de campanii masive de presă. În timpul Primului Război Mondial, presa a jucat un rol extrem de important, fiind nu numai principala sursă de informație, ci transformându-se și într-un mijloc de influență ideologică și politică. De exemplu, prin analiza publicațiilor cu privire la poziția României în timpul conflictului global*

și luând în considerare atât situația politică internă din țară, cât și relația sa cu blocurile aflate în război, autorii arată că materialele presei ruse sunt o sursă independentă și multifacetată, capabilă să reconstruiască evenimente importante din viața internațională a perioadei luate în considerare. În articol au fost folosite materialele unor ziare rusești celebre și influente, ca "Russkoe Slovo", "Novoye Vremya", "Rech" și jurnalul socio-politic "Vestnik Evropy".

Résumé : Le front de Thessalonique: la position de la Roumanie dans l'éclairage de la presse russe de l'automne 1915. L'article traite des documents de la presse russe couvrant les événements sur le front de Thessalonique (Macédonien) pendant la Première Guerre mondiale. Il est à noter qu'au début du XXe siècle, la presse est devenue un phénomène notable dans la vie politique de la Russie. Tous les grands conflits internationaux d'avant-guerre ont été accompagnés de campagnes de presse massives. Pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, la presse joua un rôle extrêmement important. Ce n'était pas seulement la principale source d'information, elle était également devenue un puissant moyen d'influence idéologique et politique. Par exemple, en analysant les publications concernant la position de la Roumanie pendant le conflit mondial et en tenant compte à la fois de la situation politique intérieure du pays et de ses relations avec les blocs en guerre, les auteurs montrent que le matériel de la presse russe est un document indépendant et multiforme, source capable de reconstruire des événements importants de la vie internationale de la période considérée. Dans cet article ont été utilisés des matériaux de journaux russes célèbres et influents, tels que "Russkoe Slovo", "Novoye Vremya", "Rech" et le journal socio-politique "Vestnik Evropy".

INTRODUCTION

Despite censorship and close attention from the authorities, the Russian press has played a significant role in the social and political life of its country. As domestic and foreign policy events were evolving, the Russian press was actively improving and entering political life. It developed not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively, providing readers with extensive information about important events of domestic and international life. Moreover, most importantly, it not only reflected but also actively shaped public opinion.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, especially after the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, which provided the population with some civil rights and freedoms, the influence of the press over the political life of Russia becomes even more significant, addressing matters of foreign policy and international relations. It not only intensively developed within the country but also merged into the general global information flow and occupied a prominent place there. The tsarist government, which completely lost the propaganda rivalry game

during the Russian-Japanese war, finally realises the importance of the periodical press, the degree of its influence on public opinion at home and abroad, and begins to form its information policy. It was about time to do so because other small and big powers have long been using this new way of influencing public opinion.

The world entered a period of globalisation, when, thanks to new means of communication (telephone, telegraph, and then radio), any event of a social, political or economic nature worthy of attention, became in a very short time the property of almost the entire world community, especially when it came to a clash of interests between leading world powers. This phenomenon was not just simple information, but the influence of the press targeted over the public of their own and other foreign countries to prepare the way for the adoption and implementation of radical measures. Thus, all major international conflicts of the pre-war period – wars for the division of colonies of the late 19th – early 20th centuries, Bosnian and Moroccan crises, Balkan wars, etc. – were accompanied by massive campaigns in the press, sometimes acquiring the character of newspaper wars. During World War I, the press of the warring countries played an extremely important role. It was not only the main source of information but also turned into a powerful means of ideological and political influence.¹

The authors have analysed materials from the Russian press belonging to newspapers that influenced various social groups. Until the outbreak of World War I, the Russian newspapers published in Moscow, as well as some provincial newspapers (such as those from Kyiv or Odesa), have stimulated the public interest. Many of them were very respectable and produced at a high technical and consistent level. In our case, we turned to the analysis of materials from popular Russian periodicals - the newspapers “Russkoe Slovo”, “Novoye Vremya”, “Rech”, and one of the oldest socio-political journals “Vestnik Evropy”.

The influential liberal newspaper “Russian Word” was quite comparable with the largest European and American publications. I. D. Sytin, a well-known Russian entrepreneur and publisher, was its founder and publisher. The newspaper was well delivered, had substantial financial resources, had an advanced technical print base, an excellent selection of editors and journalists, and was distributed throughout Russia. The “Russkoe Slovo published famous writers”; it had a correspondent network in Russia and many foreign countries. The information printed in it was operational and reliable, which made the

¹ S. Badsey, *Propaganda: Media in War Politic*, in *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/propaganda_media_in_war_politics (Accessed 10 September, 2019).

newspaper very popular.²

“Novoye Vremya” was one of the publications that sympathised with the government, but also spoke more critically than government officials speak about certain issues and even criticised some government decisions. In doing so, the newspaper could “throw” certain “test balls” into society, waiting for a reaction of public opinion or trying to formulate this reaction. The newspaper used the services of various news agencies, starting with the official St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency (SPA), as well as the most influential foreign ones, using materials from the foreign press. Nevertheless, its main advantage was the presence of its correspondents abroad in major world centres, high-class journalists and original publicists. Representatives of the liberal intelligentsia did not like the newspaper very much for being close to government circles but had to respect it for the speed and completeness of the published information.³

The newspaper “Rech” belonged to the so-called “party” print media. It was the central organ of the liberal party of constitutional democrats (the cadets). “Rech” was not as popular as “Russkoe Slovo” or “Novoye Vremya”, did not have a large journalist team, and paid much more attention to internal problems and party issues. Among the authors of the newspaper were representatives of liberal intelligence, especially teachers. One of the most published authors was the leader of the cadet party, a famous historian, professor and deputy of the State Duma P. N. Milyukov. He considered himself a connoisseur of international problems and repeatedly published his extensive articles on topical issues of Russian foreign policy, often critical of the official foreign policy. P. N. Milyukov led the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for some time after the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. However, having waited for his “finest hour”, he was not able to win recognition in his country either among the right or among the left political groups.⁴ As it turned out in practice, criticising was much easier than implementing real politics.

“Vestnik Evropy” is a popular monthly historical, political and literary journal of liberal orientation, published in St. Petersburg from 1866 to 1918. “Vestnik Evropy” was intended for certain circles of the professorial, bureaucratic, and other liberal intelligentsia who criticised the most odious manifestations of

² *Ibid.*

³ “Novoye Vremya” [New Time] (newspaper), ACADEMIC, in <https://enacademic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/11357114> (Accessed 15 September, 2019).

⁴ M. K. Stockdale, *Politics, Morality and Violence: Kadet Liberals and the Question of Terror, 1902-1911*, in “Russian History”, Vol. 22, 1995, No. 4, p. 455-480.

autocracy. The journal rejects the revolutionary methods and advocates the implementation of a system of reforms that would turn Russia into a constitutional monarchical state. In the field of foreign policy, "Vestnik Evropy" adhered to a moderate critical position concerning the activities of tsarist diplomacy, believing that it was not always defending the interests of Russia. While covering the Balkan problems, the magazine spoke on the side of the Balkan peoples fighting against the Turkish yoke and was sharply critical of the foreign policy of the German Empire and its allies from the Balkans. It published serious analytical materials on pressing international issues.

The print media in question paid much attention to events on the fronts of the First World War. In particular, it is in these newspapers that one can often find materials characterising the position of the Romanian kingdom during the global conflict. An analysis of other Russian newspapers of different political directions shows that, for example, the Bolshevik press was not interested in specific events on the battlefields, focusing its critical attention on the failures of the Russian troops, unjustified losses, on unrest and protests in the rear and on the front.⁵

The Bolsheviks believed that the world war was unleashed due to irreconcilable contradictions of the interests of rival imperialist groups, seeking to redistribute the already divided world. Therefore, the attitude of the Bolsheviks and the working class of Russia towards the war, in their opinion, should have been negative. They called the war unfair, aggressive and imperialistic. Nevertheless, if the war began, then it had to be transformed from imperialist to civilian in order to overthrow the Russian autocracy. This line was carried out throughout the war. The leader of the Bolsheviks V. I. Lenin clearly identified the main culprits of the war – Germany, and England. In addition, Serbia was called the victim of imperialist politics.⁶

THE THESSALONIKI FRONT AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

The Thessaloniki (Macedonian) front was formed after the attack of Bulgarian troops in the fall of 1915 on Serbia. This attack placed the Serbian army in the face of imminent defeat. The Entente Allies decided to land British and French contingents in the port of the Greek city of Thessaloniki to come to

⁵ K. Rogatchevskaia, *Propaganda in the Russian Revolution*, British Library, in <https://www.bl.uk/russian-revolution/articles/propaganda-in-the-russian-revolution> (Accessed 15 September, 2019).

⁶ "Социал-демократ" [Social Democrat], Женева, № 56, ноябрь 6, 1916.

the aid of the Serbian forces. The Entente discussed the possibility of launching military operations in Macedonia at a time when troops were needed on the main fronts of the war. Therefore, the number of Allied troops was too small to have an effective impact and change the position of the Serbian army. Much depended on the position taken by three important Balkan states - Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece.

From the very beginning of the war, it was important for both warring coalitions to involve the neutral Balkan states of Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece on their side. As Russian military historians noted, these countries were a bridge between Europe and Asia, had large reserves of strategic raw materials (for example, Romania had large reserves of brown coal, iron ore, and most importantly oil), and could put up armies of up to 1,5 million fighters. This material and human potential was an important factor in the plans of the General staff on both sides.⁷ The diplomatic battle for Romania began even before the outbreak of the First World War. The two blocs preparing for the battle were very interested in getting Romania as an ally. Russia was aware of the disagreements between Bulgaria and Romania and tried to maintain good relations with both countries. The obvious inclination of Bulgaria's foreign policy towards Berlin and Vienna caused by Russia's support for the Balkan Union and the sympathy of Russian public opinion for Serbia, have led to important decisions. In June 1914, one of the main events of Russian-Romanian relations took place in Constanta - a meeting between the Russian emperor and the king of Romania, Carol I. As noted by the famous Soviet historian and *Balkan specialist* Yu. A. Pisarev, "The Constantza meeting contributed to the freezing of Russian-Bulgarian relations. Sofia was very nervous about the fact that the tsar and the Russian Foreign Minister travelled to Romania."⁸

During the meeting, Nicholas II awarded the Romanian king the honorary title of "Marshal of the Russian battlefield", and Carol I, in turn, awarded the Russian emperor the honorary title of "Chief of the Romanian regiment", the very one that entered the territory of Bulgaria in 1913. There were rumours about the allegedly possible engagement of the Romanian heir to the throne with the Russian Grand Duchess Tatyana. "The dynastic ties of the Hohenzollern-

⁷ *История Первой мировой войны 1914-1918* [History of the First World War 1914-1918], В 2-х томах. Том 2, Москва, Издательство "Наука", 1975, с. 6-7.

⁸ Ю. А. Писарев, *Великие державы и Балканы накануне Первой мировой войны* [The Great Powers and the Balkans on the eve of World War I], Москва, Издательство "Наука", 1985, с. 242.

Sigmaringen with the Romanovs, according to the ruling circles of Bulgaria, could lead to the strengthening of the position of Romania, which occupied anti-Bulgarian positions”.⁹

Following these events, the King of Bulgaria went to Vienna, where he held talks with Chancellor Berchtold to gain the support of the Austro-Hungarian Empire against Romania. No precise information was recorded on the content of the negotiations, but it was suggested that their scope reached the subject of possible joint military operations against the Romanian kingdom and Russia in case of war. According to the Soviet historians F. I. Notovich and Yu. A. Pisarev, the negotiations were “about a preliminary agreement between Austro-Hungarian Empire and Bulgaria on an alliance, but Bulgaria was warned against a quarrel with Romania”.¹⁰ The alliance between Bulgaria and the Central Powers began to take shape in the autumn of 1914 after the outbreak of World War I. German diplomacy worked hard to bring Bulgaria to the side of the Central Powers. Germany relied on Bulgarian resources (Bulgaria could mobilise an army of 500 thousand soldiers and, from an operational point of view, this meant an advantageous position in case of an attack on Serbia), and on the desire of the Bulgarian government to return the territory lost in the Second Balkan War.¹¹ During the Sofia negotiations of June to September 1915, the German representatives managed to mediate a reconciliation between Bulgaria and Turkey. On September 6, 1915, the Bulgarian government signed a military convention, a treaty of alliance and friendship and an agreement on financial and material assistance. Thus, German diplomacy defeated the Entente. Germany promised to convey Bulgaria for military assistance to the Serbian Macedonia, Romania and part of the border area of Turkey.¹²

Germany's attempts to win over Romania and Greece had failed. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, the Russian envoy to Bucharest, Poklevsky, informed Petersburg through a telegram dated August 2, 1914, that the Romanian Prime Minister Brătianu had informed him of the start of the war and in the course of the conversation had asked, “Would we consider Romania's neutrality as a sign of friendship”. To this, the envoy, relying on the opinion of the

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, cc. 242-243.

¹¹ R. C. Hall, *Bulgaria, International Encyclopaedia of the First World War*, in <https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/bulgaria> (Accessed 21 September, 2019).

¹² *История Первой мировой войны 1914-1918*, Том 2, с. 7.

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, answered: "in the affirmative tone." He thanked Brătianu for his "friendly communication".¹³

In a telegram from August 3, 1914, the Russian envoy informed Minister Sazonov about the Great Council of Sinaia where the King of Romania, members of the government and party leaders "almost unanimously" decided to strengthen the military means to protect Romania's borders. The envoy notes that, in his opinion, "this is not an announcement of neutrality and, as has already been said, indicates Romania's willingness to wait for a proof of attitude".¹⁴

Greece and Romania declared their neutrality, although, after the fall of the Entente-friendly cabinet of Venizelos in Greece, the new Greek government ended the agreement with Serbia, saying that this agreement provided for assistance only in case of conflict with the Balkan countries. Having joined Germany, "Bulgaria is no longer a Balkan state".¹⁵ Of course, this was an excuse, but this way, the Greek government created a favourable situation for Germany and Austria in the Balkans. The Entente diplomacy "was late again".¹⁶ As the British historian, Liddle Hart has noted, Bulgaria's entry into the war will accelerate Serbia's defeat and then lead to the transfer of Central Powers troops to the western front.¹⁷

The presence of the Entente troops in Thessaloniki was intended to strengthen its authority in the eyes of the public and the politicians of the Balkan states. After the military and diplomatic failures, Entente "keeps an operational base from which Romania could be helped if expected to enter the war on the side of the allies".¹⁸ The expeditionary force on the Thessaloniki front was reinforced by new contingents of British and French troops, as well as troops arriving from Russia (2nd and 4th brigades of up to 18 thousand soldiers) and Italy. Russian brigades took an active part in the fighting of 1916 and 1917.¹⁹

The Russian Empire was responsible for the situation created in the Balkan region, as it knew Bulgaria's philosophical aspirations and failed to notice that the

¹³ *Международные отношения в эпоху империализма* [International Relations in the Age of Imperialism], Сокращенное издание. *Документы из архивов царского и временного правительств*, Серия III, 1914-1917 гг., Том 1, 1935, с. 539.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, с. 544.

¹⁵ "Русское Слово" [Russian Word], сентябрь 30 (октябрь 13), 1915.

¹⁶ Г. Б. Лиддел, *История Первой мировой войны* [History of the First World War], Москва, Издательство АСТ, 2017, с. 189.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, с. 183.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, с. 189.

¹⁹ C. Savich, *Succor for Serbia: The Russian Expeditionary Force to Salonika in 1916*, in <http://serbianna.com/analysis/archives/3474> (Accessed 01 October, 2019).

Bulgarian leadership was inclined towards an alliance with the German bloc. Perhaps this is the reason why Russia did not have adequate discussions with Romania about joining Entente. The idea of the presence of Russian troops in the Balkans became more and more persistent. It was also believed that Bulgarian soldiers would not open fire on Russian troops.²⁰

The autumn of 1915 was characterised by a difficult situation in the Balkans, complicated by numerous Balkan and international contradictions, intrigues of the warring parties, trying to win over the Balkan states that were not yet involved in the war.

THE REFLECTION OF THE BALKAN EVENTS IN THE RUSSIAN PRESS

The Russian press paid much more attention to the events after the start of full-scale hostilities in the Balkans. In the newspapers appeared a regular column called - "Balkan Front". In this section, we can find reports on military operations, troop movements, expediency and timeliness of the opening of the front in Macedonia. The military, political, and economic situation of the Entente Allies and the Central Powers led by the German Empire were also examined. The plans of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria to destroy the Serbian state were stated and criticised. The military actions and the role of Thessaloniki (Macedonia) front for the military position of France, Russia, Serbia, and their enemies, was constantly analysed. Particular attention was offered to the actions of Serbian and Montenegrin armies. The press also expressed its admiration for their steadfastness, sympathy, and solidarity with the fraternal Christian people. The military operations and the fate of the Russian troops, which were sent at the request of England and France to the Balkans, were also analysed.²¹

The Russian press unambiguously perceived the attack of the Bulgarian troops on Serbia as a "stab in the back", treachery, Russia's betrayal, the factual declaration of war against Russia, which appeared to be also a betrayal of the interests of all the Slavs and Christian peoples from the Balkans.²² The

²⁰ Р. Пуанкаре, *На службе Франции. Воспоминания. 1914 – 1918* [In the service of France. Memories. 1914 - 1918], Кн. 2., Москва, 1936, с. 85.

²¹ С. П. Костриков, *Русская пресса о событиях на Салоникском фронте. Россия в конце XIX – начале XX вв. Историко-культурные аспекты* [Russian press about the events on the Thessaloniki front. Russia in the late 19th – early 20th centuries. Historical and cultural aspects], Москва, Издательский дом ГУУ, 2016, сс. 52-59.

²² "Речь" [Speech], октябрь 3 (13), 1915; "Новое Время" [New Time], октябрь 7 (20), 1915.

newspaper "Rech" saw no reason for Bulgaria to intervene in the unresolved Macedonian question: "...And Russia was ready to give it Macedonia. But Russia wanted allied troops to guard Macedonia for Bulgaria, and Bulgaria wanted to send its soldiers to Macedonia." The newspaper summarised the policies of the Bulgarian government and noted: "The immorality of Bulgarian politics is at the level of its recklessness".²³

"Novoye Vremya" published an analytical article on Russian foreign policy in the Balkans, where it asked: "was everything conceivable done to provide real help to the heroic Slavic people, who entrusted their fate to the four allied great powers?"²⁴ The author accuses Italy of harming its interests and of not being in a hurry to help Serbia.

A columnist for the "Rech" newspaper noted the presence of huge German and allied military forces in the Balkans. In his opinion, this did not defeat Serbia, but threatened the entire Balkans, pointing to the far-reaching plans of Berlin to conquer the Middle East from Aleppo to Erzurum and from Jordan to Arabia and Yemen.²⁵

The Russian newspapers noted that, unlike Bulgaria, Romania was generally oriented towards the Entente, and its King Ferdinand I, ignoring his German family ties, was neutral from the very beginning of the world conflict. This attitude did not mean that his government was not subjected to serious pressure from German and Austrian relatives and diplomats. At the same time, the opposition and most of the country's public opinion stood firm for cooperation with the powers of the Tripartite Accord. The Romanian leadership, as noted in the Russian newspapers "did not make any sudden moves," as he was aware of all the consequences of entering a global conflict. "Russkoe Slovo" mentioned a clause from a published agreement between Bulgaria and the Austro-German bloc, which stipulated: "if Romania opposes Bulgaria, we are to attack Romania with the same army".²⁶ Given the complexity of the situation, the Romanian Prime Minister Brătianu, according to the Russian press sources, was in constant contact with both powers: Entente and the German bloc.

"Russkoe Slovo" noted that "Romania, not being connected with Serbia by a formal union agreement (unlike Greece), is trying to stay away from impending formidable events." A newspaper columnist stresses that this is a legal right of

²³ "Речь" [Speech], октябрь 3 (16), 1915.

²⁴ "Новое Время" [New Time], октябрь 10 (23), 1915.

²⁵ "Речь" [Speech], октябрь 7 (20), 1915.

²⁶ "Русское Слово" [Russian Word], сентябрь 30 (октябрь 13), 1915.

the Romanian state. However, he believes that “the most pressing interests of Romania dictate intervention in the war in order to put an end to Bulgarian predatory designs”.²⁷

The correspondent of “Novoye Vremya” from Paris wrote that after the start of the Bulgarian military operations against the Serbian forces, the Romanian government did not make any serious political statements, but, according to the French Prime Minister Viviani, “it behaved with dignity”.²⁸ “Russkoe Slovo” also mentioned the words of the French PM who stated that the Allies were satisfied with Romania’s attitude and “its watch over the Austrian and Bulgarian borders”.²⁹ This position was the reason why the Bulgarian General Staff, after sending large forces against the Serbian army, continued to maintain a significant number of military formations at the Romanian border.³⁰

Analysing the situation of the unfolding world conflict, in October 1914 “Vestnik Evropy” wrote that “Transylvania waits only for Romania’s military intervention to join its possessions with the consent of the Allied powers. Thus, the proper elimination of the Austro-Hungarian inheritance requires the active participation of Italy and Romania, on which depends the fate of three million Transylvanian Romanians and the Italian population of Trentino and Istria”.³¹

This reasoning was caused not only by the desire of Entente to acquire new allies, but also by the fact that the German strategy of Blitzkrieg was failing, and it seemed that with combined efforts it would be possible to defeat the countries of the German bloc. A year later, the situation changed, especially after the entry of Bulgaria into the war.

“Vestnik Evropy” noted that “Romania has not taken a final decision, and its position has become really difficult” as Austrian forces were concentrated in the southern cities of Transylvania, with a hundred thousand soldiers’ army on the Bulgarian border. Romanian public opinion continued to be divided. Marghiloman recommended an alliance with the Central Powers. A new league was formed in favour of an energetic performance on the side of the quadruple accord. It is further indicated that Romania probably lost its chance for an active speech: “When the Russians were in the Carpathians and occupied Chernivtsi, the annexation of Romania could have become a decisive factor, if not for the fate of

²⁷ “Русское Слово” [Russian Word], октябрь 1 (14), 1915.

²⁸ “Новое Время” [New Time], ноябрь 1 (14), 1915.

²⁹ “Русское Слово” [Russian Word], октябрь 1 (14), 1915.

³⁰ “Новое Время” [New Time], октябрь 6 (19), 1915.

³¹ “Вестник Европы” [Bulletin of Europe], октябрь 1915.

the entire Austrian empire, then for the future of Germanized and Magyarized Romanian subjects of Austria".³²

"Vestnik Evropy" criticised the diplomacy of the Entente countries, and wrote that "the endless courtship ... for Bulgaria ended in complete failure ... The hopes of union diplomacy in Greece and Romania turned out to be deceiving; both countries considered to be more advantageous for them to maintain their neutrality and refrain from interference, despite the persistent persuasion of England, France, and Russia."³³

It was clear to everyone that Bulgaria could not withstand the war on two fronts if the Romanian army would actively attack. For foreign observers, this made the political situation of Romania more advantageous.

Discussing this possibility, "Rech" wrote that a blow from Romania would greatly damage the German and Bulgarian armies and complicate the situation of German troops on other fronts. The author even hinted at the important territorial acquisitions that Romania would have gained as a result of these actions: "Under such conditions, it is clear that Romania's opposition to Bulgaria could end with a brilliant victory for Romania and its occupation of Dobrudja and even the northern part of Bulgaria".³⁴

Analysing the situation in Romania, the observer of "Russkoe Slovo" noted that "under the late King Carol, Romania missed the most convenient moment to intervene in the world war, last fall," and now the Bucharest cabinet is "forced to be satisfied with protection from the pressure of Germany - in other words, maintaining its neutrality..."³⁵ Summing up the events of the Thessaloniki front after the first weeks of Bulgarian aggression against Serbia, the "Rech" observer noted that "Romania ... apparently shows a tendency to go over to our side. But here everything depends on the course of hostilities."³⁶ In a message from Bucharest, the correspondent of "Russkoe Slovo" wrote that there was a French delegation in the capital of the kingdom led by MP Gilbert Plianche "for a personal acquaintance with the moods of influential political groups and parties." From an exchange of views with Prime Minister Brătianu, political group leaders Filipescu, Take Ionescu and other public figures, the delegation "had a very good impression."³⁷

³² *Ibid.*

³³ "Вестник Европы" [Bulletin of Europe], ноябрь 1915.

³⁴ "Речь" [Speech], октябрь 24 (ноябрь 6), 1915.

³⁵ "Русское Слово" [Russian Word], октябрь 2 (15), 1915.

³⁶ "Речь" [Speech], ноябрь 2 (15), 1915.

³⁷ H. Gorun, *Relațiile româno-franceze în anii neutralității României (1914-1916)*, Craiova, Editura Universitaria, 2006, p. 222.

"Russkoe Slovo" writes that "Romania's neutrality will continue as much as the Bucharest cabinet wants," and emphasises those relations between Romania and Bulgaria "remain strained," and Romanian neutrality continues to keep the Bulgarian General Staff in suspense.³⁸

The situation at this point was not very clear. On the one hand, the Serbian forces, despite the excess of enemy forces, provided by the Bulgarian aggression, resisted courageously. On the other hand, the countries of Entente decided to open the front of hostilities in Greece. "Novoye Vremya" published a statement of the French Prime Minister: "We need to act as energetically as possible to respond to the efforts of our enemies, who, being cramped on the western front and stopped on the eastern front, are trying to achieve success on the new front with the help of Bulgaria, which is now impossible for them in either France or Russia." Viviani further explains the reasons for opening the front in Thessaloniki: "To come to the aid of the Serbs, we must go through Thessaloniki, and therefore from the very first days of the Bulgarian mobilization we held negotiations with the chairman of the Council of Ministers in Athens. These negotiations seemed all the more natural because the final treaty concluded between Serbia and Greece at the end of the second Balkan war takes into consideration an eventual attack from Bulgaria"³⁹ (As it turned out, the new Greek cabinet had its thoughts on this matter).

Viviani noted that the landing of the allied forces in Thessaloniki did violate the sovereignty of Greece and that this was not an act similar to the actions of Germany in Belgium when German troops neglected the sovereignty of Belgium and passed through its territory to the borders of France. The diplomatic conditions are completely different. Moreover, the Greek population gave the allied forces a warm welcome.⁴⁰ Romania had to closely watch the progress of hostilities and the success of the Entente forces to make calculated decisions and to act with confidence. The observer of "Russkoe Slovo" noted that "Romania ... can give up its neutrality if it is proven that the allies will send truly significant forces to help Serbia."⁴¹

"Vestnik Evropy" emphasised that "Small states are afraid to take risks and their leaders will inevitably lean towards those powers that currently seem stronger to them; this shows that in relation with the Balkan governments they

³⁸ "Русское Слово" [Russian Word], октябрь 2 (15), 1915.

³⁹ "Новое Время" [New Time], октябрь 1 (14), 1915.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ "Русское Слово" [Russian Word], октябрь 5 (18), 1915.

adhered to the same tactics, both in the period of external successes and in the period of failures. ⁴²

"Novoe Vremya" wrote on October 13 (26), 1915, about the "fantastic incorruptibility of the Tripartite Treaty diplomacy", which had already "lost" Bulgaria and could miss Romania. We are talking about the inability of the Allied diplomacy to somehow interest Romania on firmly taking the side of the Entente and launch into military action against the Central Powers.

The Russian press has tried to influence the Romanian leadership, indicating that, together with Entente, Romania will manage to solve its national problems, and release its "people from Austria", but under the conditions of "German hegemony, this dream becomes completely unattainable".⁴³

"Vestnik Evropy" notes that the Allied powers did not cope with the situation and deliberately created new difficult circumstances, this indicated a difficult and risky situation for small countries: "The Anglo-French expeditionary body, has been detained near the main theatre of struggle; it had no time or could not connect with the Serbs from Uskub, or as expected, did not help the detachment of the besieged Serbs from the Monastery ... while the French and British limited themselves to defence, to operations against the attacks of the Bulgarian army, and were eventually forced to retreat to Thessaloniki."⁴⁴ The consent powers failed to save the Serbian army, and the operation in the Dardanelles. At the same time, the observer noted that "The Germans still manage to succeed in everything that they conceived".⁴⁵

The journal writes that Romania "would have willingly opposed excessive Bulgarian claims and would have taken the opportunity to occupy Transylvania if it had not been afraid to face Germany. Prime Minister Brătianu stubbornly stands for neutrality, in full agreement with King Ferdinand, and this policy has a majority in the parliament".⁴⁶ The Romanian opposition was not happy with this, and from its point of view, excessive caution was intended to raise public opinion and push the government towards more active actions. "Vestnik Evropy" writes that the opposition "sharply attacks the government, demanding immediate action against the Austrians, and meets an apparently sympathetic response from a large part of society".⁴⁷ On 11 October, Romania adopted a resolution for

⁴² "Вестник Европы" [Bulletin of Europe], ноябрь 1915.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, октябрь 1915.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, декабрь 1915.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

entering the war on the side of the Allies.⁴⁸

An author of "Vestnik Evropy" noted that the clash of opinions from the Romanian society "does not allow the government to take a definitive decision in one direction or another and makes neutrality inevitable for the time being." In his opinion, in the parliament "only the speeches of the opponents of the central empires are successful", while the speakers from the opposite side "hardly get to be heard". According to the author of "Vestnik Evropy", the chamber applauded MP Diamandi for a long time, after he finished his speech with the words: "It would be a crime to go near the Germans and Hungarians, who constantly threaten Romania and its foreign brothers, and no government will dare to lead the army to the wrong place for the interests of the nation."⁴⁹

"Vestnik Evropy" writes that, in its opinion, "noisy popular demonstrations against German supporters and in honour of the quadruple consent, arranged in the main centres of the country, show that the mass of the urban population does not approve of Romania's passive neutrality; and the ministers responsible for the country cannot be guided by feelings and desires alone, but must reckon with the real state of things: we need a major external success of the allies to encourage the Romanians to join them openly, but so far there has not been such success." The journal observer gloomily states: "Systematic military failures - at least only temporary ones - have nothing to do with an alliance with those who suffer them, and it is difficult to fight against this natural fact".⁵⁰ The Romanian government understood this. It continued to wait because the forces of the Austro-German bloc were very impressive and had not yet suffered serious defeats from the Entente forces. The plans of the Triple Accord to strengthen the Thessaloniki Front, and the post-war plans, were not completely clear.

In Russia, all military leaders (in particular the chief of the General Staff Alekseev) were convinced that Romania's entry into the war would ease the position of the allied forces on the Eastern Front. Indeed, Romania's neutrality played the role of a buffer zone between the Austrian and Russian troops, which was objectively beneficial for the Russians. A "Novoe Vremya" correspondent reported from Bucharest that "political circles" really hope for "Russian intervention" in the Balkans and, according to representatives of these circles, "the defeat of Germany in the Balkans will decide the fate of the war".⁵¹

⁴⁸ "Новое Время" [New Time], октябрь 15 (28), 1915.

⁴⁹ "Вестник Европы" [Bulletin of Europe], январь 1916.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, декабрь 1915.

⁵¹ "Новое Время" [New Time], октябрь 10(23), 1915.

At the turn of 1915-1916, the situation in Europe can be characterised as a “no change” situation. According to an author of “Vestnik Evropy”, “events are developing so far in the same direction, unfavourable for the Allies. In the Balkans, William II and Ferdinand maintain control”.⁵²

It is well known that Romania, encouraged by the success of the famous Brusilov breakthrough on the Eastern Front against the Austro-Hungarian forces, acted along with the Entente countries and, despite the difficult situation at the end of 1916, ended up among the winners of the First World War.

CONCLUSIONS

In this brief analysis, the authors try to reveal the discussions found in the Russian press, of different political directions, around the position of Romania during the events on the Thessaloniki front after the Bulgarian troops attacked Serbia, and that the Russian press is a serious independent source for the history of international relations of the First World War. It can be noted that the Russian press fulfils all the requirements to accurately and reliably reflect the historical reality, the military, and diplomatic side, to analyse the contradictions and positions of the countries participating in the global conflict, to highlight several socio-political issues and evaluations of different events, governments and political personalities, to reflect and form public opinion.

The Russian newspapers of that time are an important multifaceted historical source, which in combination with other sources can serve as solid support for historical research, recreating a vivid picture of what was happening, at that time. Thanks to the skills of the journalists and publicists, you can feel almost like a participant in the events.

⁵² “Вестник Европы” [Bulletin of Europe], февраль 1916.

THE SOVIET SPECIAL PROPAGANDA IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. TARGET: THE ROMANIAN ARMY

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Abstract. *The use of non-military means to achieve military and political goals has a long history. But each time, the tools to influence the emotional sphere of an enemy have been improved with the development of impact technologies and the emergence of new communication channels. Tasks such as demoralising the enemy, persuading to cease the armed struggle, motivating collaboration, were defined along with militant actions. The specialisation of this type of activity, the creation of appropriate authorities and the training of qualified personnel had been specified in the pre-war period and improved during the armed confrontation. The article targets one of the components of special propaganda focused on an enemy and its allies during the first period of the German-Soviet war (June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942). Printing and distributing leaflets was the most spread form of work with the enemy and its allies in the ideological branches of the Red Army. The specific features of the texts intended for enemy personnel and their allies were analysed through examples of leaflets addressed to Romanian soldiers and the Romanian Armed forces.*

Keywords: *The German-Soviet war, special propaganda, leaflets, Romanian armed forces.*

Rezumat: *Propaganda specială sovietică în cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Obiectivul: Armata Română. Utilizarea mijloacelor non-armate în vederea atingerii obiectivelor militare și politice are o istorie lungă. Numai că, de fiecare dată, instrumentele pentru influențarea sferei emoționale caracteristice inamicului au fost îmbunătățite pe măsura dezvoltării tehnologiilor de impact și a apariției unor noi canale de comunicare. Sarcini precum demoralizarea adversarului, persuasiunea cu scopul încetării luptei armate, motivarea colaborării au fost folosite deopotrivă cu acțiunile militare propriu-zise. Pregătirea temeinică a acestui tip de activitate, crearea conducătorilor potriviți și instruirea personalului calificat au fost inițiate în perioada premergătoare războiului și perfecționate*

în timpul confruntării armate. Articolul vizează una dintre componentele propagandei speciale, axate pe un inamic și pe aliații acestuia în prima etapă a războiului germano-sovietic (22 iunie 1941 – 18 noiembrie 1942). Tipărirea și distribuirea pliantelor a fost cea mai răspândită formă de activitate a diviziunilor ideologice ale Armatei Roșii în relația cu inamicul și aliații săi. Particularitățile intervenției asupra textelor adresate adversarului și susținătorilor lui sunt analizate prin exemplul pliantelor destinate soldaților români și care se referă la forțele Armatei Române.

Résumé: La propagande spéciale soviétique pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. L'objectif: l'Armée Roumaine. L'utilisation des moyens non-armées afin d'atteindre des objectifs militaires et politiques connaît une longue histoire. D'ailleurs, chaque fois, on améliora les instruments utilisés pour influencer la sphère émotionnelle de l'ennemi au fur et à mesure du développement des technologies d'impact et l'apparition de nouvelles chaînes de communication. On utilisa des tâches telles la démoralisation de l'adversaire, la persuasion au but de finir la lutte armée, la motivation de la collaboration ensemble aux actions militaires proprement dites. On initia dans la période antérieure à la guerre et on perfectionna pendant la confrontation armée la préparation sérieuse de ce type d'activité, la création des dirigeants appropriés et l'instruction du personnel qualifié. L'article ci-joint vise une des composantes de la propagande spéciale, axée sur un certain ennemi et sur ses alliés dans la première étape de la guerre allemande-soviétique (22 juin 1941 - 18 novembre 1942). La plus répandue forme d'activité des divisions idéologiques de l'Armée Rouge dans la relation avec l'ennemi et ses alliés fut l'impression et la distribution des pliants. On analysa, tout en utilisant l'exemple des pliants destinés aux soldats roumains et qui font référence aux forces armées roumaine, les particularités de l'intervention sur les textes adressés à l'adversaire et à ses souteneurs.

INTRODUCTION

Special propaganda of the Red Army was one of the most recent trends in political work during the Second World War. It began to form institutionally in 1938-1939 during the hostilities at Khalkhin-Gol and during the Soviet-Finnish war. It all started with the publication of newspapers in foreign languages. Then, a department of political operation among the enemy troops was created within the Main Political Department.¹ In 1940, the Soviet government introduced training courses for foreign language officers and political workers. In August

¹ А. Тихонов, *Слово тоже сражалось*, "Красная звезда", 30 апреля 2005 года [The word also fought], in http://old.redstar.ru/2005/04/30_04/2_01.html (Accessed on 20.11.2019).

1942, a department was formed within the Military Institute of Foreign Languages of the Red Army, which consisted of officers of political workers with knowledge of foreign languages. Two years later, a faculty and a department of special propaganda were organised.² At the beginning of the War, the Main Department for Political Propaganda of the Red Army was reorganised. Two new propaganda departments have been created. One department for operation with Germany and its allies, and the second one for operations with the population of countries occupied by Nazi Germany. During the war, the ideological institutions of the Red Army were reorganised following the needs of the war and the work on special propaganda was improved.³

On June 25, 1941, the fourth day of the German-Soviet war, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party decided to set up a Bureau of Political-Military Propaganda. The Bureau should have addressed the following issues:

- determine the ideological and political content of propaganda of the troops, citizens and prisoners of war of an enemy (separately for each country and army);
- elaborate, assign and approve the most important general policy documents of the Red Army and Navy, such as leaflets, slogans, appeals and brochures against enemy troops;
- manage the military councils and political institutions of the army and the navy in terms of political operation within the enemy forces;
- coordinate the Soviet propaganda authorities abroad, to create news agencies that would work with a foreign audience;
- cooperate with political emigration and leaders of foreign communist parties.⁴

² Д. Жуковская, *Политработа среди войск и населения противника в годы Великой Отечественной войны* [Political work among the troops and the population of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War] in http://www.historicus.ru/politrabota_v_gody_voiny/ (Accessed on 20.11.2019)

³ С. И Репко, *Цена иллюзий. Пропганда на войска и население противника в первые месяцы войны* [The price of illusions. Propaganda on enemy troops and population in the first months of the war], in "Военно-исторический журнал", 1992, № 11, с. 8-15, in http://agitka.su/files/repko_vij.pdf (Accessed on 20.11.2019)

⁴ К. В. Крайнюков (ed.), *Партийно-политическая работа в Советских Вооруженных Силах в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945. Краткий исторический обзор* [Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Brief historical review], Москва, Воениздат, 1968, с. 524.

On the same day, a decision was made to issue leaflets and appeals to enemy troops regularly. An equally important issue was their distribution in the war zones. There were 66 types of various propaganda documents such as leaflets, slogans and appeals that were published during the first 12 days of the German-Soviet war. Ninety million copies were distributed in the areas of enemy troops and rear enemy dislocation zones. The newly set Bureau has developed political propaganda topics, theses and slogans against the enemy troops. During this period, more than 60 different topics of leaflets and slogans were approved.⁵

The 7th department became the working institution of the Bureau of Military-Political Propaganda, which was authorised by orders of the Bureau to inform the Bureau about the political and moral state of the enemy troops, changes in the troops and enemy's rear, elaborate propaganda documents, appeals to citizens, enemy troops and prisoners of war.⁶

After the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow, the conditions for special propaganda were improved, and the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party created the Council for Military-Political Propaganda affiliated with the Main Political Department of the Red Army. This structure was responsible for summarising the experience and developing new recommendations for the effective impact on enemy troops and their allies. The set up of the Council has improved the quality of work with the agitprop print materials.⁷

In June of 1942, the Council developed and approved initiatives to improve the operations of military councils and political structures among enemy troops and their allies. The Council's decision mentioned that propaganda and agitation among the enemy must be based on factual elements and contain a differentiated approach to the peculiarities of enemy units and formations. The document said that figures and facts must support the explanation of Nazi Germany's commitment and the inevitability of its defeat.⁸ This approach meant that the activities directed against the specific representatives of the countries allied with Hitler's Germany required additional knowledge and skills. There was also a

⁵ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *Политическая работа среди войск и населения противника в годы Великой Отечественной войны (1941-1945)* [Political work among the troops and the population of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)], Москва, Воениздат, 1971, с. 29.

⁶ М. И. Бурцев, *Прозрение* [Disillusion], Москва, 1981, in http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/burtsev_mi/index.html (Accessed on 20.11.2019).

⁷ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *Политическая работа...*, с. 29.

⁸ *Ibid.*, с. 30.

problem with qualified translators. For operations with Allied military forces, special propaganda specialists were selected who spoke foreign languages. Captive collaborators have been involved in this work quite often.

THEORETICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTATION

The implementation of non-military means to achieve military-political goals has a long history. But each time, the means of influence on the emotional-volitive sphere of an enemy have improved with the development of simulation techniques and the emergence of new communication channels.

Modern researchers of information warfare consider various aspects of the non-military ways of affecting the enemy's behaviour to break down the enemy from within, followed by a refusal to continue the armed struggle and minimise the use of their forces and possible losses. We can say that the concept of "information warfare" is multidimensional. Following the goals of influencing people in different historical periods by the representatives of various scientific movements, information warfare was divided into propaganda, counter-propaganda, special propaganda, psychological warfare, misinformation etc. According to Russian researcher G. Zhirkov, hierarchs, monarchs, kings, leaders, state and party bureaucrats have constantly improved methods of interacting with the masses and their influence.⁹

The experience of propaganda activities of the military-ideological institutions of the countries participating in the Second World War remains a research object for the representatives of many scientific branches, from historians to political scientists. Today, there is no agreement on the possibility of achieving military-political goals without the use of weapons, only subject to an informational and psychological impact. Indeed, according to the American researcher Philip Taylor, "Words cannot win wars, but they can smooth the path of victory. Nor can they disguise defeat".¹⁰ And propaganda is already considered not only as a separate technology but as a set of events with a specific purpose and methodology to influence different segments of the target audience.

⁹ Г. В. Жирков, *Предисловие* [Foreword], in Н. Л. Волковский, *История информационных войн* [History of information wars], В 2-х ч., Ч. 1, Санкт Петербург, ООО Издательство "Полигон", 2003, с. 3.

¹⁰ Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind. A history of propaganda from the ancient world to the present era*. Third Edition, Manchester – New York, Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 240.

Before the Second World War, the General Political Administration was established in the USSR.

The military-ideological authority served as ideological sabotage. And today, many aspects of its activities are not available for research. Propaganda is based on identifying target audience segments with appropriate methodology and infrastructure. During the Second World War, the concept of political propaganda or political work emerged. It was a propaganda activity aimed at supporting the actions of its government and criticising the actions of the military and political leaders of the enemy. In Great Britain and the USA, ideological structures were engaged in white and black propaganda. F. Taylor said "The Americans also distinguished between black and white propaganda. For this purpose, they set up two separate organisations, black material being dealt with by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and white by the Office of War Information (OWI)."¹¹

Moreover, Edmund Gullion is a newly-minted Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts. He confessed that he liked to use the term "propaganda" but was too aware of its negative connotation for U.S. audiences. He eventually settled on a form of words that were used from time to time to describe a variety of information practices: public diplomacy.¹²

The different interpretation of the same phenomenon was caused by the historical experience in the practical use of political propaganda and direct participation in the battles of World War II. In countries that have experienced the German occupation, such phenomena are perceived in a slightly different way. Therefore, intentional, aggressive and systematic Soviet propaganda was not considered relevant in the United States and could be interpreted as certain communication practices. It stands to reason that, after all, Nazi plans for the Soviet Union, although more ambitious, were far more thought out than those for Western Europe.¹³

German historian Christian Hartman traced the path of five German divisions as part of Army Group Centre: from Bialystok, Brest, Lviv and Kyiv. The scientist emphasises that the Nazis aimed at "exploiting, enslaving and destroying

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

¹² Nicholas J. Cull, *Roof for a House Divided: How U.S. Propaganda Evolved into Public Diplomacy*, in Jonathan Auerbach, Russ Castronovo (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 144.

¹³ Ben Shepherd, [Review-Article] *The Nazi Occupation of the Soviet Union 1941-4: Exploitation and Propaganda*, in "English Historical Review", Volume CXXVI, 2011, Issue 519, p. 387.

the Soviet society, creating strategic and economic world domination of the Great German Reich, destroying" ideological enemies – "Jewry and Bolshevism".¹⁴ For the German historian, there is no doubt that from the very beginning "it was a racial-ideological war of extermination", that "the entire initiative in unleashing the war belonged to Germany."¹⁵ In his studies, he noted the difficulties of conducting ideological work. But, on the other hand, it was these circumstances that fit the propaganda of the Red Army.

Thus, harsh weather conditions, an underdeveloped infrastructure and a supply disruption, the frightening loss of men and equipment among the front-line units, the poor quality and quantity of troops assigned to the occupation units, and the deteriorating fighting power of both, all played an essential role, along with ideology and other factors, which shaped the behaviour of these units in different contexts and at different times.¹⁶

It is necessary to consider the fact that Hitler's Germany turned out to conduct powerful ideological pressure on both the Red Army and the citizens of the USSR. The German researcher Babette Quinkert argues that propaganda aimed at occupied Soviet citizens, coupled with the capacity to distinguish between the Soviet Union's different nationalities, was a more important facet of the Nazi occupation than had previously been acknowledged.¹⁷

Finally, the distribution of propaganda was a major problem throughout the entire occupation period. It was severely hindered by distances, terrain and increasing partisan disruption. While Quinkert argues that the place of propaganda within the Nazi occupation needs greater recognition, she does not eliminate the importance of terror either.¹⁸ This connection between terror and propaganda is essential in understanding the dynamics of the German policy in occupied areas of the East.

It must be taken into account that from the first days of the war, the highest party leadership of the USSR and the ideological institutions of the army paid the same attention to political propaganda as to military operations. According to Philip Taylor, the propaganda influence begins with determining the status of the war, which is embedded in its name. However, Soviet propaganda warfare is

¹⁴ Christian Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg. Front und militarisches Hinterland 1941/42*. Munchen, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009. p. 469.

¹⁵ Christian Hartmann, *Unternehmen Barbarossa. Der deutsche Krieg im Osten 1941-1945*, Munchen, 2011, p. 111.

¹⁶ Ben Shepherd, [Review-Article] *The Nazi Occupation of the Soviet Union...*, p. 394.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 392.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

better known. Even today, the Soviets describe the Second World War as 'The Great Patriotic War'. In many respects, patriotism was more significant than propaganda, and certainly, the propaganda was rather aimed at patriotic resistance than ideological or revolutionary change.¹⁹ The war became nationwide, and the patriotism of the citizens of the USSR was the driving force both on the fronts and at the rear. The war was presented as a conflict between two ideologies. The brutality of the Nazi invaders was never avoided; indeed, the hellish reality of the war was a distinctive feature of the Soviet art of war.²⁰

The role of media was decisive in propaganda during World War II. The military-political leadership of the USSR exercised total control over information flows. Russian researcher N. Volkovsky called the press a piano in the hands of the government.²¹ There have been situations when propaganda has had many meanings. Its domain may vary from intentional communication, which indicates a particular ideological or partisan sensitivity, to virtually provide meaning to any verbal or visual expression of identity or opinion.²²

In the pre-war period and during the Second World War, a set of historically unprecedented options and parameters was established that would support propaganda to operate against both enemies and allies, both nationally and internationally.²³ In the view of the ideological organs of the Red Army, propaganda pursued two main goals: raising the morale of its own soldiers and demoralising the enemy troops.

Special propaganda, as an integral part of the entire political work of commanders and political authorities, included, as mentioned, three interrelated courses: political operations among enemy troops, political operations among the citizens of enemy countries and countries occupied by the Nazis and political operations among prisoners of war. Each of these courses was intended to demoralise an enemy utilising propaganda and agitation, strengthen the processes of decay of its front and rear, and propagate the military successes of the Red Army persuading the soldiers and citizens of the enemy countries on the imminence of defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies.²⁴

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

²⁰ Philip M. Taylor, *Munitions of the Mind...*, p. 237.

²¹ Н. Л. Волковский, *История информационных войн...*, с. 191.

²² Michele Hilmes, *The new vehicle of nationalism: radio goes to war. Propaganda studies*, in Jonathan Auerbach, Russ Castronovo (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 201.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

²⁴ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *Политическая работа...*, с. 25.

The most widespread form of print propaganda was the leaflet. Small content of an understandable text, a hot topic, a suitable name, or a slogan, progressive presentation of information with a final appeal to certain actions was meant to attract enemy soldiers and officers to read them. The leaflets were “operational”, “informational” and “general political”.²⁵ The leaflets published by the Chief Political Departments of the Army and Navy were generally political. Such leaflets covered ideological and political issues, international conditions, the course of the war, its prospects, the state of Hitler’s Germany. They were distributed to all areas of the front.

The leaflets published by the political departments of the armies and divisions, as well as the political directorate of the fronts, were considered to be operational. They disclosed the operational state of separate units at a particular sector of the front in a specific period. These leaflets reflected specific stories, the life of soldiers, their relationship with commanders. The combination of general political and operational leaflets was considered to be an achievement of the special propaganda. All the leaflets for the Allied armies soldiers were divided into five main types: official statements, speeches and documents, informational leaflets, leaflets containing letters and appeals of prisoners of war and leaflets-slogans.²⁶

Political operations among enemy troops were a growing trend and became widespread by the end of the war. Thereby, during the German-Soviet war, more than 20,000 designations of propaganda literature in 20 foreign languages were published and distributed with a total circulation of 2 billion 706 million copies. Among them, there were 10 million copies of newspapers, 10.2 million copies of agitation brochures. Another vast majority contained leaflets and appeals.²⁷

Leaflets and appeals were considered to be effective weapons in the war. Why has so much attention been paid to their work by the ideological authorities of the Red Army? As it results from analysing the goals and objectives of the special propaganda, an operation carried out among the Nazi allies troops was a means of moral and psychological impact to obtain the victory of the Red Army

²⁵ К. В. Крайнюков (ed.), *Партийно-политическая работа...*, с. 526.

²⁶ *Оружием правды. Листовки к войскам и населению противника, изданные политорганами Советской Армии и Военно-Морского Флота во время Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 годов* [The weapon of truth. Leaflets to the enemy troops and population, published by the political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Москва, Воениздат, 1971, с. 15-21.

²⁷ М. И. Бурцев (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 23.

over the adversary forces with minimal losses.²⁸ This activity was carried out under the conditions of the military-political situation.

In the defensive stage of the first period of war (June 22, 1941-November 18, 1942), the main task of special propaganda was to thoroughly shatter the offensive spirit of enemy troops, weaken the influence of the Nazi ideology, and deface the military successes of the enemy. In the second period of the war (November 19, 1942-1943), upon the victory of the Red Army near Stalingrad, the main thing was to deepen the process of moral and psychological decay of the enemy, including allies, in order to promote the conditions of Soviet captivity and to make them surrender.

In the third period of the war (19 November 1942 - December 1943), the main task of the special propaganda was the appeal to the enemy soldiers and officers to surrender themselves and the units that were surrounded. Successes on the frontlines primarily determined the success of ideological influence.²⁹

Propaganda among enemy troops, especially in the first period, was of a class nature and was widespread both in terms of social purpose and target audience. This research paper considers the original samples of leaflets of the first period of the German-Soviet war, which were prepared for the Romanian soldiers to motivate them to act against the Germans and I. Antonescu. An example of a leaflet addressed to the Soviet troops, defacing the Romanian Armed forces is provided.

LEAFLETS ADDRESSED TO THE ROMANIAN SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS

The leaflets discussed in the article referred to generally political ones. Such leaflets should have contained accurate facts and events about the life of the Romanian soldiers on the frontline, and that of their relatives left behind. Such information was obtained after careful research of the trophy documents and during the interrogation of prisoners of war. The style of such leaflets needed to meet the requirements of figurative, literary and artistic forms of presentation of the material. The language of such leaflets had to be clear and at the same time logical.

Leaflets intended for Romanian soldiers had to be composed in Romanian. But translated copies into Russian were sent to authorities for a report. This fact

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27, 30.

was stated in the upper left corner of leaflets informing that the copies were provided for reference.

In the process of work on the texts, facts from interrogations of Romanian prisoners of war and quotes from military orders were used. This method should have contributed to increasing the authenticity of the written texts.

This leaflet is made on newsprint and contains the required target elements. At the bottom of the text, there is a pass in Romanian and Russian, so that it could be understood by Romanian soldiers who decided to surrender and for the Soviet military, as well. Attention is drawn to the highlighted call to read and hand over the leaflet to a “comrade”. This element is specific for leaflets intended for the Red Army, as it contains elements of the class approach. It is unlikely that Romanian soldiers were able to understand the meaning of the word “comrade” call unless they were communists.

The ideological operation among personnel of the Nazi ally troops was initially based on the class approach. Appeals were often made to understand the imperialist nature of the war and to defect to the Red Army. It did not usually resonate with the target audience.

This leaflet (see *Annexe 1*) is an appeal to the Transylvanian Romanians, who were forced to fight for the Hungarian troops on the side of Nazi Germany. The military ideologists of the Red Army estimated all social and political contradictions.³⁰

At the beginning of the text, their compatriot and prisoner of war Dumitru Medan, who was a soldier of the 5th company of the 35th Hungarian regiment, made an appeal to the Romanian soldiers. This perspective immediately established credibility and drew attention. He appealed to his compatriots saying that Hungary was fighting for the Germans, and the Hungarian rulers sold themselves to Hitler. But why should a Romanian die for Hitler and the Hungarian lords who oppress the Romanians? The sentence is written in bold type and immediately attracts attention. The main message of these words is that Transylvanian Romanians die for the Hungarians and Hitler. The text indicates the

³⁰ Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України [**Hereinafter: ЦДАГО України**], Фонд 56 (Колекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), Справа 484 (Листівка “К трансильванским румынам венгерской армии”) [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 484 (Leaflet “To the Transylvanian Romanians of the Hungarian army!”)].

enemies. This problem was the main for all Transylvanian Romanians. The Soviet Army ideologists took advantage of this to influence Romanian soldiers with the subsequent motivation to put an end to the armed struggle.

Further in the text, there is a sentence written in ordinary font type stating that there was no reason for the Romanians to die in Russia because the Russians have never been enemies of the Romanians. And as a consequence of the mentioned statement, the slogan is highlighted in bold font type: "Your enemies are the Germans and the Hungarians!" The sequence of designated enemies has been changed in this sentence. At the beginning of the text, the Hungarians were the enemies first mentioned, and now the Germans come first. But such a change in emphasis is not accidental; it is necessary for further argumentation. The authors of the leaflet wrote that the Germans invaded Northern Transylvania and gave it to the Hungarians. And the Hungarians rob and oppress the Romanian citizens, kill their women and children. Further, the audacity of the Hungarians' approach towards the Romanians is shown.

The authors of the leaflet used an important theme of a family, the insecurity of relatives, which has always struck men in war because of their inability to protect relatives. It also refers to the robberies of farms and the export of everything valuable to Germany. It all led to the statement that Hungarians treat Romanians worse than they treat their cattle. And there is no limit to the humiliation of Romanians in the Hungarian army. In this case, there is a transfer of rhetoric from the actions of the Nazis in the USSR to the actions of the Hungarians in Northern Transylvania.

The following paragraph contains a special order No. 3607/M1 of the Hungarian General Staff on the Transylvanian Romanians. A fragment of the mentioned order states in bold letters: "deceit, thievish, shallowness, laziness, craftiness, herd instinct and low mental level". This sentence in Russian conveys the use of the Russian mentality set to aim the attention of the reader on their demeaning condition. This text in bold is a continuation of that super text, it is immediately noticeable, even if the entire leaflet is not read. The enemies and their attitude towards the enslaved Romanians are defined and described as such. Everything else is for confirmation.

In addition to the use of trophy documents (such as the order mentioned above), there is also one figure that is indicated in the leaflet – 30% of the Transylvanian Romanians who fight for the Hungarians. There is nothing to confirm this figure, and it most likely acts as amplified propaganda which claimed that the Hungarians fought using Romanian blood and the list of places of their death during militant actions. After the presentation of the information,

there is a call to pay attention to how many personnel remain in the Romanian units. As an answer - the phrase in bold font: "Death awaits each of you at the front!". It is not just written text; it has a voice. This menace is the apogee of everything mentioned in the text.

Then there is a sentence, which consists of several parts that have different time sequences: "So, let every one of you decide, at this last moment, when you faced death before it is too late ..." The quote "faced death" is already in the past tense. However, it looks like it is not too late, by the present tense of "let every one of you decide" what to do in the future. As in tragic plays, there is a "heat of the moment" and then the ending where two exits are offered. They are in bold in the form of a poetic stanza. Either die for Horthy and Hitler or save your life, save yourself for your family. And to do so, one must leave the Germans and Hungarians and defect to the Russians, who are the friends. And then the gaps are posted.

Analysing the text of this leaflet in the Russian version, we can say that rather writers than propagandists worked on it. The text is composed in such a way that there is a progressive perception of the topic with an aggravation of the plot, of the imminence of death and the opportunity to take advantage of the proposal to stay alive. The text of the leaflet contains speech patterns specific to the Russian language. Therefore, no mechanical translation will provide readers with an understanding of the difficult position of the Transylvanian Romanians, but a specialist should have done translation to convey the entire emotional nuance of the text in Romanian. By genre, this text looks more like a literary essay with a corresponding appeal. It is not brief, not always concrete, overfilled with slogans. Since it was forbidden for all troops to collect, read and store enemy leaflets, the chances to read the entire text were minimal. That is why key phrases in bold formed an over text that could be grasped right away.

Another sample of a leaflet (see *Annexe 2*) is a translation of a text prepared for Romanian soldiers and officers into Russian ³¹. Based on the likely incompleteness of the text, we can conclude that the second page has not been preserved, so the other two necessary elements – a pass for surrender and the slogan on the need to read and pass this leaflet to a "comrade", are absent. This copy contains an appeal to the Romanian soldiers to determine their fate. A. Hitler and I. Antonescu were identified as their main enemies. The text of the leaflet was composed as reporting about the imminent death of Nazi Germany and Romania,

³¹ ЦДАГО України, *loc. cit.*, справа 482 (Листівка 'Как кончить войну!') [File 482 (Leaflet "How to End the War!")].

which is enslaved. Some fatalism is also present in the title: "How to End the War", which is marked out with bigger print. Without a question mark, but with an exclamation mark, this interrogative sentence turns into a statement-answer.

The authors of the leaflet immediately identify the target audience in their appeal: "Romanian soldiers! Officers!". In this case, this is an important fact for understanding the German army hierarchy. The appeal to the enemy's personnel is not based on the class approach of the Soviet ideology but takes into account the traditions of the armies of the countries - allies of Germany.

The first paragraph refers to signing the treaty between Russia and England on a military alliance against Germany and its accomplices in Europe on May 25, 1942. This information assumes that the leaflet is of 1942 issue. A stylistic approach, such as mitigation is noteworthy. It is not about the allies of Hitler's Germany, to which Romania belonged, which determined the legally correct status. It speaks about accomplices, which significantly softens the perception of the opponent's responsibility. This approach would not turn off the Romanian soldiers, but motivate them to read further. And further, it says that a military agreement between Russia and America would be signed in less than a month.

Then, as part of the progressive presentation of the information, the following question was asked: "What does this mean for Nazi Germany?" The conclusion in bold letters indicates its imminent defeat. Further, the answer to this question is detailed by the facts. The number of states opposing Nazi Germany is listed, the numbers intending to show the power and inaccessibility of the coalition of member-countries against Germany and its allies. They progressively show that these countries have much more land and population and that they produce much more industrial goods and food.

An interesting fact is that the text estimates the capabilities of Russia, England and the USA in the third person, and not in the propaganda tone for any of them. It is said, "not us, but they can put ten of their soldiers against a German one, four of their tanks against a German one". The same thing is said about guns and aircraft. These phrases are in bold letters. And the apotheosis almost sounds like the words by which A. Hitler pulled the Romanians and their unfortunate country into the War against this powerful force with the hands of I. Antonescu.

Such type of stylistic device was used when all responsibility for participating in the war on the side of the invaders was transferred to one conductor-person. In the next sentence, the figure is distinguished - 400,000 Romanians have already paid with their lives for the crimes of A. Hitler and I. Antonescu. The following two sentences are drawn up in the framework of the stamps adopted in the Soviet propaganda, which amplifies the preliminary

statement. These are simple sentences contributing to a visualisation of the described events: Romanian blood flows and the daily mountains of bodies of Romanian soldiers and, as a result, thousands of widows and orphans. The next phrase in bold letters looks like a verdict. Keeping the struggle on the side of Hitler means death for Romania. Next is the beginning of an unfinished phrase, that the English-Soviet treaty is a way out for Romanian soldiers. Even without continuation, it can be said that this leaflet, in comparison with the previous one, is more aligned with the style of small forms of agitation. The material presentation ranges from macro events of geopolitical nature to micro-events concerning the participation of every Romanian soldier in the War and the opportunity of saving lives. The gradual perception of the text filled with literary techniques makes it possible to perceive the content as the tragic fate of the Romanian soldiers, deceived by their lords, who served Hitler.

Unlike the previous leaflet, the selected phrases of this text do not constitute a super text that can be quickly grasped unless it is possible to read the entire leaflet carefully. The highlight of words and sentences was used to emphasise individual thoughts while reading the entire leaflet. The authors of the leaflet assumed its full reading, which was doubtful in the face of combat activity.

The following sample of leaflets (see *Annexe 3*) addressed to Romanian soldiers is written in poetic form³². The leaflet is unilateral, made on newsprint with the usual attributes. There is an inscription (a note) in the upper left corner that shows it is a translation from Romanian into Russian. Below the text, there are gaps in Russian and Romanian. The call "Read it and pass it on to a comrade" is missing from the leaflet. The Soviet military ideologists already understood that if a leaflet has a pass-it-on note, it is, in fact, target-focused. That means there is an inclination to surrender for anyone who reads this leaflet. And the inscription suggests handing over the text with a pass to another reader.

The leaflet contains a letter from a Romanian woman named Anika (Rom. perhaps Anica, Anuța or Anuca) to her husband, Ion, who served in the army under the command of I. Antonescu. The wife complains to her husband about the difficult life under the German occupation. She says that the Germans are mocking helpless farmers, taking livestock, robbing and destroying everyone. She also worries about her husband's life. Therefore, the last four separate lines of the poem show that Ion could not stand it and deserted at night.

³² ЦДАГО України, *loc. cit.*, справа 483 (Листівка "Письмо от жены румынскому солдату на фронт") [File 483 (Leaflet "A letter from the wife of a Romanian soldier to the front")].

The poem can be called sarcastic with fictional characters. It is well perceived in Russian. Stylistics and separate phraseological units, for example, such as "... damned Germans mock us, defaming soldiers, take oxen", are peculiar to the Russian-speaking reader. It is doubtful whether this poem can be adequately translated into Romanian. Firstly, we can assume that the translation was done into the Romanian language with the preservation of all literary forms, and experts made it the literary translation. Secondly, if the poem was translated, most likely it was automatically, without preserving the character and stylistic features of the Romanian language, which significantly reduced the degree of tension during reading. Nevertheless, it is more likely that this leaflet was presented for report or approval only.

The next sample (see *Annexe 4*) is a newsletter (report) with serial number 384. The issue date is September 30, 1941.³³ The report was intended to be put in navy newspapers. This report is issued by the Press Bureau of the Main Political Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Navy in Moscow according to the output after the text. The address of the printing house, reference number and surnames of an author and a responsible editor are indicated. The title of the Bulletin material is brief: "What's on the mind of the Romanian soldiers and sailors?" In this case, methodological material for conducting information and communication events among the Red Army soldiers is considered. This issue is dedicated to the participation of the Romanian Armed forces in the war and is intended for sailors of the Black Sea Fleet.

The text contains a detailed analysis of the social and political situation in Romania before and during the War. It is backed up by the Romanian captive soldiers and quotes from trophy documents of the Romanian command. This text is not intended for Romanian soldiers. We consider it a full-fledged propaganda article that is recommended for distribution and discussion among Red Army soldiers, displaying a gradual presentation of the material, simple and understandable speech, numerous specifics made the text receptive. From the very beginning of the text, the situation before the War and the role of I. Antonescu in involving Romania in alliance with Germany is given. The emphasis is made on the actions of the Germans, who occupied the territory, took control over oilfields and financial institutions.

³³ ЦДАГО України, *loc. cit.*, справа 43 (Листівка "О чем думают румынский солдат и матрос?") [File 43 (Leaflet "What are the Romanian soldiers and sailors thinking about?")].

The Romanians were told about the liberation war for three weeks with promises of obtaining land. The text refers to the treacherous nature of actions of the Romanian leadership. It seems that they were promised the inclusion of Romania in the new system of Nazi Europe. But, according to the text, Romania was given the role of a natural-resource base. According to the tradition of propaganda text, the peoples of Romania were separated from the military-political leadership. The image of I. Antonescu as an enemy was created. And that it was he who dragged the Romanians into the bloody war. Such conclusions should have been supported by pieces of evidence from prisoners of war. Therefore, the leaflet contains the testimony of the Romanian soldier Kurku (probably, in Romanian, Curcă) and officer Zaveru, that no one knew the reason and purpose of the War and did not want to fight. Moreover, in his testimony, the soldier Ponzyak is candid about their promised plots of land after the liberation of Bessarabia.

Gradually, the topic moves towards relations and subordination between the German and Romanian military. First, as the soldier Peredescu (correctly, in Romanian, Predescu) testifies, they were promised that the Romanian troops would move around the German units. But the Germans “propelled” the Romanians ahead, and those who retreated were shot. Therefore, the Romanians were used as cannon fodder. Second, according to the author, the Germans treated the Romanian soldiers without respect. Disrespect and humiliation contributed to the escalation of interpersonal relations in the military environment. Even on the Romanian command side, orders were issued about the necessity to keep the normal drill. Third, the Romanian military leaders themselves made a disappointing assessment of the military capabilities of their personnel. The text quoted the order No. 81 of Colonel Semionescu, which states that the Romanian soldiers are cowards, they are afraid of bullets, aircraft and artillery fire, even at low intensity. The trophy headquarters reports cited here refer to cases of desertion and suicide among the Romanian soldiers. The propaganda author makes a statement about the demoralisation of the Romanian army related to the situation in the rear front, as a conclusion of the text. High food prices, industry destroyed by Soviet aviation and high death rate at the front cause confusion among the country’s population. The German units exercise police functions, and I. Antonescu begins to call older people into the Army. According to the author, Romania is in a difficult situation. And the Black Sea defenders must inflict heavy losses to demoralise the Romanian Army completely.

The analysis shows that this was a pure propaganda text that was written correctly without unnecessary deviations from the content. The statement of facts

is combined with the emotionally filled evidence of Romanian prisoners of war. Their testimonies are embedded in the text in a single literary style. The translated version of these testimonies of prisoners of war was likely drawn up to meet the requirements of the Soviet propaganda document.

On the one hand, the Romanians are described as deceived and humiliated by the Germans; on the other hand, their role as a serious enemy is beyond doubt. These perceptions were the reason for writing such material for further discussion. It was necessary to motivate the Soviet troops not to be afraid of the Romanian Army, to fight them in order to break them from the inside, demoralise and make them incapable of continuing military operations. The author manages to successfully maintain the balance between the need to prove the insolvency of the Romanian troops as an equal adversary and an effective German ally, with the admission of the real strength and capabilities of the Romanian Armed forces, which must be fought hard. The archival document itself serves as evidence.

Although this archival document speaks of its role as information material for the Soviet military, it is likely that the facts and evidence stated in the text were used in other leaflets addressed to the Romanian soldiers. We refer to the versatile use of the facts collected with a corresponding ideological tinge.

An important role in the ideological pressure on Romanian soldiers was given to the religious factor. In Eastern Europe, where borders have rarely been firmly fixed and where the political affinities of populations have been highly changeable, religion has been one tool, often the principal one, to ensure the loyalty, or at least submission, of subjects.³⁴ The Russian Orthodox Church held the dominant position because this Church possessed the assets the Soviets needed to deal with their political and diplomatic tasks.³⁵

More cleverly, the Soviet Union also sought to sow disunity in the ranks of the Nazi coalition by cultivating Romanian-Hungarian discord. To this end, the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation adopted the slogan "Romanians! Defend your land from Hungarian invasion, struggle for the return of northern Transylvania, given by Hitler to Hungary."³⁶ The Russian Orthodox Church has done its part by appealing to the people of the Balkans. On November 22 and December 9, 1942, the Metropolitans Sergii and Nikolai launched two appeals to the "Brothers in Faith! Soldiers of the Romanian Army." "The metropolitans

³⁴ Steven Merritt Miner, *Stalin's Holy War. Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941-1945*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 15.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

reprimanded Romanian soldiers for participating in Hitler's aggressive war against the "peaceful Orthodox Russian people" and fellow Orthodox believers. The Nazis had fantasised about conquering the world, but "The powerful alliance of Russia, America, and England is squeezing fascist Germany and its vassals in a ring ... and the hour of fascism's defeat is not distant." "Finally," the metropolitans declared "the Romanian soldier must not forget the state independence and (...) a holy hatred toward the enemy."³⁷

The idea that National Liberty and the existence of Romania was obtained by the blood of Russian soldiers in the war of 1877-1878 was played out. Therefore, the conclusion-slogan was unconditional: the Romanian people are forever indebted to Russia. The metropolitans expressed their arguments in Christian terms: "Your military and Christian duty are not to die for the Germans, whose fault pours the blood of your homeland and exposes your people to endless suffering. The Christian duty is to immediately leave the German ranks and go over to the Russian side, thereby atoning for sin."

The appeals were carefully timed to coincide with the beginning of the Battle of Stalingrad, which began on November 19, 1942. The texts of the leaflets were printed in Romanian in the form of propaganda leaflets.

The American researcher Steven Merritt Miner regrets that it is impossible to find out about the effects of the appeals of the Orthodox hierarchs. But, in his opinion, for the first time, Soviet propaganda was ready to issue appeals to a foreign audience in clear Christian terms, and such calls were used by the most important events in the military field.³⁸ The appeals to Romanian soldiers indicated the direction that Soviet propaganda and church policy were heading; in the spring of 1943, the church's role in foreign policy would become much more prominent.³⁹

It is necessary to note one more trick of the Soviet special propaganda. Stalin's public statements always ignored the presence in the Soviet territory of citizens of states allied with Germany. He thought, probably correctly, that his citizens preferred to conceive of the enemy as one. Famous Soviet writer I. Ehrenburg once made this explicit. He wrote: "We do not add anything to the oath 'Death to the German occupiers,'" because Italian, Romanian, Finnish, Spanish, French, and Belgian hirelings were "not representatives of other

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

peoples.” They were “the very same German occupiers, ‘second rate.’”⁴⁰ Still, non-German invaders were mentioned and to varying degrees included in the campaign for hate. Romanians had been denigrated for years, and in the middle of 1940, the Soviet media raged against “Romanian boyars and gendarmes” oppressing Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.⁴¹ The rhetoric regarding the atrocities of the Romanian army against the Jews was comparative.

Concerning the Romanian soldiers, political propaganda was of a multi-vector nature. The contradictions between Romanians and Hungarians were used. The religious theme was exaggerated. Class approaches were used. Romanian soldiers and the Romanian people were divided by the government of I. Antonescu and received the role of a deceived martyr. The propaganda materials used the contradictions that arose as a result of the unequal position as an ally of the Nazis.

In the context of this study, it is also necessary to speak about the use of the anti-Semitic theme against the Romanian troops. The rhetoric regarding the atrocities of the Romanian army against the Jews in Odesa was comparative with Babi Yar in Kyiv and Drobitsky Yar near Kharkiv. But, in August 1944, when the King of Romania, Michael, adopted a truce in the Soviet Union it was at a time when anti-Romanian propaganda stopped abruptly.⁴²

Leaflets were only one direction of the special propaganda of the Red Army. Periodicals for the Romanian soldiers were also issued. In addition to such activities as working with prisoners of war, the creation of collaborative structures between prisoners of war camps has been practised. Work was carried out separately with each of these target audiences⁴³.

These measures were taken to create conditions where soldiers, their families, and the entire population of Hitler’s allied country would cease to support their state leadership and strive to end the war on the side of Germany.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the above leaflet copies leads to the following conclusions:

1. The work with the texts was the subject of great attention from the ideological structures of the Red Army responsible for conducting special

⁴⁰ Karel C Berkhoff, *Motherland in danger. Soviet propaganda during World War II*, Harvard University Press, 2012, p. 90.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 194-195.

propaganda. Professional writers who were involved have not always maintained brevity and objectivity in the texts of leaflets, which are based on a careful reading of the printed by the target audience. In the first period of the War, such a situation was unlikely.

2. The stylistics of writing intended for Romanian soldiers mainly corresponded to Soviet ideological clichés. A high-quality translation into Romanian, preserving the emotional component and motivational messages was a condition for adequate perception of leaflets by the Romanians. The possibility of this is doubtful.

3. The purpose of the leaflets was their contribution to the demoralisation of Romanian soldiers and motivating them to stop participating in the War. The use of various literary genres and stylistics is effective in Russian. Although in each leaflet copy it is said that this is a translation from Romanian, there is a doubt that the Romanian version of these leaflets was written first.

4. The interest is taken in the last example that was drawn for the Soviet soldiers as if it is about the collapse of the Romanian Army. The last phrase informing about the necessity to inflict crushing hits to demoralise the Romanian Army testifies that the main role in maintaining the moral and psychological state of the Romanians was allotted to real events on the fronts. And the period of this leaflet issue was characterised by the victorious advance of the Nazi troops and their allies throughout the USSR territory.


5. Taking into account the fact that all the leaflets were printed in the rear frontline, probably in the capital's printing house, we can conclude that there was a well-established centralised system of working with texts, printing, delivery and distribution at the locations of the Romanian troops.

6. Despite all these disadvantages, we should keep in mind that this work of issuing and distributing leaflets among the enemy troops and their allies was carried out in conditions of fierce military confrontation, the constant movement of fronts and powerful ideological countermeasures by the relevant enemy institutions.


This kind of propaganda (experience) is extremely important in the modern military conflicts when forms of confrontation spiral into non-military clashes and the information and communication component becomes of the same importance with the military one to achieve military and political goals. No matter how overwhelming the availability of the Internet may be, however, in the absence of electricity, the inability to pay for the Internet or the absence of appropriate gadgets, the printed word remains a decisive factor in the exercise of information and psychological influence on the enemy. Soviet special propaganda has been an

inaccessible topic for a long time. Only with the opening of the archives and the possibility of a free study of historical sources, the opportunity to study this line of activity of the ideological structures of the Red Army arose.

Annexe 1




Source: Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, Фонд 56 (Колекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), Справа 484 (Листівка “К трансильванским румынам венгерской армии”) [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 484 (Leaflet “To the Transylvanian Romanians of the Hungarian army!”)]




Source: Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, Фонд 56 (Колекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), справа 482 (Листівка 'Как кончить войну!') [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 482 (Leaflet "How to End the War!")]

Annexe 3



Source: Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, Фонд 56 (Колекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), справа 483 (Листівка “Письмо от жены румынскому солдату на фронт”) [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 483 (Leaflet “A letter from the wife of a Romanian soldier to the front)"].



— «Не только я, но и другие офицеры были настроены пессимистически, так как воевать с Россией мы не хотели».

Генерал Антонеску и его продажная клика старались внушить румынам, что война эта ведется во имя освобождения Бессарабии, что она продлится не свыше 3-х недель и закончится созданием «великой Румынии». Они старались изобразить войну против народов великого Советского Союза, как освободительную войну.

Солдат румынской армии Поньзяк рассказывает в своих показаниях:

— «Когда германские войска пришли в Румынию, нам говорили, что немцы помогут Румынии, что нам дадут в Бессарабии наделы земли и жить будет гораздо лучше».

Но вот война попрежнему продолжается. Немцы гонят румын на захват Одессы, не считаясь с огромными потерями румынской армии.

Румынские солдаты убеждаются на деле, что они являются пушечным мясом в руках немцев.

Военнопленный солдат Передеску пишет:

— «Нам обещали, что немецкие части будут идти впереди, а мы только будем следовать за ними. Но в первый же день войны мы убедились, что это была сплошная ложь. Вперед погнали нас, а немцы шли за нами, строго следя за тем, чтобы никто из нас не отставал. Отходящие части они расстреливали в упор из пулеметов».

Румынским офицерам и солдатам приходится претерпевать немало унижений от своих «союзников». Немецкие офицеры не скрывают чувства презрения к румынской армии.

Военнопленный солдат 3 пограничного полка Гиорди заметил по этому поводу:

— «Румынские солдаты должны при встречах с немецкими солдатами или офицерами приветствовать их. Немецкие солдаты и офицеры очень часто не отвечают на наши приветствия, и нередко при встрече в ответ на приветствия румын смеются, или обзывают нас мамалыжниками».

Так с каждым днем все больше вырастает не только взаимная отчужденность между «союзниками», но и острая, с трудом сдерживаемая ненависть. Взаимоотношения между румынами и немцами в результате настолько обострились, что румынскому военному министру пришлось издать специальный приказ.

— «Господин генерал Ион Антонеску заметил,— говорится в этом приказе,— что румынские офицеры не отвечают взаимно младшим командирам из германской армии на приветствия, а когда и отвечают, то делают это не по-солдатски. Приветствия между низшими чинами румынской и германской армий также не практикуются в духе дружбы».

Многие из румынских солдат и моряков жаждут мира. Именно на этой почве выросло массовое дезертирство, участились случаи самострела, падает дисциплина. Румынское командование

серьезно озабочено упадком воинской дисциплины. В приказе полковника Семиоанеску за № 81 отмечается:

— «Недостаток храбрости проявляется в том, что румынские солдаты боятся пуль, боятся авиации, боятся артиллерийского огня даже тогда, когда он незначителен по своей интенсивности».

Командир 103 полка 15 пехотной дивизии несет штабу дивизии:

— «Солдаты всячески уклоняются от боя. Группами и в одиночку они бросают оружие и сдуются в плен. За один день во второй роте устанавлены 7 случаев самострела. Ни на кого нельзя возложить».

Эти пораженческие настроения среди солдат являются отражением глубокого недовольства войной и брожения в народных массах Румынии в связи с резко ухудшившимся их жизненным уровнем. Цены на хлеб и мясо за последние два месяца резко повысились. Молоко и масло стали редкостью. Безработица быстро растет. Поля остались невозделанными, ибо лошади реквизированы для армии, а оставшийся тягловый скот из-за недостатка кормов пришлось передать на убой. Нефтепромыслы и промышленные предприятия сильно пострадали от бомбардировок советской авиации. Огромные потери румынской армии вызывают среди населения чувство глубокого смятения и тревоги. Румынский солдат и моряк получают наглядный урок того, как Румыния, втянутая гитлеровскими бандитами в водоворот войны, неуклонно катится к гибели.

Половина румынской армии уничтожена в боях под Одессой. Силы этой армии надломлены, но пока еще не сокрушены окончательно. Генерал Антонеску бросает на фронт все новые дивизии. В Валахии, Трансильвании, Банате — во всех районах Румынии происходит спешная мобилизация старших возрастов. В тылу армии Антонеску сосредоточены германские части, выполняющие полицейские функции по отношению к румынским солдатам. В этих условиях румынские дивизии еще пытаются лезть вперед, не считаясь с огромными жертвами.

Героические защитники советского Черноморья должны направить свои силы и волю, чтобы нанести румынской армии ряд новых сокрушительных ударов и ускорить тем самым процесс окончательного ее разложения.

И. ЮЗЕФОВИЧ.

Source: Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, Фонд 56 (Колекція листівок періоду Великої вітчизняної війни), Опис 1 (ЦК КПРС України), Справа 43 (Листівка "О чем думают румынский солдат и матрос?") [Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine, Fond 56 (Leaflets Collection of the Great Patriotic War), Register 1 (CPSU Central Committee), File 43 (Leaflet "What are the Romanian soldiers and sailors thinking about?")].

THE MAIN STRUCTURAL FACTORS THAT MAKE THE BALKANS IMPORTANT FOR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract: *The Balkans, due to its geographical proximity and historical, social and cultural ties, represents one of the regions where Turkey has shown special interest. Throughout history, Turkey has played a decisive role in the Balkans for nearly 550 years, and its policies and actions have been instrumental both in shaping the region and at the same time in determining the course of history. The Balkans – which geographically constitute Turkey's opening gate to the European continent – is also of importance for its special status in the historical process in which the Turkish nation took shape and for its potential for the future in terms of regional integration and security. As a result, the Balkans have been and remain Turkey's main strategic objective regarding the balance of power in this area and European security. Although relations between Turkey and the Balkan neighbours were severely affected during the Cold War, their historical links have continued, in various ways, to this day. From the ethnic and cultural perspective of Turkey, the Turks living in this region belong to both Turkey and the Balkans, such that their dual belonging is considered as being particularly important. In this respect, the emerging / potential emergence of crises in the region has a major significance for Turkey in terms of the sustainability and stability of peace. The Balkans is therefore much more than a neighbouring region for Turkey as a state that has always advocated stability in the Balkans and supported the state integrity. In this study, the main structural factors (historical ties, Balkan Muslims and Turkish minority, geopolitics, security) that make the Balkans important for Turkey's Foreign Policy will be addressed.*

Keywords: *Balkans, The Ottoman Empire, Turkish Foreign Policy, Balkan Muslims minorities, Balkan Turkish minorities.*

Rezumat: *Principalii factori structurali care acordă importanță Balcanilor în politica externă a Turciei. Datorită apropierii geografice și legăturilor istorice, sociale și culturale, Balcanii reprezintă una dintre regiunile față de care Turcia a manifestat un interes special. De fapt, Turcia a jucat un rol decisiv în Balcani timp de aproape 550 de ani, iar politicile și acțiunile sale au contribuit atât la definirea regiunii, cât și la determinarea*

cursului istoriei. De asemenea, Balcanii, care constituie, geografic, poarta de deschidere a Turciei către continentul european, au importanță datorită statutului special dobândit în procesul istoric în care s-a format națiunea turcă, precum și potențialului în ceea ce privește integrarea și securitatea regională. Drept urmare, Balcanii au fost și rămân principalul obiectiv strategic al Turciei în termenii echilibrului de putere în această zonă și ai securității europene. Deși relațiile dintre Turcia și vecinii din Balcani au fost puternic afectate în timpul Războiului Rece, legăturile lor istorice continuă, în diverse moduri, până în zilele noastre. Din perspectiva etnică și culturală a Turciei, turcii care trăiesc în această regiune aparțin deopotrivă Turciei și Balcanilor, astfel că dubla lor apartenență este considerată deosebit de importantă. În acest sens, apariția / potențiala declanșare a crizelor în regiune are o semnificație majoră pentru Turcia în ceea ce privește durabilitatea și stabilitatea păcii. Prin urmare, Balcanii sunt mult mai mult decât o regiune vecină pentru Turcia, ca stat care a susținut întotdeauna stabilitatea în Balcani și a sprijinit integritatea statală. În acest studiu vor fi abordați principalii factori structurali (legăturile istorice, musulmanii din Balcani și minoritatea turcă, geopolitica, securitatea) care fac ca Balcanii să fie importanți pentru politica externă a Turciei.

Résumé : Les principaux facteurs structuraux qui accordent de l'importance aux Balkans dans la politique extérieure de la Turquie. Grâce au voisinage géographique et aux liaisons historiques, sociales et culturelles, les Balkans représentent une des régions envers lesquels la Turquie manifesta un intérêt tout à fait spécial. D'ailleurs, la Turquie joua un rôle décisif dans les Balkans pendant presque 550 années, tandis que ses politiques et ses actions contribuèrent à la définition de la région, ainsi qu'à la détermination du cours historique. De plus, les Balkans, qui constituent, géographiquement, la porte d'ouverture de la Turquie vers le continent européen, présente de l'importance grâce au statut spécial acquis le long du processus historique pendant lequel se forma la nation turque, ainsi qu'au potentiel en ce qui concerne l'intégration et la sécurité régionale. Par conséquent, les Balkans ont été et restent le principal objectif stratégique de la Turquie dans les termes de l'équilibre de pouvoir dans la région et de la sécurité européenne. Quoique les relations entre la Turquie et ses voisins des Balkans furent puissamment affectées pendant la Guerre Froide, leurs liaisons historiques continuent, en diverses manières, jusqu'à nos jours. De la perspective ethnique et culturelle de la Turquie, les Turcs qui vivent dans cette région appartiennent à la Turquie, mais aussi aux Balkans, de manière qu'on considère leur double appartenance extrêmement importante. À cet égard, l'apparition / le potentiel déclenchement des crises dans la région a une signification majeure pour la Turquie en ce qui concerne la durabilité et la stabilité de la paix. En conclusion, les Balkans représentent beaucoup plus qu'une région voisine pour la Turquie, en tant qu'État qui soutint tout le temps la stabilité dans les Balkans et appuya l'intégrité étatique. L'étude ci-jointe, on abordera les principaux facteurs structuraux (liaisons historiques, les musulmans des Balkans et la minorité turque, la géopolitique, la sécurité) qui fassent que les Balkans soient importants pour la politique extérieure de la Turquie.

INTRODUCTION

The Balkans is one of the few regions in the world where diversity is politically, culturally and geographically rare. This diversity is an advantage when strong states dominate the Balkan geography, while it becomes a disadvantage in times of the efforts of many weak states to exist. The British political leader, Winston Churchill, characterises the Balkans as saying, "*The Balkans produce more history than they can consume.*"¹ Indeed, when we look at the historical background of the Balkans, not only has no region of Europe witnessed more attacks, invasions and occupation movements than the Balkans, but the region of which the dominance has often changed hands has been one of the most chaotic and unsettled regions on earth. As Eric J. Hobsbawm rightly refers to the past 20th century as the "*Age of Extremes*"² or the "*Age of Catastrophe*", the fact that one of the two bloodiest and most chaotic regions in the world has been the Middle East, and the other one, the Balkans, makes this reality clear. Because in both regions, there have been experienced great wars, civil wars, occupations, ethnic cleansing, exiles, and refugee situations, and there have never been lacking in blood and tears in the lives of the people in these regions. When we look at the history of the Balkans, appear as dynamic and multi-layered geography where the four great civilisations (Ancient Greece, Rome, Byzantine and Ottoman empires) intersect, a wide variety of cultures interact with each other, but never dominated by a single culture. Therefore, if that is true, the Balkans have a destiny that seems immutable. Just in terms of not only races and religions but also it is difficult to find a homogeneous state, even a homogeneous province in this region. So to say; conflict, partition, and ethnic cleansing have been the "ill fate" of the Balkans throughout history.³

¹ Alex N. Grigor'ev, Adrian Severin, *Debalkanizing the Balkans: A Strategy for a Sustainable Peace in Kosovo*, in "Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft" [International Politics and Society], 2007, No. 1, pp. 123-124.

² Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Kısa 20. Yüzyıl (1914-1991): Aşırılıklar Çağı* [Age of Extremes: Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991], Yavuz Alogan (çev.), İstanbul, Everest Yayınları, 2003.

³ This negative image of the Balkans has led politicians and researchers to frequently refer to the concept of "Balkanization" when describing similar regions of the world. The concept is used as a negation term in order to refer to some regions that possess or have the potential to contain features such as conflict, division and instability in international relations.

As a result of all these facts and processes, the Balkans, which consisted of six countries (Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia) in the past; simultaneously with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, together with the countries that emerged after the collapse of Yugoslavia, it has become a region with 12 countries. Besides this, the Balkans, surrounded by globalisation and popular culture, is an area where Orthodox, Catholic, Slavic, and Islamic cultures interact and collide. In this respect, the emerging / potential emergence of crises in the region has a critical importance for Turkey in terms of the sustainability of peace and stability. The Balkans is therefore much more than a neighbouring region for Turkey, which has always advocated stability in the Balkans and supported the establishment of countries' territorial integrities.

In this study, an analysis will be made within the framework of the main structural factors (historical ties, Balkan Muslims and Turkish minorities, geopolitics, security) that make the Balkans important for Turkish foreign policy.

GEOPOLITICS OF THE BALKAN PENINSULA

The Balkan Peninsula is the easternmost of the three peninsulas in the south of the European continent. The geopolitical importance of the Balkans is remarkable as it is a transition point between East and West. This region, as well as being a transit area to other parts of Europe, is noteworthy because of its proximity to Asia and its location extending from Central Europe to the Mediterranean and even to Central Asia.⁴ As a result of its geopolitical situation, the Balkan Peninsula, which has shown a long history and cultural unity for centuries, is bordered to the Mediterranean Sea as a historical region in the south. Here, the Aegean Sea, with its hundreds of islands, is positioned in the Balkans; it is bordered to the Adriatic Sea in the West while stretching from there to Crete and the Mediterranean Sea. As for the northern border of the Balkans, since Roman times the Danube River has been designated as the northern border of the peninsula. The Danube River forms a water barrier that is challenging to overcome, such as The Straits in the south. However, since the Danube River is the main trade route to the Black Sea, and because of the strong trade ties between the two coasts, it has never been an insurmountable obstacle. The empires that dominated this side of the Balkans have always tried to keep the territories beyond the Danube under their control. Not only is this not direct sovereignty, but

⁴ Kenan Arıbaş, *Küresel Çağda Siyasi Coğrafya* [Political Geography in the Global Age], Konya, Çizgi Kitabevi, 2007, p. 429.

also the north and south of the Danube have shown significant differences in terms of culture and social structure. The Danube has remained as the northern border of the Balkans, especially in military terms. Towards the west of the Balkans, Vidin, and in particular, Belgrade, played a crucial role, and after Belgrade, the Sava River has formed a border separating the Western Balkans from Syrmia and Hungary.⁵ Within this natural and historical border formed by rivers, 0.2% of Italy, 27% of Slovenia, and 9% of Romania from the west remain within the Balkan geography. The west of the Balkans borders the Adriatic Sea and the east borders the Black Sea. Its southern border constitutes Greece with the remaining part of Turkey in Western Thrace, which constitutes 27% of the total surface area, and gives the Balkans a feature that provides an exit to the Mediterranean via the Aegean and Ionian seas in the South.⁶

TURKISH AND MUSLIM PRESENCE IN THE BALKANS

The Turkish presence in the Balkans dates back to very ancient times. Even the word “Balkan” is an Old Turkish word that was meaning “mountain range / mountainous”.⁷ The Balkan Peninsula, starting from the 6th century, became a

⁵ Halil İnalçık, *Türkler ve Balkanlar* [Turks and the Balkans], in “BAL-TAM Türklük Bilgisi Dergisi” [BAL-TAM Journal of Turkishness], 2005, Year: II, No. 3, Prizren, Balkan Türkoloji Araştırmaları Merkezi, pp. 23-24.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁷ According to Mark Mazover, the name “Balkan” itself is a name given afterward to the peninsula. According to him, this naming is the name of a mountain, and today’s Balkans was known as “Rumeli” or “European Balkans” between the late 19th century and early 20th centuries. When the Ottomans called the region “Rumeli”, it was based on the fact that the region was previously the territory of the Roman Empire. In this context, Anatolian lands were called “Diyar-ı Rum” and Anatolian Seljuks were called “Greek Seljuks”. Rumi was the title of the inhabitants of this region. Even in the classical period of the Ottomans, the concept of Rumi had a social content. In general, to distinguish Ottoman Turks from other Asian Turks and in particular it was used to describe an urban, educated and cultured class of the Empire. To Mazover, the widespread use of this name with negative connotations was during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Therefore, the Balkans began to mean much more than a geographical term over time. Unlike its past uses, the term has strong connotations of violence, desert, and primitivism that are hard to find elsewhere. Hugh Poulton, *Balkanlar: Çatışan Azınlıklar, Çatışan Devletler* [Balkans: Conflicting Minorities, Conflicting States], Yavuz Alogan (çev.), İstanbul, Sarmal Yayınevi, 1993, p. 104.

homeland where Turkish tribes came and settled and the mounted nomadic Turkish tribes who came after each other from the east, through Asia and the northern Black Sea steppe region, either mingled with the Native people from Dacian, Thracian and Slavic origin, then disappeared (such as the Pechenegs and Uz from Oghuz origin in the 11th century), or founded powerful states in the north-eastern Balkans as a military ruling class.⁸

This presence continued with the Bulgarian, Oghuz, Pecheneg and Kuman migrations in later periods and reached its climax during the Ottoman Empire. Within the Balkan Peninsula, several strategic massive mountainous regions, straits, and passageways marked the stages of the Empire's founding. This geopolitical factor is of fundamental importance for understanding the stages of Ottoman expansion in the Balkans. After the Ottomans settled on the European coast of the Dardanelles, the Evros River from Edirne to Enez became the first frontier of conquest and spread.⁹ Therefore, first of all, the Ottoman Empire was born and developed as a Balkan empire in the 14th and 15th centuries.¹⁰ In terms of power balance, the Balkans constituted the dynamic for the establishment and rise of the Empire's power and influence to spread to Europe and to become one of the great powers of Europe.¹¹ With the annexation of Edirne to the Ottoman territories in 1361, the Turkish population in the Balkans began to increase, and these lands which were called "Rumeli" became one of the two main politically and culturally dominated areas of the Ottoman State, along with Anatolia. Until the Balkan war in 1912, it was possible to go from Istanbul, almost as far as to the Adriatic Sea, within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. All Western Thrace, Macedonia, Albania and even today's Kosovo and Sancak were under Ottoman rule. Salonika was the second-largest city in the Empire, and the majority of the populations living on the aforementioned "Rumeli" lands were either Turkish or Muslim.¹² In Western Thrace

⁸ Halil İnalcık, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁰ İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Barışı* [Ottoman Peace], İstanbul, Ufuk Kitap, 2006, p. 46.

¹¹ Marija Mitrovic, *Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: The Influence of Traditional Determinants on Davutoğlu's Conception of Turkey-Balkan Relations*, Berlin, GeT MA Working Paper Series, No. 10, 2014, p. 27.

¹² The history and duration of Ottoman sovereignty as a region or country in the Balkans are as follows: Macedonia (1371-1913) 542 years, Serbia (1389-1829) 440 years, Bulgaria (1396-1878) 483 years, Greece (1456-1830) 374 years, Bosnia (1463-1878) 396 years, Albania (1468-1912) 444 yıl, Wallachia [Eflak] (1476-1829) 353 years, Crimea (1478-1774) 296 years, Herzegovina (1482-1878) 396 years, Moldova (1504-

and Macedonia, a Muslim-Turkish population consisting of Turks, Muslim Pomaks and even Muslim Slavs who had migrated from Anatolia at the time was the majority. Albanians living in Albania, Kosovo, and Western Macedonia made up a significant part of this population because they were Muslims. Especially, Islamization and migration from Anatolia to the region, it has contributed to the high level of the Turkish-Islamic population in the Balkans. Therefore, the most powerful and long-term influence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans is the massification and institutionalisation of “Islamization” in the region.¹³ The Balkans are also important in terms of being the starting point for the decline and collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. The late 19th century witnessed rising Greek nationalism and the modern Greek state in 1830 was the first nation-state in the Balkans to come out of clashes between nationalism and the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴ So to say, the fall and collapse of the Empire spreading and rising in the Balkans began tragically from the Balkans. The tragedy of the Empire in the Balkans, especially the Balkan Wars, ended the search for Ottomanism, which aimed to keep the empire together, regardless of religion or race, and turned the Committee of Union and Progress to Turkish nationalism. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish and Muslim peoples living in the Balkan countries did not cut their ties with the motherland and managed to maintain their identity despite all kinds of oppression. Following the assimilation policies implemented during the Cold War, ethnic cleansings against the Turkish and Muslim presence in the Balkans emerged in the just after the Cold War. Although the region seems to have reached tranquillity today, in reality, the political and ethnic conflicts that have been the bleeding wound of the region have not been fully resolved.

BALKANS AND TURKEY: INDEFEASIBLE LEGACY

Moving from the historical reality above, it should be firstly mentioned that

1829) 325 years, Croatia (1526-1699) 173 years, Hungary (1526-1699) 173 years. See L. Carl Brown, *İmparatorluk Mirası: Balkanlarda ve Ortadoğu'da Osmanlı Damgası* [Imperial Legacy: Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East], 4th ed., Gül Çağalı Güven (çev.), İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2000, pp. 9-10.

¹³ The majority of the Muslim population in the Balkans, is not the Turks brought from Anatolia and settled in the region within the framework of the settlement policy, was composed of the “Islamized Balkans” under the influence of the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁴ Mustafa Aydın, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs*, in “Middle Eastern Studies”, 1999, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 164.

the Republic of Turkey bears the heritage of the Ottoman Empire¹⁵, which dominated the Balkans for about 550 years, and since its foundation, it has turned its face to the West and brought its European and Balkan identity to forefront, rather than its Asian one. Therefore, Turkey is a Balkan country not only geographically but also politically, historically and culturally.

After centuries of the Ottoman Empire's sovereignty, the Balkans became one of the most depressed regions during the collapse of the Empire. Both the effects of the French Revolution and the struggles of the great powers on the Balkans as determinants of the independence movements in the region have led to a radical change in the political, human and geographical structure of the region. Following the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Turkey's relations with the Balkan countries have shown progress on a peaceful basis. In the interwar period, Turkey's prominent status quo approach in international relations was also reflected in the Balkan policy. During the Cold War period, however, Turkey's Balkan policies were much more limited and it did not find much room for action in the area squeezed by the eastern and Western blocs. The main change in Turkey's Balkan policy was triggered by the end of the Cold War and entering of Yugoslavia into a break-up process in a regional sense, and thus, Turkey gained a wider room for manoeuvre in the Balkans just as it did in the Caucasus and the Middle East.

The Balkans region has become significant for Turkish foreign policy due to four main factors in the period from past to present. These four main factors make the Balkans region significant for Turkey and that furthermore affect its relations with the countries and peoples of the region at all times closely. The factors in question are as follows:

- 1) Historical ties with the region
- 2) The population of Balkan-origin living in Turkey
- 3) Muslim and Turkish-origin communities living in the Balkans
- 4) The geopolitical position of the region and security

Looking at the *historical ties with the region*, one must first state that the Ottoman Empire was born in the town of Söğüt as a beylik, but it was established

¹⁵ The Ottoman Empire's dominance over the Balkans is divided into three periods: 1) The period of progression and supremacy in the Balkans (1354-1683), 2) The period of weakening and decline of supremacy (1683-1821), 3) The period of breaking down of supremacy and withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkan territories (1821-1913). For more information, see Caner Sancaktar, *Balkanlar'da Osmanlı Hâkimiyeti ve Siyasal Mirası* [Ottoman Dominance and Political Heritage in the Balkans], in "Ege Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi" [Ege Strategic Research Journal], 2011, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 27-47.

and flourished in the Balkans as a world state. In this context, with the conquest of Edirne (1362), we see that the Balkans were historically the main expansion area of the Ottoman Empire. In the course of the in the process of expansion of the Empire, its orientation to the West much more than the East, in fact, ensured that the empire is regarded as a Balkan empire rather than an Asian or Eastern Empire. Because a significant portion of the Ottoman human resources and economic income were also provided from the Balkans. Furthermore, the Balkans is a region that has closely influenced Ottoman-Turkish political life. It is a fact that the political ideas and movements that developed in Western Europe entered the political life of the Ottoman Empire through the Balkan lands and strengthened. Therefore, it is an undeniable fact that nationalist ideas, organisations and movements in the Balkans affected Ottoman-Turk intellectuals and political leaders in the development of the understanding of motherland and nation in the modern sense. Indeed, the fact that two of the most prominent centres of the Committee of Union and Progress, the pioneer of the 1908 Revolution (re-declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy [II. Meşrutiyet]), were located in Salonica and Manastir is meaningful in this regard.

The Balkans, in the Ottoman Empire, was the region where the Devshirmeh [Devşirme] system was applied most intensively.¹⁶ In this context, this region provided the Empire with a great number of soldiers (Janissary [Yeniçeri]) and senior executives. Considering that from the 215 grand viziers of the Empire, this figure reaches 292 with the reassignments¹⁷, and 62 of them are of Balkan origin, and the military and civilian cadres performing war of independence are mainly of Balkan origin; the importance of the Balkans in Turkish political life and Turkish foreign policy can probably be better understood. For example, considered one of the most important grand viziers of the Ottoman Empire, Sokullu Mehmet Pasha, who served as Grand Vizier for more than 14 years during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, Selim II, and Murat III, marked the period of the Ottoman Empire with his statecraft, projects, and personality as a devshirmeh Ottoman statesman of Serbian origin.¹⁸ Similarly, Mustafa Kemal

¹⁶ Colin Imber, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (1300-1650)* [The Ottoman Empire (1300-1650)], Şiar Yalçın (çev.), İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2006, p. 178.

¹⁷ T. C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü [Republic of Turkey, the Prime Ministry General Directorate of State Archives], *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi* [Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives Guide], 2nd ed., İstanbul, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, No. 42, 2000, pp. 487-500.

¹⁸ The provinces in the Balkans were mostly ruled by the pashas of Balkan-origin. Many of

Atatürk, Republic of Turkey's founder, was born in Salonika as a member of the last generations of a Turkmen Yoruk family who migrated from Anatolia to the Balkans in the 14th or 15th century.¹⁹

It is to some degree true that the Ottoman conquests caused a sudden interruption in the natural development of Balkan history. It is also true that Balkan nations have lost their national dynasties and ruling classes. With the disappearance of the Balkan states, the development of the "high culture" symbolised by their elite also halted. Nonetheless, folk culture and literature and arts connected to the church sustained its vitality and development during the Ottoman period. On the other hand, Ottoman culture had a strong influence on language, arts and daily life. It can be argued that the culture of the indigenous people thus prospered by coming into contact with Islamic culture. The most apparent document of this cultural influence is the Balkan languages. The number of cultural words taken from Turkish, even in today's Balkan languages, varies between 2000 and 5000 words depending on the region. Also, the Ottoman heritage is visible even today in clothes, folk music, eating and drinking traditions,

these people were successful managers who grew up through the Devshirmeh system. There were also numerous devshirmehs among the Ottoman viziers and other Council (Divan) members. Therefore, an important element of the political institutionalization of the Ottoman Empire was the practice of devshirmeh. The practice of devshirmeh took place between the 14th and 18th centuries. This practice declined in the 17th century and then ended in the 18th century. At the time period determined by the central government, the desired number of Christian boys was gathered from the designated regions. The gathering of the children was carried out by officials authorized by the central government and the Janissary Agha. As a rule, one boy was subjected to being devshirmeh for every forty families. Children were chosen by different criteria (body structure, height, intelligence, morals, character, beauty, etc.). According to these criteria, the best children were collected. Only the single-male child family, clergies and prominent families of the region were exempted from the practice of devshirmeh. The collected children were taken to Istanbul and delivered to Janissary Agha. The best ones were taken to the palace, employed in various jobs and trained at Enderun. The most successful ones in the training process were assigned to different positions under the Sultan's command at the palace. Others were sent as rulers to different parts of the Empire. Devshirmehs, who achieved the highest success in the training and post-training posts, were rising up to senior positions in the state administration. See Caner Sancaktar, *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁹ For more information, see Ali Güler, *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Soyü* [Lineage of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk], in "Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi" [Journal of Atatürk Research Center], 1999, Vol. XV (Kasım), No. 45, pp. 969-1009.

and behaviours.²⁰ On the other hand, long centuries of living together with the Turks in cities and villages, the influence of the laws and infrastructure institutions of the Ottoman Empire and finally the imitation of the Ottoman high culture as a prestige-culture constituted the main ways of acculturation among the Balkan native population. F. William Hasluck, a British historian and archaeologist, has shown how members of both communities share widely Christian and Islamic folk beliefs and customs.²¹ The eclecticism of folk religious sects such as Bektashism played an important role in this. On the other hand, the Rumelian Turks took many cultural elements from the Balkan native population in agriculture, daily life, and the arts, so that in time, a cultural difference between Rumelians and Anatolian people emerged.²²

Nationalism has been the fundamental dynamics of development, change, integration, and disintegration in the Balkans since the 19th century. Both the dominance of the Ottoman Empire over the Balkan peoples and that the Balkan peoples embarked on national struggle for independence against the Empire from the early 19th century and the subsequent efforts to build their own “nation-state”, inevitably initiated and developed a process that gave rise to the “Ottoman / Turkish / Muslim” antagonism in the Balkans. Therefore, it is worth noting that both behind the happenings experienced during the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans and the ethnic and religious conflicts experienced in the Balkans in 1990s, the process of being purified from the Ottoman past/heritage at both political, cultural and ethnic levels, in other words, “*De-Ottomanization*” process/efforts, lies. On the other hand, in the first stage of the post-Cold War era, domestic and foreign developments encouraged Neo-Ottomanist ideas and discourses in Turkish foreign policy. The rise of Neo-Ottomanist discourse in Turkish political life in the early 1990s arises from both the actualisation of changes in Turkish foreign policy that promoted the emergence of critical ideas and alternative discourses and a series of developments (the collapse of the bipolar international system, new independent Turkic republics in Central Asia, Bosnia-Herzegovina

²⁰ Halil İnalcık, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

²¹ See F. William Hasluck, *Sultanlar Döneminde Anadolu'da Hristiyanlık ve İslam* [Christianity and Islam in Anatolia During the Sultans], Vol. 1, Timuçin Binder (çev.), İstanbul, Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2012; F. William Hasluck, *Sultanlar Döneminde Anadolu'da Hristiyanlık ve İslam* [Christianity and Islam in Anatolia During the Sultans], Vol. 2, Timuçin Binder (çev.), İstanbul, Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2013.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 33. For more information, see F. William Hasluck, *Bektaşilik İncelemeleri* [Bektashism Reviews], Ragıp Hulusi Özden (çev.), İstanbul, Say Yayınları, 2012.

War, the rise of Kurdish ethnic nationalism in Turkey). Neo-Ottomanism emerged as a result of the political developments in the Balkans, the rise of the Islamic bourgeoisie in Turkey, the widespread religious education especially following the September 12, 1980, military coup, and the economic liberalisation efforts initiated by the Motherland Party, led by Turgut Özal. He sought a geopolitical redefinition of Turkey-West relations (in particular Turkish-American relations) in the cultural geography of a potential Turkish sphere of influence over vast geography, expanding from the Balkans to the China Sea so that the “next century would be a century of Turks.”²³ In this context, in the 1990s, Turkey has “entered into more rapprochement with the Ottoman past” in this process, undoubtedly, the attacks against the Turkish and Muslim communities in the Balkans, taking into account the action and reaction principle, have historically led to the development of prejudice in the public opinion and the administrative circles of Turkey as well as against the non-Muslim nations and states of the Balkans. Therefore, in the memories of Turkish foreign policy, the Balkans have often taken their place with negative images. Because, during the interwar period, in terms of spreading area of fascism, and communism after World War II (1939-1945), the Balkans were perceived as a threat to Turkey and a region where minority problems were endless.

Considering the second factor, the “*population of Balkan origin living in Turkey*”, that makes the Balkans important for Turkey, together with the process of the Ottoman withdrawal from the Balkans, the waves of migration from the Balkans to Anatolia during the period of the Republic continued for various reasons (oppression and war), creating a population of Balkan origin (Bosnians, Muslim Albanians, Torbesler, Pomaks, and Bulgarian Turks) which has a population of approximately 3 million among Turkey’s population²⁴, and even a significant number of the relatives of these people still live in the Balkans. Facing massive immigration from the Balkans to Turkey also affect Turkey’s ethnic composition, it has also contributed to the construction of the Turkish nation. Although while migration between the Balkans and Turkey based on ethnic rather than religious-based (for example, in the Turkish-Greek population exchange

²³ Hasan Kösebalan, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 12.

²⁴ For more information, see Seyfi Yıldırım, *Balkan Savaşları ve Sonrasındaki Göçlerin Türkiye Nüfusuna Etkileri* [Effects of Immigration in Turkey’s Population after the Balkan Wars and Aftermath], in “Cumhuriyet Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi” [The Journal of Modern Turkish History], 2012, Vol. 8, No. 16 (Güz), pp. 75-92.

(1923-1930), which was one of the most recent mass immigration, despite a religious-based exchange), these immigrants are considered as ethnic Turks in Turkey and were also considered Greek in Greece. Because, in the historical process, the fact that the most important determinant of ethnic identities in the Balkans has been primarily the religion, not the race or the language. Turkey and Greece have taken an important step towards forming their national states with the necessary exchange of people. In this context, these immigrants were after the arrival subject of intensive *Turkification*, which resulted in changed family names, inability to use the mother tongue, etc.²⁵ On the other hand, the political, social, economic and psychological losses caused by these migrations for the Muslim and Turkish communities of Balkan origin, as well as the pressures experienced by the Muslim and Turkish communities living in various Balkan countries, have become one of the most sensitive issues Turkish foreign policy in every period. In this context, Turkey's one other reason for the interest in the Balkans, increasing concerns about the new wave of mass immigration. Turkey has received large amounts of immigration from the Balkans since the period of the Ottoman Empire; one of the most important reasons for this is that when a crisis or war broke out in the region, Turkey has always been a popular destination for Balkan Muslims and Turkish minorities. In other words, in both groups, especially in times of crisis, they see Turkey as the biggest guarantee. Since the high economic and social cost of these migrations laid a burden on Turkey, Turkey carries out policies that support human rights and freedoms in the countries where minorities come from and still reside, to eliminate the need to emigrate to Turkey. Also, mass migration leads to a reduction in the number of the Turkish minority in the Balkans, and this situation is not a desirable situation for Turkey. This approach, which may also be considered as Turkey's taking an active role in the Balkans, has been perceived, from an imperialist point of view, as Turkey's return to the former Ottomans and the Balkans. This was also considered to be Turkey's foreign policy status quo as a sign of a major change. It has therefore been claimed that the new, Islamic and Ottomanist tendency foreign policy identity was now operative and on the arena.²⁶

Considering the *"Turkish and Muslim population living in the Balkans"*, as the

²⁵ Eşref Kenan Raşidagić, *A Critical Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Western Balkans*, in Muhidin Mulalić, Hasan Korkut, Elif Nuroğlu (ed.), *Turkey-Balkan Relations: The Future Prospects of Cultural, Political and Economic Transformations and Relations*, İstanbul, TASAM Publication, 2013, p. 182.

²⁶ Marija Mitrovic, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

third factor that makes the Balkans important for Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, This Muslim and Turkish presence in the Balkans is the result of continuous mass migration from Anatolia in the 14th and 15th centuries. It is known that the Ottoman Empire forcibly moved nomadic groups from Anatolia to Rumelia and settled them in certain areas along strategic routes. One reason for this migration and settlement was to secure the conquered territories and main roads and provide raiding forces at the borderlands. Another reason was the policy of sending animal-breeder nomads to the borderlands of Rumelia, who caused a disturbance in Anatolia and caused harm to the villagers. Whatever the reason is, there is no doubt that the Empire played a leading role in Turkifying Rumelia. Besides that, especially in the 14th century, there seems to have been a spontaneous movement of migration from Anatolia to settle in the rich lands of Rumelia. Those who participated in this migration were mostly Turkmen tribes who came to Western Anatolia under Mongol pressure from Eastern and Central Anatolia. It seems that the occupation of Byzantine lands in Western Anatolia and the emergence of Turkmen beyliks was the result of this Turkmen migration movement. According to the 16th-century archival records, even in the 1520s, the Yoruks in Western Anatolia accounted for one in nine of the entire population. The Turkmen nomads who migrated from East to West Anatolia continuously were causing a population pressure, and the Balkans were an appealing area for the nomads who had to search for new grasslands.²⁷ Today in Balkan geography, more than 1 million Turkish population (approximately 760 thousand in Bulgaria, 120 thousand in Greece, 78 thousand in Macedonia, 40 thousand in Kosovo, and 70 thousand in Romania) and more than 8 million Muslim population (approximately 2.5 million in Albania, 2 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1.6 million in Kosovo, 900 thousand in Bulgaria, 670 thousand in Macedonia, 150 thousand in Greece, 120 thousand in Montenegro, 235 thousand in Serbia, 70 thousand in Romania) live.²⁸

In this context, Turks and Muslims living in the Balkans today, as they did yesterday, have positive thoughts and opinions towards Turkey and see Turkey as a “protective state” in almost every period (especially during times of oppression, conflict, and crisis). Likewise, Turkey’s public opinion and state are also equally sensitive to these communities in the Balkans because of their historical and

²⁷ Halil İnalcık, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

²⁸ Caner Sancaktar, *Balkanlar Türkiye İçin Neden Önemli?* [Balkans Why is It Important for Turkey?], Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (TASAM), 27 Mayıs 2010, in https://tasam.org/tr-TR/Icerik/71/balkanlar_turkiye_icin_neden_onemli (Accessed in 08.10.2019).

cultural ties and are interested in their problems. Hence, Turkey, even if other factors are ignored, Turks and the Muslims minority in the Balkans are directly affected by the developments in the region. After the Cold War, Turkey's apparent interest in the Balkans began to experience a change. In the context of Yugoslavia, with the end of ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, since the early 2000s, while soft power has become an effective key throughout the region, Turkey's foreign policy towards the Balkans in the framework of this new approach has emerged.²⁹ In addition to seeking the political and security aspects that Turkey's Balkan policy as well, in the last decade, quests based on soft power elements have also been very important.³⁰ In the period following 2009, when Turkey's foreign policy behaviour towards the Balkans is analysed, it is evident that beyond the major changes in the meaning of discourse, there is indeed an essential continuity in terms of Turkey's shaping of its relations with the region.³¹ During Ahmet Davutoğlu's term as prime minister, Turkey displayed a better-structured vision in the region, endeavoured to be more proactive in the face of developments experienced in the region, and emphasised the approach of being in touch with people in the field through the use of soft power capabilities and, in particular, cultural ties.³² Turkey sought new instruments to expand its sphere of influence, and in this context referred to the common Ottoman history of the Balkans in its discourses. It began to use its cultural and religious ties arising from Ottoman heritage, including kinship relations with the Balkan people, to position itself more strongly in Balkan politics and to balance the influence of the great powers in the region.³³ In this context, the instruments of soft power for the region said that Turkey's heavily granted.

Looking at the *"Geopolitical position of the Balkans and security"*, as the fourth factor that makes the Balkans significant for Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, firstly, it can be mentioned that the main influence of Balkan geopolitics on Turkey is cultural and historical and this was because the Muslims of the region

²⁹ Zeynep Elif Koç, Murat Özsoy, *An Evaluation of Turkey's Western Balkans Policy under the AKP and Prospects for the Post-Davutoğlu Era*, in "Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi" [Selçuk University Journal of Studies in Turcology], 2018, Issue: 43 (Bahar), p. 358.

³⁰ Birgül Demirtaş, *Reconsidering Turkey's Balkan Ties: Opportunities and Limitations*, in "Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach", Pınar Gözen Ercan (ed.), Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 140.

³¹ Marija Mitrovic, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

regarded Turkey as their homeland. The culture that dominated the region for centuries was Ottoman-Turkish culture. At this point, it should also be noted that for the first time in 1808, until the German geographer, August Zeune, uses the term Balkan Peninsula, the region was called "European Turkey" (Turkey d'Europe) in most sources and maps.³⁴ Therefore, the historical background and the Turks in the region are an important geopolitical factor for Turkey. On the other hand, we can say that the geopolitics of this geography, especially in terms of the "stability" and "security" factors, are significant for Turkey and Turkish foreign policy in every period. Indeed, during the period of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans had strategic importance with its "outpost" position protecting Istanbul against Europe. Turkey's special geographical position between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, makes Turkey a Balkan, Mediterranean, and the Middle Eastern country all at the same time. This geographical position also makes Turkey much more sensitive to the developments and changes in the regional or international political and military balances.³⁵ So, the Balkans region is a very important geographical region connecting Central and Western Europe with Asia, as a peninsula adjacent to the Black Sea, Aegean and Adriatic seas and extending into the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, and with this feature, the geopolitical value of the Balkans is really high both in terms of security and in terms of trade routes, transportation, and stability. In other words, the Balkans has the distinction of being a road corridor to the West for Turkey. The link roads, between Turkey and Europe countries, which have intensive economic and political relations, to pass through this region. Therefore, maintaining security and stability in the Balkans is extremely important that both in terms of Turkey's security as well as to sustain economic and political relations. The emergence of the possibility of a conflict in this geography as well as the creates risk for regional security, Turkey's relations with the region and with Europe will also be negatively affected. Secondly, the Balkans region is Turkey's way of opening up to Europe, so the Balkans' being in "stability" and "security" is of great importance both for Turkey's "national security" and for the path to Europe not to be interrupted. Therefore, the Republic of Turkey has been continuously seeking "stability" and "security" in the Balkans region since its establishment and has supported and promoted all kinds of political, military, economic and cultural formations that

³⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* [Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position], 22nd ed., İstanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2007, p. 66.

³⁵ Mustafa Aydın, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

will serve that purpose (For example, the Balkan Entente established in 1934, and the Balkan Pact established in 1954).³⁶ Moreover, the Balkans region, one of the hinterlands of Turkey's foreign policy, is also very important in its event race against Greece in the context of its struggle to become a "regional power" in this geography. Considering Turkey's deep disagreements with Greece. In this context, Turkey's entering into more effective relations in the Balkans from Greece, to be a balance across Greece is of utmost importance. Thirdly, since the early 1990s, in Turkey's relations with the Balkans, it has emerged as a process of redefining the role and discourse. With the end of the bipolar international system, however, Turkey also had a wider arena of manoeuvring in foreign policy, thereby enabling it to develop more effective foreign policy initiatives.³⁷ In this context, throughout the 1990s near Turkey's land basin said that a foreign policy showed increased but controlled activity. The wars that took place in the Balkans in the 1990s brought great security concerns, especially for Turkey, and therefore Turkey played an active role in generating a solution in the crisis areas of the Balkans and especially in the conflicts experienced in Bosnia and Kosovo. Turkey's role in the region during the said crisis has reached its peak. In this context, Turkey approached the issue of Yugoslavia with similar matters, such as political and security concerns, and tried to play an active role in solving the Yugoslavia Crisis. Besides, following the internal conflicts that took place in the Balkans, Turkey has played an important role in the international peacekeeping mission in the region. In this context, to ensure lasting stability in the Balkans and to strengthen the cooperation environment, Turkey continues to play a leading role in regional affairs and organisations.³⁸

³⁶ For more information on the determinants of the emergence of the Balkan Entente and Balkan Pact, see Hasan Kösebalan, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-56; Melek Fırat, *Relations with Greece (1923-1939)*, in Baskın Oran (ed.), Mustafa Akşin (trans.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, Salt Lake City, The University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 210-212; Melek Fırat, *Relations with Greece (1945-1960)*, in Baskın Oran (ed.), Mustafa Akşin (trans.), *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, Salt Lake City, The University of Utah Press, 2010, pp. 350-353; Dilek Barlas, *Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s*, in "Journal of Contemporary History", 2005, Vol. 40, Issue: 3 (July), pp. 441-464.

³⁷ Birgül Demirtaş, *Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Balkans: A Europeanized Foreign Policy in a De-Europeanized National Context?*, in "Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies", 2015, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 129-130.

³⁸ Birgül Demirtaş, *Reconsidering Turkey's Balkan Ties...*, p. 133.

The new context of global politics and the new outlook of Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War period, in the context of the Middle East and the Balkans, Turkey pulling the focus of regional politics has opened up new possibilities in international relations to Turkey.³⁹ In the post-Cold War era, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) that will make a big change in Turkey's domestic and foreign policies, came to power, it not only continued active diplomatic initiatives that had intensified since the 1990s, but it also had a chance to add new elements to Balkan policy thanks to its increased interactions with the European Union (EU).⁴⁰ In this respect, since the 1990s, Turkey's active and inclusive in the Balkans is possible to say that the foreign policy of a positive impact on Turkey-EU relations. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the determinant of the main lines of Turkish foreign policy under the JDP, has played a significant role in the theoretical and practical framework of Turkey's Balkan policy. He proposed a new framework in terms of post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy and argued that Turkey should shape its policy in the Balkans, especially by making it based on the region's two important Muslim people: Bosnians and Albanians.⁴¹ On the other hand, for Ahmet Davutoğlu, cultural cooperation with the Balkans and the protection of Ottoman and Turkish heritage in this region are particularly important. According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, based on intra-regional balances and inter-regional dependency, strengthening the internal security of these communities, protecting their cultural assets, strengthening their socio-economic infrastructure, and maintaining and increasing communication between communities, Turkey, as well as peace in the region will make a powerful and secure the tension conjuncture.⁴² In the EU, such as Turkey, as well as the maintenance of peace and stability, also sees the Balkans as an area of influence as a test area for its capabilities.⁴³

CONCLUSIONS

Turkey is a multifaceted country for reasons such as its geographical

³⁹ İbrahim Kalın, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, Values, and Mechanisms*, in "International Journal", Charting the New Turkish Foreign Policy, 2011, Vol. 67, No. 1, (Winter), p. 13.

⁴⁰ Birgül Demirtaş, *Reconsidering Turkey's Balkan Ties...*, p. 130.

⁴¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-318.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 318.

⁴³ Marinko Bobic, *Congruous or Conflicting? Great Power Configurations in the Balkans*, in Aharon Klieman (ed.), *Great Powers and Geopolitics: International Affairs in a Rebalancing World*, Switzerland, Springer International Publishing, 2015, p. 97.

location, history, culture, and the social, political and economic composition of its nation. In this context, Turkey is both an Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea country, as well as Eurasian, the Near Eastern and the Balkans country.

The Balkans is a very important region not only for Turkey but also for regional and international powers. The Balkans is a region that cannot be reduced to homogeneous patterns in terms of the facts discussed in this article. Therefore, it is necessary to think of the Balkans with many political facts and factors in which the countries in the region whose conflicting histories, contradicts today and becomes uncertain in the future.

Turkey's relations with the Balkans, as well as the countries of the region and Turkey's national conjuncture, has been developed within the facilities and subjects where the international conjuncture makes it possible. The foreign policy understanding of the Republic based on maintaining the status quo, Yugoslavia experience of the Balkan countries, multipolar recognises opportunities to the countries in question of the international system after the end of the Cold War, and finally, from the countries of the region they live in identity crisis, and Turkey's since 2002, foreign policy understanding evolving from status quo to active foreign policy understanding was the determining factor of the relationship. In this context, since the end of the Cold War, mainly of Turks and Muslims in the Balkans in the international arena—even one-spokesman Turkey. Therefore, the position of Turkey in the region is special and unique. No doubt, as well as the advantages of this position, the disadvantages will always exist.

However, relations between Turkey and the Balkan countries should not be understood as purely bilateral relations. In fact, the international organisations to which each party is a member and the responsibilities it imposes have a direct or indirect impact on mutual political and economic relations. Thus, Turkey and Balkan countries, as well as EU enlargement and deepening policies, affect unequal degrees. On the other hand, EU members Bulgaria and Romania have expressed their support for Turkey's EU membership so far. This might work to their benefit with regard to the EU insofar as the EU recognizes a need to enhance its presence in the Black Sea area and insofar as it is officially favourable toward Turkish membership. This support, as long as the EU is aware of the need to increase its presence in the Black Sea region and it is important as long as the positive view of Turkey's membership.⁴⁴ Therefore, the Balkans have great importance with its special position, as well as with its potential for the future, in

⁴⁴ Ronald H. Linden, *Balkan Geometry: Turkish Accession and the International Relations of Southeast Europe*, in "Orbis", 2007, Vol. 51, Issue: 2 (Spring), p. 345.

the context of regional integration and the EU membership goal shared with all the countries of the region. In the post-Cold War period, increasing the effectiveness of Turkey's foreign policy and Turks and Muslims living in the Balkans, language, religion and culture in the sense of partnership of its, offers a wide range of ground relations in the region to Turkey. In this context, Turkey has an important position in the Balkans, which is often in crisis, thanks to its position of being a model country in the region with its image of moderation in foreign policy, responsibility, respect for the international order and, democratic attitude. On the other hand, the developments underwent in the Balkans during the 19th and 20th centuries indicate that the region will continue to be an important area of struggle for the great powers in the 21st century. Because the region is in a strategic location as a geographical position and it is also the geopolitical basin of many historical powers.

Within this framework, its special position in the historical process bears the Balkans far beyond being a geographic place for Turkey. Turkey depending on the current national power capacity and has the potential to be a state of shaping the developments in the Balkans. Turkey, which strives to develop regional cooperation with all countries in the Balkans, increases its effectiveness in the Balkans by creating different platforms and contributing to these formations both economically and culturally through a multi-relationship and dialogue network including non-governmental and professional organisations. It is inevitable for Turkey to know and manage the perceptions that pose risks for the policies it will produce in the Balkans, which are very diverse in terms of ethnicity, in order to be more effective in these efforts. In this regard, it is an inevitable necessity for Turkey, which is based on the principles of "regional ownership" and "comprehensiveness" in its Balkan policy in the 21st century, to claim the Balkans heritage that it inherited from the Ottomans today and in the past, and to play an active role in the region, in terms of both its historical and geo-cultural responsibility and the strategic horizon that Turkish foreign policy holds.

POSTMODERN GEOPOLITICS AND THE POST-COLD WAR BALKAN POLICIES OF GLOBAL POWERS

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Abstract. *Theoretical and practical structure of the power system behind the implementation of the global powers' foreign and security policies should be analysed with the postmodern understanding. In this context, the global powers' interests – in their soft or hard forms of manifestation – are crucial elements of democratic development and crisis management within the network strategy in Balkan policies. The security culture is about the states' security perception and about the tools, which are used to combat specific threats. According to postmodern geopolitics, the Post-Cold War realities – with the axis of global powers – and Balkan policies of these powers are related to the political changes. United States (US) maintains its military superiority in the world order with state actors, and on the other hand, cooperates with the European Union (EU) as an international organisation. According to the post-modern understanding, there is neither a new world order nor a new world disorder in the world today. Instead, there is a security zone in Europe and a zone of danger and chaos outside. Balkan policies of global powers are essential because of the problematic issues in the region. Balkan geography constitutes a critical equation in this regard. This study emphasises that EU democratic development projects are different from the US in terms of strategy and institutional means. Some of the projects are considered within the EU enlargement strategy, while others are viewed as a foreign policy strategy, which is mainly assumed by leading countries like China. Compared to the US, the EU strategy focuses more on non-military operations, and the Balkan policies of these states represent a specific feature of the postmodern geopolitics.*

Keywords: *Postmodern Geopolitics, Balkan Policies, Post-Cold War, Global Power, US, EU, Turkey.*

Rezumat: *Geopolitica postmodernă și politicile balcanice post-Război Rece ale Puterilor Globale. Structura teoretică și practică a sistemului de putere din spatele implementării politicilor externe și de securitate ale puterilor globale ar trebui analizată în termenii înțelegerii postmoderne. În acest context, interesele puterilor globale – în formele lor blânde sau tari de manifestare – sunt elemente cruciale ale dezvoltării democratice și gestionării crizelor în cadrul strategiei de rețea din politicile balcanice. Cultura securității se*

referă la percepția de securitate a statelor și la instrumentele utilizate în vederea combaterii amenințărilor specifice. Conform geopoliticii postmoderne, realitățile post-Război Rece – cu axa puterilor globale – și politicile balcanice ale acestor puteri sunt orientate spre schimbările politice. Statele Unite ale Americii își mențin superioritatea militară în ordinea mondială față de actorii statali, iar pe de altă parte, cooperează cu Uniunea Europeană ca organizație internațională. Potrivit interpretărilor post-moderne, în lumea de azi nu există nici o nouă ordine mondială, nici o nouă tulburare mondială. În schimb, există o zonă de securitate în Europa și o zonă de pericol și haos în afara acesteia. Politicile balcanice ale puterilor globale sunt importante din cauza aspectelor problematice existente în regiune. Geografia balcanică constituie o chestiune critică în această privință. Studiul de față subliniază faptul că proiectele de dezvoltare democratică ale Uniunii Europene sunt diferite de cele ale Statelor Unite ale Americii din punctul de vedere al strategiei și mijloacelor instituționale. Unele dintre proiecte sunt luate în considerare în cadrul strategiei de extindere a UE, în timp ce altele sunt văzute ca o strategie de politică externă asumată, în principal, de țările-lider precum China. Strategia Uniunii Europene, în comparație cu cea a SUA, se concentrează mai mult pe operațiuni non-militare, iar politicile balcanice ale acestor state reprezintă o particularitate a geopoliticii postmoderne.

Résumé: La géopolitique postmoderne et les politiques balkaniques post-Guerre Froide des Puissances Globales. On devrait analyser la structure théorique et pratique du système de pouvoir derrière l'implémentation des politiques externes et de sécurité des puissances globales dans les termes de la compréhension postmoderne. En ce contexte-là, les intérêts des puissances globales - en leurs formes gentilles ou fortes de manifestation - représentent des éléments d'importance cruciale du développement démocratique et de la gestion des crises dans le cadre de la stratégie de réseau des politiques balkaniques. La culture de la sécurité fait référence à la perception de sécurité des États et des instruments utilisés en vue de combattre les menaces spécifiques. Conformément à la géopolitique postmoderne, les réalités post-Guerre Froide - avec l'axe des puissances globales - et les politiques balkaniques de ces puissances sont orientées vers les changements politiques. Les États Unis de l'Amérique maintiennent leur supériorité militaire dans l'ordre mondial envers les acteurs étatiques, et de l'autre partie, coopèrent avec l'Union Européenne en tant qu'organisation internationale. Conformément aux interprétations post-modernes, le monde de nos jours, il n'y a aucun nouvel ordre mondial, aucun nouveau trouble mondial. En échange, il y a une zone de sécurité en Europe et une zone de danger et de chaos en dehors celle-ci. Les politiques balkaniques des puissances globales sont importantes à cause des aspects problématiques qui existent dans la région. La géographie balkanique en constitue une question critique. L'étude ci-jointe souligne le fait que les projets de développement démocratique de l'Union Européenne sont différents de ceux des États Unis de l'Amérique du point de vue de la stratégie et des moyens institutionnelles. On prend en considération certains de ces projets-là dans le cadre de la stratégie d'extension de l'UE, pendant qu'on aperçoit des autres en tant que stratégie de politique extérieure assumée, en

principal, par les États-leaders tels la Chine. La stratégie de l'Union Européenne, en comparaison avec celle des États Unis, est concentrée plutôt sur des opérations pas-militaires, pendant que les politiques balkaniques de ces États-là représentent une particularité de la géopolitique postmoderne.

INTRODUCTION

There is no consensus definition of postmodernism, which is widely discussed in the period from the mid-20th century to the present. However, postmodernism corresponds to situations such as globalisation, consumption, change of centralist understanding in-state levels, and commodification of the knowledge. According to postmodernism, geopolitics is a discipline that examines humanity in correlation with the spatial factor. At the political level, it examines the similarities between power and purpose, nowadays and in the future, based on physical and political geography. Geopolitics is also the activation and evaluation of the geography with all its species and data. It forms the scientific basis of the security and development policy of a state.

Postmodern geopolitics concept and the post-Cold War Balkan policies of global powers prove that many important variables concerning the Balkan geography emerged with the deterioration of the bipolar world order after the Cold War Period. At the beginning of these variables, the liberation of Western Europe from the threat of the Soviet Socialist state as well as the ability to control the energy resources vital for the European continent can be mentioned as nationalist conflicts of ethnic origin in the Balkans.

In this study, with a mix of hard and soft power, it is evaluated that global powers have some postmodern geopolitical features in this region. In the literature, there are many kinds of research explaining the region with hard power, but as in postmodern geopolitics, global powers need all variables.

One of the main discussion topics of this postmodern approach is energy. As a postmodern geopolitical aspect, an important reason for the worldwide wars of occupation is the struggle for the seizure of natural resources, the means of transportation, and the control of trade. Large consumers, particularly the US, which consume 25% of the world's primary energy sources and crude oil, have been fighting for years to take control over the limited natural resources and the transport routes. In the world economies, the socioeconomic dimension and the importance of access to energy were clearly understood due to the unilateral

increase in crude oil prices by the OPEC member countries in 1973-74, and their long-term negative economic and social effects.

On a global scale, it can easily be said that the Balkans are not very important in the matter of energy supply. The main reason is that the region is impoverished in terms of other derivative energy sources, especially oil. Therefore, the Balkans has not been one of the most remarkable regions regarding the energy security supply. However, for widening the scope of energy security, diversification of distribution and transmission channels, and the introduction of very different methods to meet the energy need, the Balkans should be included in the global energy security equation, even though it is insignificant in terms of supply.

The analysis of the global powers' view of the Balkan geography in the light of these data is the main reference point of this study. The postmodern geopolitical approach constitutes the fiction of this study, which will underline the role of global powers in the Balkans, in the future. The classic geopolitical frames focus only on a historical and strategical view of the Balkan region.

1. AS A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION. POSTMODERN GEOPOLITICS AND STATES

Geopolitics is defined as the research of the parameters of geographical factors in international relations. Geopolitical theorists have attempted to demonstrate the importance of concerns in reaching national boundaries, exploiting important maritime routes and controlling strategic land-based parts in determining national policies.

Geographical concerns have a significant role not only in the political calculations of strong states that are trying to play a critical role in international politics but also in determining the spheres of influence of small and medium-sized states that aim to reach appropriate geographical boundaries to protect their national interests. Undoubtedly, geopolitics is not the only determinant in foreign policy decisions.¹ However, when the values of a country are compared with those of other countries, combining them with the elements of power, it can affect the possible results positively or negatively.

¹ Carlo J. Bonura Jr., *The Occulted Geopolitics of Nation and Culture: Situating Political Culture within the Construction of Geopolitical Ontologies*, in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, New York, Routledge Publishing, 2002, p. 88.

The geopolitical approaches² gain importance in the correct reading of the effects of the post-Cold War period and the globalisation process. Geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural assessments, prepare a scientific basis for the states' foreign policy strategies and provide political decision-makers with worldwide, regional and countrywide action options. It is only possible to understand the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and the USSR, to explain the current situation in which the greatest effects of globalisation are experiencing, and to produce policies appropriate to the changing conjuncture by using geopolitical depth and geopolitical approaches.³

In addition, geopolitical assessments are needed to ensure that thought is passed through discipline and handled with integrity in decisions on international relations, security, policy, and planning priorities. The political, economic, military, and socio-cultural power of the countries can change in time relative to other countries in the world and the region. These developments in the changing elements of geopolitics also affect geopolitical evaluations and foreign policy strategies.

Table 1. Modern versus Postmodern Geopolitics⁴

Modern Geopolitics	Postmodern Geopolitics
Cartographic visualizations: maps	Telemetrical visualizations: GIS ⁵
Perspectivist theatre	Post-perspectivist simulations
Inside/outside, Domestic/international	Global webs, glocalization
East/West	Jihad/McWorld
Territorial power	Telemetric power

² Traditional geopolitics examines current and future power and target relationships based on physical and political geography. In other words, it determines the direction that all elements of power give to politics in the geographical area and data. Political geography, physical geography, biological geography, social geography, anthropology, cultural and civilization history, social and political sciences, such as examining many disciplines according to their methods and trying to judge on the current events are considered as a geopolitical, empirical branch of science.

³ Anders Stephanson, *Fourteen Notes on the Very Concept of the Cold War*, in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, New York, Routledge Publishing, 2002, p. 62.

⁴ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination and Beyond*, in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, New York, Routledge Publishing, 2002, pp. 28.

⁵ GIS – Geographical Information Systems.

Hardware ascendant: GPR ⁶	Software ascendant: C142
Territorial enemies	Deterritorialized dangers
Fixed, rigid posture	Flexible, rapid response
Geopolitical man	Cyborg collectives
States/Leaders	Network/Cyborgs

Statistical information is insufficient to explain the whole existence of a state. Statistical data is more about the past. However, geopolitics is oriented towards the future as it considers the state as an organism above individuals. In this view, it is not content with political geography but also benefits from other sciences.

Geopolitical science, which is defined as the foreign policy directed by geography in its most general definition, has been used in different meanings in the historical process and sometimes formed the moral basis of an ideology that claims that a country's expansion policy is logical and sometimes hegemonic. From the point of view of critical geopolitics and Marxist thinkers, classical geopolitical theories are considered as a rationalisation tool built for US imperialism.⁷

When we evaluate the US foreign policy in a historical process, we see an image of foreign policy strategies shaped in the axis of geopolitical theories. Another feature of geopolitics is that the problems that countries or states consider nationally, such as the Balkans, have rapidly aroused universal repercussions. As in the Balkans, universal events are reflected in the national problems of the respective states. For this reason, it is obligatory for international problems to be interpreted together with national problems and to make geopolitical evaluations. In fact, the lack of this could generate a grave mistake because the national values of a country are sensitive to the effects coming from many focal points.

However, it is not possible to argue that geopolitical theories take into account all the balance of power in the world or respond to every situation. As such, it is necessary to make new assessments according to the position of global powers against each other. Especially in the geopolitical studies to be carried out in the Balkans, it brings the consideration of the real geography and the determination of distant goals.⁸ Thus, short-term or close-purposed developments that seem to be contradictory in the Balkans will not be considered.

⁶ GPR – Ground Penetrating Radar.

⁷ Anders Stephanson, *Fourteen Notes...*, pp. 63-66.

⁸ Blagoy Klimov, *Geopolitics vs Globalization in The Balkans: The New Rivalries in The*

Theoretically, the scope of geopolitics and the meaning of geopolitical phenomena change. Geopolitical renewal and change are problematic and even impossible within the framework of the view that geopolitics is a static and geography-dependent determinism. The distinction between geopolitics and political geography reveals itself once again and is critical. In short, political geography explores the impact of geographical structures and features on political life. Since geography is immutable, geopolitical renewal and change are not possible in this view. However, it is clear that this view is a multidimensional and dynamic phenomenon, far from the one-dimensional understanding of geopolitics.




Figure 1. Three core dimensions of approaches to discourse analysis in critical geopolitics⁹

Today especially, it is clear that the national policies cannot be considered separate from global and regional policies. In addition, examining the two pillars of

Energy and Transport Sectors, MPRA (Munich Personal RePEc Archive) Paper No. 4112, 2007, p. 13, in https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4112/1/MPRA_paper_4112.pdf (Accessed on 02.09.2019)

⁹ Martin Müller, *Doing Discourse Analysis in Critical Geopolitics*, in "L'Espace Politique" [En ligne], 2010, no. 3 (12), consulté le 06 octobre 2019, in <http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/1743>; DOI: 10.4000/espacepolitique.1743

power and goal, geopolitics expressed various theoretical approaches.¹⁰ It is for this reason that all decisions regarding the Balkans will need to be subject to a broad and comprehensive geopolitical assessment. In fact, in a changing world, powers or countries, societies aiming to reach a better place must take into account all the elements and theories of geopolitics. Therefore, it is evident that many problems regarding the Balkans cannot be solved without a geopolitical view.

First, it is because the determinist ideas do not value the classical geopolitics. The second is that many things that geopolitics envisage do not happen. The third is that it appears to be ethnocentric from the very beginning. This view can be seen in the statements of the classical defenders of geopolitics, such as the German Ratzel and Haushofer, the American Mahan and Spykman, the British Mackinder and the Swedish Kjellen. However, in recent years, five main trends in geopolitics have emerged. These are the American geostrategy, the radical French "*geopolitique*", which gives importance to environmental geopolitics on an international scale, followed by geopolitics, geoeconomy, and the critical geopolitics. Therefore, it can be said that the geopolitical evaluation of the Balkans can be made by taking into account the geopolitical theories based on the developments in the 21st century.¹¹

2. POST-COLD WAR BALKAN POLICIES OF GLOBAL POWERS

Another issue to be discussed is whether the rules or laws are systematic with geopolitical theories. The reality is that Balkan geopolitics should not be based on hard power or independent geography. In fact, the geographic and geopolitical positions have different meanings because of the geographical location of the Balkans – according to their physical geography – and explains the situation.

The geopolitical position refers to the location of the Balkans along with the power centres, the political structure of the supply and political perceptions, along with the value of the Balkans. The geopolitical area of the Balkans is much broader and more comprehensive than its place on a map. Therefore, when its geographical position is evaluated together with the elements of power, its geopolitical position will have a value.

While today's world-wide power centre in the US, Europe, and the CIS, if they lose their power-centre characteristics and new powers form in hypothetical

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

South America or the east of Asia, it is inevitable that geopolitical position will change value even though the geographical position of the Balkans has not changed.¹² Postmodern geopolitics will directly affect the fundamental political, economic, and security parameters of the Balkans. Moreover, the future position of the Balkans is expected to be in the form of an alternative reorganisation of relations with power centres and a structure in which long-term cultural, economic, and political ties are strengthened.

2.1. Geopolitics and Balkan Concept

“Balkans” is the name given to the region located in the southern part of the geography constituting the European Continent. For this reason, the concept of South-East Europe for the Balkans can be used in some studies. The northern boundary of the Balkan geography is the Danube and Sava rivers, which divide the midline of Europe in the east-west direction. This region, also called the Balkan Peninsula, can be defined by the borders of countries such as Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria.

Conflicts in the Balkans make the region more problematic. This environment of struggle can show us that the Balkans is a famous region. For this reason, the most prolonged battles since the beginning of the 20th century and the periods of severe heavy losses continued in these lands, and unfortunately, there was a constant occupation and oppression in this region. It is possible to see here the traces and evidence of the Western geopolitical understanding of Rimland developed by Spykman during the Cold War Era based on the Mackinder's theory of Black Dominance by the Soviet Socialist state.¹³ The most violent of this polar power struggle was again on this geography, and it was seen that this struggle resulted in the victory of the Western society in a way that affected the Balkan societies the most.

After the end of the Cold War, power struggles and the control of the routes that can be used to circulate these resources in the world markets have been on

¹² Licínia Simão, *European Energy Security: The Reconcilable EU and Russian Approaches?*, in Carlo Patricio Fernandes, Teresa Ferreira Rodrigues (Eds.), *Geopolitics of Energy and Energy Security*, Lisboa, Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2017, p. 89.

¹³ Ljubiša R. Mitrović, *The Geopolitics of The Balkans in The 19th and 20th Centuries-Between National Emancipation Movements and Geostrategic Games of The Great Powers*, in “Facta Universitatis”, Series: Law and Politics, Vol. 9, 2011, No. 2, p. 103.

the agenda.¹⁴ With this agenda, the Balkan region is the most suitable route for energy resources in the Middle East and Caspian Basin within the scope of meeting the energy needs of Western Europe.

Post-Cold War researches brought new priorities and policy options for the US. The United States has to take into account the increasing interdependence of globalisation as well as the protection of these priorities and the implementation of policies. The US cannot remain indifferent to the problems, even if any developments in any part of the world in the new era do not directly concern US interests.¹⁵ The reflections of crises and conflicts in the Balkans, on the other hand, directly and indirectly, affect the security of the US as seen in the past. With the effect of the power gap resulting from the Post-Cold War, the US began to approach regional security problems differently.

One of the main factors underlying US policy in the Balkans is the integration of the region's countries into the Euro-Atlantic alliance as a relevant military and political structure. The American administration has taken steps in this context since the Bosnian crisis, and firstly encouraged the EU to play a role in these confrontations.¹⁶ The establishment of political stability in the region is also of great importance for European security. Historical experience shows that instability in the Balkans can threaten the stability and peace in Europe. Therefore, the next objective is to prevent crises that would require NATO's intervention.

A report by Congress, in May 2009, also showed a significant reduction in the financial dimension of US engagement in the region.¹⁷ For example, while the aid to the Balkan countries was 621 million dollars in 2002, this amount decreased to half in 2010. The primary purpose of the aid already provided is to promote the integration of the region into the Euro-Atlantic perspective.

¹⁴ In terms of the Balkans, main features of the Cold War period; in addition to serving as a border between two blocs, the plans of the USSR regarding the Mediterranean and the Middle East were disrupted and separatist movements in Yugoslavia played a key role in dissolution of the USSR.

¹⁵ Ljubiša R. Mitrović, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

¹⁶ José Félix Ribeiro, *Russia Oil Energy and Arms*, in Carlo Patricio Fernandes, Teresa Ferreira Rodrigues (Eds.), *Geopolitics of Energy and Energy Security*, Lisboa, Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2017, p. 111.

¹⁷ In this context, military engagement with Bosnia and Kosovo interventions and the former Eastern Bloc countries within the framework of NATO's enlargement strategy can be considered as an attempt to block a European-based defence and security policy.

In this context, the US aims to strengthen democracy, the market economy, civil society, and press freedom in the region's countries, to prevent the weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, and to promote the development of human rights. In this process, the US supports the EU's more significant role in the region to achieve the above objectives.




Figure 2. The Western Balkans' Tortuous Road to Integration with The West¹⁸

As an integration concept, *Europeanization* is defined as a *civilisation project*, which aims to transfer countries from a low to high culture, through the conditionality and socialisation processes determined by the EU. Within this framework, the former Soviet countries and the Balkan geography have been intensely confronted with the processes of Europeanization.¹⁹

In 2004 and 2007, EU enlargement encompassed many former Soviet countries and the Balkan countries.²⁰ Bulgaria and Slovenia were accepted as

¹⁸ *GIS Dossier: The Western Balkans*, in <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/gis-dossier-the-western-balkans,politics,2527.html> (Accessed on 02.09.2019)

¹⁹ Jelena Subotic, *Europe Is a State of Mind: Identity and Europeanization in the Balkans*, in "International Studies Quarterly", Vol. 55, 2011, No. 2, pp. 309-330.

²⁰ Russia is the EU's biggest threat in the Western Balkans. Russia tries to build an image that restores its military power and its foreign policy by centring its historical ties in the Balkans, its Orthodox and Slavic brotherhood, its role as the protector of tradition

members of the Union. Six Western Balkan countries, except Serbia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, making some reforms with the projection of transforming their structure in line with the EU's acquis for nearly 20 years, but this process has not been completed yet.

It can be seen that many important variables concerning the Balkan geography emerged with the deterioration of the bipolar world order after the Cold War period.²¹ When all of these variables are considered, it shows the fact that Balkan geography is in a strategic position. The new era that started after the war brought the Balkans to a new geopolitical structure²² that combines traditional security with a more modern concept: energy security.²³ Ensuring energy security is directly related to regional security. In the Balkans, especially if the prevention of hot conflicts arising from ethnic differences and the friendly settlement of various disputes will become a pragmatic choice, the energy security agenda will have a significant contribution.

2.2. Balkans' Energy Dilemma, Global Powers, and Geopolitics

The Balkan countries focused on economic development after the 1990s in search of political stability. However, energy resources have great importance to achieve this economic development. The most important advantage of the Balkan countries that do not have abundant fossil reserves is that they are located very close to the countries with abundant reserves. Unique to the Balkans, Russia is the largest gas supplier in Europe and the country with the largest natural gas reserves in the world. It has a strategic position in the transfer of the Caspian Region resources to Europe.²⁴

and family values. The Ukrainian civil war and the annexation of the Crimea, the Syrian civil war, the abduction of Estonian security forces, the intervention of the Baltic countries, the support of the coup attempt in Montenegro, make Russia an opportunistic and destabilizing state and all these events did not find an adequate response from the EU.

²¹ When we try to define and make sense in the geography, culture, and civilization of the Balkans, it is seen that cultural structures are belonging to opposite poles.

²² Jelena Subotic, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-330.

²³ Economic elements in geopolitics include crucial elements such as raw materials, minerals, energy resources, and transport at the strategic level that affect foreign policy and directly contribute to political power.

²⁴ Franco Tomassoni, *Some Features of The Russian Foreign Policy Approach to Europe*, in Carlo Patricio Fernandes, Teresa Ferreira Rodrigues (Eds.), *Geopolitics of Energy and*

The Balkans, with its strategic position, is the focal point of energy diplomacy of energy supply and demand countries. Balkan countries, whose energy requirements are very low, can quickly meet their needs thanks to this position and can achieve political gains according to their role in energy transfer.

The European countries' dependence on Russia was the determining factor in the Balkans' prominence regarding energy geopolitics. In the EU's search for resource diversification, the Balkan geography was seen as the gateway to the opening of new transfer routes. In terms of oil and gas, many projects have been developed across the Balkans.²⁵ While the EU has fully supported some of them, others have been hampered by serious opposition.

When the energy situation in the Balkans is examined, the first thing that stands out is the fact that the oil and natural gas reserves of fossil energy sources are deficient and that the region meets a large part of its need through imports. According to the Energy Information Administration, the proven oil reserves of the Western Balkans are about 335 million barrels. Total proven oil reserves of the European continent are 18.7 billion barrels. Of the 335 million barrels in the Western Balkans, 165 million are in Albania, 92 million in Croatia, and 77 million in Serbia and Montenegro. Oil production is at deficient levels.²⁶

Russia is the biggest actor in the field of natural gas. Except for Albania, all the Balkan countries have natural gas connections with Russia. The Russian natural gas reaches the Balkans via two routes: the first is the Trans-Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline, which connects Russia with Hungary and extends from there to the countries of the former Yugoslavia; the second is from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria, while Turkey through Bulgaria, Macedonia and Greece are extending the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline line. This line is a branch of the Brotherhood from Ukraine. In terms of increasing Russian natural gas exports, Bulgaria is also one of the geographical transit countries.²⁷

Despite the recovery in natural gas demand of European countries in the

Energy Security, Lisboa, Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 2017, pp. 117-133.

²⁵ Licínia Simão, *European Energy...*, pp. 90-95.

²⁶ Güney Ferhat Batı, *Küresel Enerji Politikasında Balkan Jeopolitiği ve Enerji Güvenliği Paradigması* [Balkan Geopolitics and Energy Security Paradigm in Global Energy Policy], in "International Journal Entrepreneurship and Management Inquiries", Vol. 1, 2017, No. 1, p. 24.

²⁷ Zoran Nechev, Svilans Aleksandrs, *Western Balkans: More Resilience for the Energy Sector*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2017, in www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06916 (Accessed on 13.09.2019)

last three years, the gas consumption was below the rate in 2010. In this case, the Balkan countries come to the forefront in the search for a market for the increasing natural gas supply in the short term. In addition to the increase in energy efficiency, renewable energy investments and the increasing dependence of LNG technology on pipeline gas, the EU is gradually decreasing, which has led supply countries, especially Russia, to seek a new market for increasing natural gas supply.

The growing importance of the Balkans in natural gas trade has come up with the creation of a natural gas hub that will appeal to this region, and this has become a competitive element among the Balkan countries. With its growing economies and developing energy infrastructure, the Balkans have a more critical role in the global and regional economy. For a case, there are three strategic points for Bulgaria in Russia's energy policies.²⁸ The first is the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Oil Pipeline, and the Belene Nuclear Power Plant is the second one. The third is the South Stream Natural Gas Pipeline Project. Especially in the process until the mid-2000s, Bulgaria has tried to increase its capacity to transit Russian gas instead of developing different alternatives from Russia due to natural gas dependence. However, Bulgaria has not done this by laying out new pipelines, but rather by improving the capacity of existing pipelines. As a matter of fact, following an agreement signed with Gazprom in 1998, Bulgargas agreed to increase its transit capacity.²⁹

As a grander view, great importance was attached to the membership of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU. The EU countries' inability to develop a solution to the growing energy needs in the first place with the existing policies and the solutions to prevent the use of Caspian energy resources for printing to the EU under the control of the Russian Federation has been a priority for the EU. For this reason, by joining these two countries to the EU, the European Union could reach the Black Sea via the Eastern Balkans. Thus, by handing the Caspian route from the Caucasus direction through the Black Sea to the energy supply, to the EU

²⁸ The focus was on joint efforts to increase the capacity of Russian natural gas to be exported to other Balkan countries via Bulgaria. It can be said that Russia attaches great importance to Bulgaria in the export of natural gas to the Balkans. Russia attaches great importance to Bulgaria geographically and calls Bulgaria an energy corridor.

²⁹ Margarita Assenova, *Bulgaria's Ambitions for a Balkan Gas Hub. Challenges, Opportunities and the Role of a New Offshore Gas Storage Project*, Washington DC, The Jamestown Foundation, 2018, pp. 5-11.

territory without interruptions and restrictions, this has emerged as a vital Balkan-EU energy geopolitics.³⁰

The Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project, which will reach Europe, has been put into practice. After the enlargement of the EU to the countries in Eastern Europe, it is expected to move towards the Balkans and to include Romania and Bulgaria. The enlargement policy should be considered as a part of the Balkan energy geopolitics developed by the EU to meet the growing energy need without restriction. Thus, as a natural result of this geopolitical approach, the EU has acquired a significant part of Balkans geography, and the first genius in its history has allowed the Black Sea to exit from the Balkan region without any restrictions.

Recently, Germany and Poland have stated that the EU should not delay accession negotiations with the Western Balkan countries.³¹ These countries are the gaps that may frequently occur in the region, Turkey, Russia, and China are warning for the filling. China sees the region as a corridor for Europe under the “One Road, One Belt” project. In this context, the plans include a bridge over the sea in southern Croatia, the modernisation of Huawei Technologies’ Serbian telephone administration and the construction of a motorway in Montenegro to connect Belgrade and the Adriatic Sea.³²

China stands out with its intensive transportation, energy, and industrial investments in the region.³³ In addition, it is the third trade partner of Bosnia and Montenegro and the fourth trade partner of Macedonia and Serbia. Reducing

³⁰ Milan Simurdić, *The Energy Community – EU Energy Enlargement?*, in “International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs”, Vol. 18, 2009, No. 3, pp. 49-68.

³¹ The analysis of political power should focus on the system’s mechanism by focusing mainly on the internal and external political functioning of a country. At this point, the institutionalization level of the political structure and the ability to act holistically with all elements of the administrative structure should be focused on. Accordingly, it should be considered whether the political structure of the state examined is a symphonic harmony.

³² Plamen Tonchev, *China’s Road: into the Western Balkans*, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2017, in www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06772 (Accessed on 02.09.2019).

³³ According to Stumvoll-Flessenkemper, who examined China’s influence on the Balkans, China’s policies have a paradoxical structure; while ensuring political stability, it has the effect of detaching from EU values and norms. The analysis reveals that China has undermined democratization by consolidating public credit and existing regimes, not holding tenders for transparency in investments, sometimes cooperating with local corruption networks, and making investments by ignoring environmental and social conditions.

transportation costs, securing energy routes and linking Europe and China, which are among the main objectives of Chinese foreign policy, will also affect the Western Balkans policy.³⁴ In this sense, China has increased its effects in the region to the institutional level by conducting summit meetings every year since 2012 with its 16+1 mechanism, which includes Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries. Entering the region with the investment of Piraeus Harbour in Greece, China has identified it as the main port of the Mediterranean and also has an essential role in transfer its products to Germany through transportation projects such as railway and highways (Skopje-Belgrade-Budapest Corridor) in the Balkan countries.



Figure 3, Bridgehead to Europe: Transport Infrastructure and Chinese Investment in the Balkans³⁵

³⁴ Loïc Poulain, *China's New Balkan Strategy*, Center for Strategic&International Studies (CSIS), "Central Europe Watch", 2011, Vol. 1, No. 2, in https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110829_CEW_China_in_Balkans.pdf (Accessed on 22.09.2019).

³⁵ GIS Dossier: *The Western Balkans*, in <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/gis-dossier-the-western-balkans,politics,2527.html> (Accessed on 12.09.2019).

CONCLUSIONS

Conceptual shifts in the meaning, function, and perception of geopolitics can be mentioned. The emergence and importance of a region according to cyclical changes can be explained by postmodern geopolitics. Although some fixed and objective elements of geopolitics can be mentioned, the geopolitical definition takes different forms at certain times. This is because the security phenomenon gains meaning through various references. The concept of geopolitical shift expresses the fact that some regions become a zone of contention in line with the international conjuncture.

The increasing importance of energy security in the EU, in particular, has led the Balkans to witness the geopolitical struggle again. The Balkans, which are among the developed economies of the world and between the European countries that demand a high amount of energy resources and the countries that own 2/3 of the world's fossil fuel reserves, are critical for the transfer of energy reserves. With the change in the political map, the control of the geography in question also meant the control of energy resources going to Europe.

Although the Western Balkans account for 3.6% of the EU's total population, it is clear that there are regional and global reasons for Europe that the EU is struggling to transform the area and consequently reading the region through security. The European Parliament elections in 2019, the election of the new German Chancellor in 2021, the possible global economic crisis, the discussions of the European army, and the Balkans became a chessboard of the global conflict of interest show that it is not easy for Europeanization to move forward powerfully in the Balkans.

On a global scale, it can easily be said that the Balkans are not very important in terms of energy supply. The main reason for this is that the region is impoverished in terms of other derivative energy sources, especially oil. Therefore, the Balkans has not been one of the most remarkable regions of energy security supply. However, due to the widening of the scope of energy security, diversification of distribution and transmission channels, and the introduction of very different methods to meet the energy need, the Balkans should be included in the global energy security equation, even though it is insignificant in terms of supply.

The future role of the Balkans will determine the priority and importance of the region as regards energy security. In other words, the importance of the Balkans in terms of energy security is closely related to its ability and role to be part of the distribution route. The framework and nature of such a role will be determined by the complex dynamics of global and regional relations.

TURKEY'S SOFT POWER POLICY TOWARDS THE BALKANS AFTER THE 1990'S: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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Abstract: *During the communist period, many people in the Balkans lost their knowledge about religious beliefs and practices. After the regime change and the abolition of anti-religious laws, the places of worship have begun to fill up: more and more Christians have chosen to go to their churches; Muslims turned to the mosques, and Jews to the synagogues. While Christians and Jews had no problems to obtain accurate information about their beliefs, Muslims were faced with a difficult and serious dilemma. In the communist era, they had lost their institutional infrastructure, their social knowledge and the needed values to separate the correct information from the false ones. These phenomena allowed radical Islamic groups to gain ground throughout the Balkan area. The dictatorial regimes of the Gulf oil tycoons became their biggest supporters, encouraging non-democratic ideologies and financing the subtle penetration of some terrorist organisations in various regions of the world and different areas of activity. This study proposes an analysis of the “radicalisation of the Balkans”, the contemporary challenges related to the Islamic extremism, and how the soft power of Turkey contributes to combat terrorism in the Balkans.*

Keywords: Turkey, Policy, Balkans, Soft Power, Challenges, Opportunities, Radicalism, Extremism, Recruitment.

Rezumat: *Puterea blândă a Turciei referitoare la Balcani după anii 1990: provocări și oportunități. De-a lungul perioadei comuniste, multe dintre populațiile din Balcani și-au pierdut cunoștințele despre credințele și practicile religioase. După schimbarea regimului și abolirea legilor anti-religioase, lăcașurile de cult au început să se umple: creștinii au ales să meargă la bisericile lor, musulmanii s-au îndreptat către moschei, iar evreii către sinagogi. În timp ce creștinii și evreii nu au avut probleme legate de obținerea informațiilor exacte despre credințele lor, musulmanii s-au confruntat cu o dilemă dificilă și gravă. În comunism, ei și-au pierdut infrastructura instituțională, cunoștințele sociale și valorile necesare pentru a separa informațiile corecte de cele false. Acest lucru a oferit grupărilor islamice radicale oportunitatea de a câștiga teren în toată zona balcanică. Regimurile dictatoriale ale magnaților petrolului din Golf au devenit cele mai mari*

susținătoare ale acestora, încurajându-le ideologiile nedemocratice și finanțând pătrunderea subtilă a unor organizații teroriste în diverse regiuni ale lumii și în diferite domenii de activitate. Acest studiu propune o analiză a „radicalizării Balcanilor”, a provocărilor contemporane referitoare la islamismul extremist și a modului în care „puterea blândă” a Turciei contribuie la combaterea terorismului în Balcani.

Résumé : Le soft power (manière douce) de la Turquie concernant les Balkans après les années 1990: provocations et opportunités. *Le long de la période communiste, plusieurs populations des Balkans ont perdu leurs connaissances sur les croyances et les pratiques religieuses. Après la chute du régime et l'abolition des lois antireligieuses, les édifices de culte ont redevenu pleines: les chrétiens choisirent aller à leurs églises, les musulmans se sont dirigées vers les mosquées, pendant que les Juifs vers les synagogues. Pendant que les chrétiens et les Juifs n'ont pas eu des problèmes liés de l'obtention des informations exactes sur leurs croyances, les musulmans se sont confrontés avec un dilemme difficile et grave. Sous le communisme, ils ont perdu l'infrastructure institutionnelle, les connaissances sociales et les valeurs nécessaires afin de séparer les informations correctes de celles fausses. Cela offrit aux groupes islamiques radicaux l'opportunité de gagner de terrain dans la zone balkanique toute entière. Les régimes dictatoriaux des magnats du pétrole du Golfe devinrent leurs plus grands souteneurs, encourageant leurs idéologies pas démocratiques et finançant la pénétration subtile des organisations terroristes en divers régions du monde et en différents domaines d'activité. L'étude ci-joint se proposa une analyse de la "radicalisation des Balkans", des provocations contemporaines concernant l'islamisme extrémiste et la manière dans laquelle le pouvoir de convaincre de la Turquie contribua à combattre le terrorisme dans les Balkans.*

INTRODUCTION

In general, the words' power is the capability to force the rest to obtain the desired outcomes. In this sense, soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of actors in international relations.¹ Logically and commonly, it is believed that the use of soft power is easier, cheaper, peaceful, more humane and sustainable than hard power. Because there seem to be some major errors in this conviction, contrary to the general understanding, sometimes use of soft power could not be easier than the use of the latter. Soft power is not only influence, though it is source of impact, therefore to use soft power international actors needs to have at least minimum basic universal values and intangible

¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, in "The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences", Vol. 616, 2008, No. 1, p. 95.

assets such as a sustainable democracy, the rule of law, attractive, modern living standards, a higher culture, political values, democratic institutions, wealthy urbanisation and state policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.² Although those items, of course, may only be basics of several *sine qua non* assets; saying easier than do, preserving those high standards is not as simple as talking about their wisdom.

Because of the reasons as mentioned above; in some hot geographies and under definite conditions, use of soft power much more difficult than hard power. Balkans, due mixed demographic structure, cultural diversity and religious, sectarian, ethnic conflict potential throughout known historical span were one of the hot points of world politics.

Almost all nations during the historical span no matter either located in the east or west lusted for a stronghold in the Balkans. Antiquity Greeks, Scythians, Germans, Persians under King Daria and his successors during early age had worked to carve hegemony over the Balkans. Later comers Alexander the Great, Rome, Crusaders, Turks, Russians, Latins, Anglo-Saxons also wanted to have a stronghold, if that was not possible, they desired to keep their eyes on the Balkans. It is not a coincidence that two world wars started in the Balkans, the area still geographically is a hot region and always preserves a high risk of ethnic, religious or sectarian conflict. Proving this fact memory of brutal massacres and genocides during the last three decades are still fresh.

In the mid-14th century, Ottoman Turks stepped into the Balkans and until the end of the 19th century the hegemonic power, directly or indirectly controlling the area was that of the Turks. Under the Ottoman rule, similar to the Anatolia modest understanding of Islam boosted in the Balkans. Ottoman policy during its rule not to let any radicalisation spread to the area. During this period, except a few very seldom marginal cases there was no radical, fundamental or extremist religious penetration into the region. Ottoman rulers did not allow such penetration putting in use strict rules. When the Ottoman period ended Balkans, especially after WWII this area gradually came under Communist rule. The famously known rhetoric criticising wild capitalist exploitation of the proletariat class formulated by Karl Marx: "religion is the opium of the people"³, was implemented by early Soviet practice for the purpose of the prohibition of almost all religious practices and institutions and deprivation ordinary people

² *Ibid.*

³ Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (ed. Samuel H. Beer), Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. New York, 1955, p. 30-32.

of casual religious knowledge. That kind of mischief Soviet forced atheism, especially in rural areas and lack of religious knowledge, the prohibition of religious practice paved the way of illiterate religious societies, who were unaware how to practice their rituals even the basics of their religious knowledge also mostly faded during this period.

In contrast with Soviet pressure on religion, societies did not forget their faith while time passed basic practices and rituals disappeared first from daily life later from the memories. In addition to the problems regarding basic rituals, sacraments, and liturgy or prayer when the Soviet system was withdrawn and the old Yugoslavia collapsed both left poor, underdeveloped and ethnically problematic societies behind. Because of this reason, when the old regime collapsed, people belonging to different religions soon after the lifting of oppression filled their temples to learn and practice their rituals. Unfortunately, this era overlapped with the rise of radical sectarian movements based on extremism. Worse than this, most of radical, extremist movements openly or secretly had been supported by Gulf dictatorships saw post-Communist Balkans a breeding field to propagate their radical ideologies and recruit newly devoted members.⁴ Bosnian war and ongoing genocides, social conflicts poured oil on this process.

Among those who arrived first, Wahhabism was one of the strongest. At the very beginning of the 18th century, Wahhabism was a hard-line commendation of mainstream understanding, and it was core identity builder of Saudi Autocracy, has been the keystone of Saudi Arabian state structure, supported as a state identity by Saudis penetrated to the Balkans.⁵ Salafism lacking open solid-state support older than Wahhabism had started in the 18th centuries also together with Wahhabism boosted in the region.⁶ Ottomans, soon after its emergence, tried to exterminate that newly fundamental, in some parts heretic understandings, but all those efforts could not be effective to combat such radicalisation. Another

⁴ Nicole Ely, *Combating Salafist Influence in the Western Balkans*, in "European Security Journal News.com", August 5, 2019, in <https://www.esjnews.com/salafist-influence-in-the-western-balkans> (accessed 25 August 2019).

⁵ Stephen Schwartz, *Wahhabism in the Balkans*, in www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/wahhabism-in-the-balkans (accessed September 16, 2019). For Saudi use of Religion and Wahhabism see: Joseph Novo, *Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", Vol. 34, 1998, No. 3, p. 34-53.

⁶ M. Sait Özervarli, *Selefiyye* [Salafiyya], in <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/selefiyye> (accessed September 21, 2019).

state-supported radical movement was Shia, the official sect of Iran Islamic Republic that also penetrated the Balkans.

One of the bold supporters of extremist understandings, Saudi Arabia is the most theocratic state in the contemporary Sunni Muslim world. In Saudi Arabia, religious faith and loyalty to the ruling family is the predominant component of the collective identity. Religion in general, Wahhabism which in use in the Peninsula for about two and a half centuries, in particular, has been utilised as a unifying instrument and as a source of political legitimacy for Saudi rule. Thus Wahhabism was not only as a spiritual experience or state religion but also as a component of the Saudi nation's collective identity.⁷ Transferring and carrying this so-called "pure teaching" to other Muslims has been seen both as a religious duty and state asked, supported office. In addition to Saudi fundamentalism, extremist Salafism is another danger grown in the region. Widespread extremism, by participation and enforcement of other extremist countries' support inevitably poured oil on the turbulent Balkans. Religious extremism/radicalisation/fundamentalism regardless name of faith is something like when someone infected, healing and rehabilitation almost impossible. The only solution to prevent the spread of extremism in the Balkans is to use soft power and to teach modern understanding.

Turkey is a developing country; is a secular nation-state, despite few interruptions, preserves the democratic culture which has been started at 1876's onwards, long before adapted liberal market economy, has a modern legislative system; it is among world's 20 largest economies. Turkey, more or less a westernised modern state, a member of NATO (1952), since the Treaty of Ankara signed in 1963 tracking the process to be a full member of the EU, has been granted full membership candidate status in the year of 1999. Admittedly, in its geography, Turkey is the only democratic, secular country which its population is about 99.2% Muslim.⁸

The discussion of whether Turkey could be a role model for post-Communist era Balkan countries or not is not the scope of this paper. However, there is a large Muslim population in the Balkans, and Turkey could use its soft power to assist Balkan Muslim societies for modest religious commentary,

⁷ Joseph Novo, *Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jul., 1998), p. 35-36, 46.

⁸ Sarp Özer, *Türkiye'de Dini Hayat Araştırması [Religious Life Research in Turkey]*, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı [Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs] Publication, Ankara [Turkey], 2014, p. 3.

adaptation into modern living standards, secular understanding and liberal economic model. Modest understanding and Turkey's soft power role for widespread liberal ideas in the Balkans are so vital that this area about half a century were under Communist hard rule, during that period religious practice almost absolutely had been interrupted. If a modest understanding would not fill this gap, as it is seen today, extremism will have a large space to radicalise the illiterate, economically poor classes. Even though the crucial role and potential positive effect of Turkey's soft power; Western Europe (i.e. EU) turns blind eyes to this opportunity and prefer to underestimate Turkey's role. In contrast with this approach, Turkey preserves the potential to play a vital role and be more and more valuable than average European ignorant evaluation during the coming years.

PENETRATION AND RISE OF RADICAL MOVEMENTS IN BALKANS

During Ottoman rule, Sufism and other moderate sects boosted in the Balkans, mostly neither Ottomans nor Balkan Muslims had fundamental views. They were moderate Islamic communities meaning radical interpretations remained alien to most of them.⁹ Thus during post-Communist era fundamentalism, radical commendations and religious scholasticism have been imported into the Balkans; actually, scholastic thinking is in stark contrast to the traditional strains of Islam in the region.¹⁰ When radical ideologies' penetration came, Balkan Muslim Societies lacked two basic vital necessities of their daily practice: (1) true, modest religious information and useful causal knowledge; (2) average income level for a sustainable, wealthy life and high unemployment rates. Filling both gaps, radical scholastic thinking when penetrated Balkans in their backpack they had been carrying: (1) oil-dollars and (2) radical Islamic teachings veiled by the falsely produced commendation of the Holy Koran and falsely commented sayings of the Prophet. Bigotry and lack of religious knowledge banned any rational evaluation of newly arrived preachers while oil-dollar capitalism cleared the path of propaganda. Besides, extremist propagandists were/are native speakers of Islam and ordinary people easily could think that what they say comes from the pure holy sources.

⁹ Boris Georgievski, *Could Balkan nations become the new hotbeds of Islamist extremism?*, <https://p.dw.com/p/2dpSC> (accessed September 21, 2019).

¹⁰ Kennet Morrison, *Wahhabism in the Balkans*, Shrivenham, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, February 2008, p. 2-3.

Moreover, ethnic clashes and need to use faith as a cement to build identity gave extremists a great opportunity to radicalise Muslim societies. As a result of that widespread, strong propaganda during the last decades, extremists advocating violence and acts of terrorism or fought with jihadi groups in Syria, Iraq or somewhere else also have been active in Balkans to recruit new religiously misled myrmidon members successfully.¹¹

Regardless of their faith, when people believed that, their acts are the orders of God, they stop rational thinking. During Medieval ages in Europe, numerous women had been accused of being witches and masses persuaded that it was the will of God to burn those so-called witches to protect the holy wisdom wildly. As that case clearly shows, when the masses were persuaded that an illogical act is the will of God, people prefer not to question such orders. Same in Gulf dictatorships, preachers argue that dressing style, civil rights, marriage, divorce, polygamy, social status, etc. of women should be in accordance with so said their commendation which as if the will of God. It is men who decide what behaviours are the will of God and what are not. Women have not any right to say loudly their will or idea about the restrictions they forced to obey. When the masses have been persuaded that, for instance, the restricted style of women's life is the will of God, in dictatorships, not to offend governments, and not to be in contrast with the will of God almost all people are reluctant to question the rationality of such practices. In sociology, this communal irrational acting style is defined as learned helplessness.

Radical penetration into Balkans started with university education in the 1980s. Youngsters from Balkans due attractive scholarship programs enrolled in Middle Eastern universities such as; Damascus, Beirut, Tripoli, Cairo, Medina, etc. and upon their return as brainwashed adults, they started to establish some foundations to spread Salafi understanding, begun to argue that the existing way of faith during the Ottoman period almost heretic. Balkan Muslims' faith, since the Ottoman period, mostly has been based on rationalist Maturity-Hanafi school, so Muslim societies as whole were unfamiliar with that radical argument.¹² Thus, this first attempt was unsuccessful, but radicalisation had had a foot in the Balkans before the end of cold-war.

¹¹ See *Balkan Jihadists. The Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq*, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, March, 2016.

¹² Metin İzeti, *Balkanlardaki dini ve kültürel gelişmeler ve Türkiye* [Religious and cultural developments in Balkans and Turkey], <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz-haber/balkanlardaki-dini-ve-kulturel-gelismeler-ve-turkiye/508841> (accessed November 15, 2019).

When the Cold War came to an end, upon their very arrival to Balkans, oil-dollar sponsored extremist propagandists injected people Gulf traditions with their hard-line commendations as the basis of Islam. Because Muslim societies lacked any comprehensive and family learned Islamic knowledge, they easily tended to believe such irrational arguments. Extremists intend to convert Balkans into a breeding field for radical movements.

Their propagandists generally tracked a four stepped program to achieve their aims: (1) they disbursed plenty of oil-dollars to poor people; (2) they established cultural centres and used definite mosques as headquarters; (3) they thought their way of dressing and behaviour as the basis of Islamic life; soon after they had a stronghold they started to intervene daily life, denying any modest understanding or secular way of life; (4) Consequently they argued that fight against infidels is the order of God, who fights in the war against infidels he unquestioningly will be granted with the Paradise.

As it was underlined above when Cold War came to an end, alike their Christian neighbour's Muslim societies in Balkans, have been vulnerable societies when faced with such kind of oil-dollar fostered propaganda and radical, extremist misled teachings veiled by the argument of true Islam. The result inevitably has been a breeding area for brainwashed, extremist, marginal groups. If any word needed to be said about Christian societies in the Balkans, why same problems did not rise among those societies: (1) The Orthodox Church overwhelmingly dominant in the Balkans and it also alike Catholic Church passed a reformation period; (2) there is a strong church structure in the Balkans and such penetration almost impossible to have any effect; (3) because modern life standards are mostly western values it is easier for Balkan Christians to adopt new lifestyle. Despite all, the Balkan Christians also were defenceless when faced with oil-dollar capitalism.

As a result of heavy propaganda and oil-dollar capitalism for instance, in a mosque near Tirana Albanian youngsters faced with brainwashing propaganda and since the 1990s onwards about 70 of them recruited by radical, extremist terrorist organisations to fight for the terror groups. All those at the beginning innocent youngsters after facing with misleading gulf radicalisation became devoted, irrational, unmerciful myrmidon fighters. Unfortunately, the number of mosques where hard-line radical interpretations have been thought by Salafi or Wahhabi groups are higher than expected. For instance, in Albania, including Mezes Mosque, there have been several mosques directly linked with violent understanding recruiting fighters for ISIS and Al Qaeda affiliated Al Nusra. Even

with existing data, it is impossible to give a fixed number; it is estimated that during last decades more than 100 Albanians have joined terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, including 13 women and 31 children, 26 of whom were minors.¹³ The number of myrmidon recruits most probably much higher than that statistic.

Almost half of the Albanian recruits have been killed in clashes or used as suicide bombers. The terrifying figures clearly show the danger of widespread misled approaches of so-called radicalised teachings. In the case of at early prevention of such radical penetration into the Balkans most probably expect some marginal cases there would one or two Albanians joined such illegal organizations. Albania just a random sample, the figures in the rest of the Balkans are mostly worse than Tirana case. Another risk is the returnee terrorist organization fighters who will endanger their country's stability upon their arrival. By early 2014 at least 40 Albanian fighters had returned from Syria.¹⁴ There are doubts about how to consolidate them and most importantly, at what level their remorse could be trusted. The other danger which does not attract attention is a widespread lifestyle of misleading radical movements worsening especially women's rights. This phenomenon is as dangerous as terrorism because women are the first teachers of their children, and if their understanding is radicalised, a new generation with high radical tendencies will grow out.

Another random sample is Bosnia which radicalisation figures much more badly than Albania. During ethnic conflict and Serbian mass killings, Bosnia was a destination for radical movements in the 1990s. That situation made Bosnia more vulnerable; radical, extremist organisations made Bosnia a hot breeding field for terrorising radical movements. Around 120 Bosnian men are thought to be currently fighting in Syria and Iraq with ISIS and Al Nusra in the year of 2014. One of the most widespread radicalisation happened in Kosovar Muslims, the number of active fighters in Iraq and Syria are estimated around 300. That high number overlaps with high involvement of Salafi and Wahhabi extremists in the area, and high unemployment rates worsen the situation. World Bank reports show that unemployment rates in Balkans constitute almost half of the population.¹⁵ Same in Macedonia, the youngsters have been brainwashed, the number of active fighters in Iraq and Syria is around 110. The number is 13 in

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Predrag Petrovic, *Islamic Radicalism in the Balkans*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Alert No 24, June 2016, p. 1-2.

Montenegro and about 26 among Serbian Muslims.¹⁶ Another fact light should shed Iran's penetration with un-secular teachings into the Balkans. As it is known, Iran is the supporter of some radical organisations and a wide-spread Iranian effect in the Balkans as risky as a Wahhabi influence. No need to say that the above-given numbers are just identifiable figures, the actual unveiled statistic data much higher.

Following gathered statistics; it is estimated that more than 1.000 men, women and children brainwashed by extremist propagandists went abroad as militants and some of them desiring to return home, creating a new risk for home countries because they could still espouse the radical ideology.¹⁷ Extremist preachers not only radicalising people; they are also breaking the peaceful coexistence and understanding, escalating religious discrimination and hatred in the Balkans. Radicalised, ultra-nationalist, ethnic groups and leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic and Ratko Mladic and many others have been bold assistants of such activities. Regardless religions, the extremists are a malign, grave danger to the peace and the peaceful coexistence; it is not native, but as mentioned above, mostly imported to the Balkans.

Besides the widespread wave of fundamentalism, another risk is clashing among societies living neighbourhood for centuries. Extremists also provoke people to attack secular Muslims. As a result of escalation in February 2009, Wahhabi brainwashed militants attacked people supporting moderate understanding.¹⁸ Even some of them based on state statistics, general survey reports present mostly estimated figures on the number of persons actively participated in terrorist organisations. Because of this reason, it is impossible here to figure out the exact number, but the estimates shed light on the spread of radicalism that becomes dangerous in the coming decades.

All those organisations and radical movements are active in Turkey also. Because strict police monitoring in cities, such radical organisations commit their criminalised, illegal activities secretly in remote areas. Turkish Government, when unveiled such radicalisation detain and jail such propagandists, but being on the border of Syria, Turkey faces a serious threat. Turkey, for 36 years has been fighting against ruthless, leftist terrorist organisation PKK since 1983, also, suffered several deadly bombings of extremist terror groups since the beginning

¹⁶ *Balkan Jihadists. The Radicalisation and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq*, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, March, 2016.

¹⁷ Nicole Ely, *Combating Salafist Influence in the Western Balkans* (accessed 25 August 2019).

¹⁸ Stephen Schwartz, *Wahhabism in the Balkans* (accessed September 16, 2019).

of Syrian crisis. In the year of 2013, 11 May, one of the bloodiest terror attacks in Turkish history killed 52 people and 140 people also injured.¹⁹ Paradoxically, for the Balkans and Turkey itself only sustainable solution is the use of soft power, rising literacy on religion, teaching modest understanding, the secularisation of societies and monitoring all such radicalisation are prior measures to be taken. As a sample to combat against radical terrorist organisations, in the year of 2019, September, a comprehensive operation launched targeting radical organisations such as Al-Nusra and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 13 southern provinces.²⁰ Here it is seen that despite one of the radical organisations, HTS is not so active in Balkans yet, but it is active in Turkey.

All historical experiences and field reports in Balkans prove that once recruited by extremist ideas and brainwashed it is almost impossible to de-radicalize infected individuals, very little the success can hardly be achieved by injecting new modest and secular approaches. Thus, the solution is to prevent penetration or infection such ideas at the beginning. If radicalisation is accepted as a disease, because curative efforts born no positive result, prevention of illness before it metastasis, is a much more sustainable and successful method.

THE CATALYST ROLE OF TURKEY: MODERATE UNDERSTANDING AND USE OF SOFT POWER

After almost three decades of malign consequences and an accelerated rise of extremism, to cope with widespread penetration of the fundamentalism, some strict measures and regulations have been put in force by the Balkan countries. The new laws also have been enacted to prevent radical movements. Also, in 2014, UN Resolution 2178 has been adopted in the Balkans, and desire to access EU also is steering leverage forcing the Balkan countries to harmonise their domestic regulations with the EU. Nonetheless, oil-dollar supported preachers and radical institutions veiled by peaceful initiatives such as; humanitarian aid, social assistance, teaching societies, etc. are still active in the Balkans. As it is very well known, ideological movements could not be prevented by force or solid laws. If

¹⁹ Cumhuriyet, *Reyhanlı Saldırısı için Vahim İddialar* [Serious Allegations for Reyhanlı Attack], http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/274009/Reyhanli_saldirisi_icin_vahim_iddialar.html (accessed 10 September 2019).

²⁰ *13 ilde kritik operasyon! 41 kişi hakkında gözaltı kararı...* [Critical operation in 13 provinces! About 41 people in custody ...], in <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/13-ilde-kritik-operasyon-41-kisi-hakkinda-gozalti-karari-41329483> (accessed September 15, 2019).

they are not allowed to commit their malign activities openly, such radical organisations commit their criminalised, unlawful acts underground. A sustainable solution could be achieved due to education and the use of benign soft power. At this point, Turkey, as a strong regional actor due to its strong, historical, cultural, and geographic ties could play a vital catalyst, peace facilitator consolidation's role among the Balkan Muslim societies.

Turkey, the successor country of the former Ottoman Empire upon its very foundation, generated strong cultural, educational and security ties towards the Balkans. Because the extremist malign effects were unnoticed at the very beginning, the main aim was not to combat radicalisation. Meanwhile, its historical background assisted Turkey to develop policies towards its western security depth Balkans while numerous actors desire to have a strong, king-making role in the region. There are both challenges and opportunities for Turkey to play a sustainable role in the region. Turkey supports the foundation of a peaceful world, preserving the *status quo*. In this respect at the very beginning Turkish Foreign Policy based on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's famous proverb: "*Peace at home peace in the World*", following this track until the end of the Cold War Turkish Foreign Policy shaped by three basic rules respectively: (1) Maintenance of *status quo* in-home and in the world; (2) Establishing a westernised modern state structure, having reciprocal strong relations with neighbours; (3) Active participation into peace operations and peaceful initiatives.

As it is underlined above, Gulf dictatorships, no need to name them here one by one, have been exerting their radical ideology through the use of soft power under the guise of humanitarian aid, educational support and social works. Surveys show that Saudi Family is one of the main supporters of radical ideologies.²¹ They spend an extensive amount of oil-dollars to spread their ideology. Even if they do not radicalise society, they demolish secular understanding and gender equality. In the consolidation of the area, both EU and US involved the region to balance the rising Gulf oriented movements, but because their involvement is not as strong as it once and because they use Christian rhetoric towards Muslim societies, their effect could not reach the optimal influence level. A new and different actor, having easy access to Muslim societies is a grave need for successful combat against radicalisation.

Turkey is the only secular country in the region, which its population overwhelmingly Muslim. Due to its limited sources and vulnerable location,

²¹ Carol E. B. Chosky, Jamsheed K. Chosky, *The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad*, in "World Affairs", Vol. 178, 2015, No. 1, p. 24-25.

Turkey while using its soft power towards the Balkans could face some grave challenges to compete for oil-capitalism and theoretically misled radicalism. Because of this reason, Western democracies should collaborate and provide support to Turkey for combating radicalism.

The Balkans is the backyard of Europe, meanwhile, is the western security depth of Turkey, because of that historical fact, Brussels has been trying to annex Balkan countries into the Union by gradual enlargements since the end of the Cold War. Brussels, regardless of their religion or ethnic origin, should accept all Balkan nations as an integral part of Europe and should boldly support Balkan consolidation. Until the present day, the EU's enlargement policy towards Balkans was both effective and successful, but there are some problems over sustainability.²² Contrary to that success, radical movements still penetrate and breed in the Balkans, last figures show that the EU is unsuccessful in the hindrance of the consolidation of radical movements. Another failure of the EU not to accept Turkey as a full-member putting new obstacles to prevent Turkish entry into the Union. Yet Turkey could provide a vital contribution to the prevention of radicalisation in the Balkans and propagate of modest understanding into Muslim societies, including remote areas. That policy doubtlessly could foster mutual security and peaceful ongoing of both EU and Turkey, and even safety and well-doing of Balkan Muslim societies will be a great achievement. Turkey, together with its secular state structure, could play a crucial role in Balkans to minimise mostly probable malign effects of all kinds of radical movements using oil-dollars, have been trying to find footing in the Balkans. If necessary measures in the communal level were not taken in collaboration, there would be sectarian clashes between Balkan societies reminding Medieval European fatal conflicts.

Turkey, soon after the end of the Cold War, pursued some initiatives and established some institutions addressing Balkans and the underdeveloped areas of the world. One of those institutions was TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) established in 1992, active in the Balkans between the years of 1996-2017 undertook about total 4.248 major projects (see table below). According to data given by TİKA; during the last years, Turkey in cooperation with the Bosnia Herzegovina Ministry of Education and Science launched an experience sharing program, aiming to contribute social integration of disadvantaged, vulnerable groups. Also, some religious training schools have been restored

²² Ela Golemi, *The Common Challenges of South-East European Countries in the Process of European Integration*, in "Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe", Vol. 16, 2013, No. 3, p. 281.

during this period. A sports hall has been constructed about 20 thousand people could benefit from this hall. Bus support has been provided to Sarajevo Canton. Reclamation of Janina River also undertaken. In Moldova, education and care of kindergarten children supported the institution has been serving 72 children by 2018. A hospital named Aziz Sancar Diagnosis and Treatment Centre has been opened with a 56-bed capacity.²³

In Macedonia, religious training schools established to train Muslim priests with contemporary teaching methods. In Kosovo, a dormitory has been modernised, approximately 100 university and high school students have been accommodated in this dormitory. Sheep and goat reclamation and development of milk production supported, 710 breeding animals were provided comprising Balusha breed ram and sheep. In Albania, a kindergarten has been renovated, the number of children enrolled in kindergarten is about 150. Also, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk School, with 650 students has been renovated. In Macedonia, the technical equipment support provided to International Balkan University has been given to the Ministry of Justice. The Skopje Huseyin Shah Mosque and its annexes have been restored; in Bosnia Herzegovina, a library construction; in Romania, Turkish language laboratories were established and 38 Turkish classrooms have been renovated. Polyclinic department of Mecidiye Hospital was also renovated.²⁴

In Serbia assistance provided to the modernisation of Supreme Court building. Sokullu Mehmet Pasha (famous Ottoman Grand Vizier was born in Sokolovici/Ruda: 1506-1579) fountain has been repaired, Valide Sultan Mosque has been restored, and Ram castle has been restored. In Hungary, some Ottoman historical buildings such as Gul Baba Tomb have been restored. In Croatia, construction of the Sisak Islam Cultural Center started it will be completed in 2020. In Albania, Berat Hunkar Mosque and Halveti Tekke have been restored. Help was provided to 500 families, victims of the Iskodra floods. In Montenegro, a micro-based olive processing plant has been established. Undercover cultivation support also is given to 35 families who have poor economic conditions.²⁵

The total area of Balkans approximately is 788 thousand km². As it is seen in below table Turkey, at the very beginning undertook active initiatives in the Balkans. Yet, when marshy, mountainous topography of the region is considered, it is seen that

²³ See: *Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency Annual Report 2018*, pp. 43, 59, 74, in <https://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/2019/Faaliyet%20Raporu%202018/T%C4%B0KA%20Annual%20Report%202018.pdf> (Accessed October 20, 2019).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30-50.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Turkey's activities are far from being sufficiently comprehensive for combating radicalisation. Turkey is a developing country; its south-eastern and north-eastern regions also need investment. Thus, when Turkey would like to raise its activities in the Balkans, it means to deduct some budgets from the underdeveloped eastern regions. This fact is not a kind of burden Turkey could face alone. In contrast with Turkey's limited economic sources, on the other hand, oil-rich, capitalism has a great number of dollars to spend on the radicalisation of the region.

Table 1. Turkey's Humanitarian Activities in Balkans (1994-2017)²⁶

COUNTRY	EDUCATION PROJECTS	RESTORATION PROJECTS	AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS	HEALTH CARE PROJECTS	CIVIL INFRASTRUCTURE. PROJECTS	CULTURAL COOPERATION PROJECTS	OTHER PROJECTS	TOTAL
ALBANIA (d.r. 1996-2017)	105	27	27	44	114	66	52	<u>435</u>
BOSNA HERZ. (d.r. 2008-2017)	210	84	70	39	54	321	67	<u>845</u>
CROATIA (d.r. 2016-2017)	14	---	3	1	9	6	2	<u>35</u>
HUNGARY (d.r. 2014-2017)	11	11	---	7	1	42	---	<u>72</u>
KOSOVO (d.r. 2005-2017)	137	34	26	16	168	117	82	<u>580</u>
MACEDONIA (d.r. 2006-2017)	280	14	---	16	236	45	249	<u>840</u>
MOLDOVA (d.r. 1994-2017)	27	---	---	35	88	64	81	<u>295</u>
MONTENEGRO (d.r. 2007-2017)	91	8	16	43	63	79	6	<u>306</u>
ROMANIA (d.r. 2015-2017)	27	2	---	5	13	15	73	<u>135</u>
SERBIA (d.r. 1992-2017)	60	13	27	31	42	31	21	<u>225</u>
UKRAINE (d.r. 1997-2017)	130	2	----	41	61	106	140	<u>480</u>
Grant Total								<u>4.248</u>

²⁶ TIKA Report Balkans, 2018, p. 11-72 (d. r.: date range which activities started). The Balkan data of 2018 has not been published yet while this article written.

During WWII, democracies in strict collaboration had battled against rising fascism. If the necessary investment was not made, needed measures were not taken, if assistance and goodwill were not provided Balkans inevitably will be the breeding centre of radical ideologies in coming decades. Thus radicalisation using sneaky methods patiently will continue to penetrate to the region.

As it is very well-known, education and modernisation are the only sustainable way to combat radicalisation. Turkey undertook several religious education projects to preserve the modern understanding in the Balkans. Since the very beginning of the post-Cold War era, Turkey has opened Islamic theological schools in the Balkans to prevent radicalisation. Also, Turkish priests have been appointed to central Balkan mosques to combat malign understandings. Officially, the Republic of Turkey since the 1990s onwards has been appointed Turkish priests/ imams to the Balkans, religious books which translated into local languages also have been distributed in the Balkans and addressing moderate theology teaching, scholarship programs have been granted to the Balkan youngsters from the high school and university levels.

Moreover, universities and Theology faculties also have been opened in Balkans to train youngsters with sustainable moderate rationalist understanding. Turkish soft power policies to combat radicalization is active in the Balkan countries, namely Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Greece, Romania and Slovenia.²⁷ Statistical numbers of Turkey's official activities were published yet none the less it is very well known that Turkey actively using its soft power in Balkans both to combat radicalization and to stabilize its eastern security depth.

In addition to comprehensive investment and cultural works, another positive effect of Turkey is rising ratings of Turkish soap opera. In the Balkans, wonder to learn long-lasting Ottoman past addicts people on TV. During the last years, American and European Union's involvement to Balkans dwindled, the Turkish soap opera finds a space to fill the gap. The course aims to reach the Balkan people as a whole, regardless of religion or ethnicity. For instance, in the year of 2014, Turkey was the second-highest global exporter of TV series, including soap operas. The first exporter was the US; Turkey's high rate competing with Hollywood is very important.²⁸ The addiction level of Turkey's soap opera is

²⁷ See: Ali Erken (Ed.), *Balkanlarda Din Eğitimi* [Theology Education in Balkans], Istanbul, Degerler Egitimi Merkezi, Aralık 2016, pp. 7-100, in https://media.dem.org.tr/dir/dem/dem/proje/goruntuleme/20181209170708_0.pdf

²⁸ Nicole Ely, *Much-loved Soaps Polish Turkey's Image in Balkans*, in <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/06/18/much-loved-soaps-polish-turkeys-image-in->

still preserved at its high level. This fact, together with high investment rates, is an opportunity which reaches almost all corners of the area.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite some serious challenges, soft power politics are more sustainable and peaceful. If necessary measures are not put in force, post-Cold War Balkans could be a breeding centre of radicalism. Penetration of such movements is a grave danger both for the Balkans, Europe and Turkey. Estimate reports and field surveys show that there has been a sneaky widespread radicalisation in the Balkans. Despite newly enacted rules to combat radicalisation, a little success could be achieved until now.

Combating dramatic wide-spread penetration one of the influential countries be able to balance and effectively could prevent such radicalisation in the Balkans is Turkey. The only sustainable way out for Balkan radicalisation is to implement soft power policies. But there are some serious challenges for Turkey's use of soft power; meanwhile, there are some historical, cultural and geographic opportunities. Prevention of radicalisation is the benefit of both Western Countries, Balkan Societies and Turkey. Therefore, the EU countries, instead of turning a blind eye to the developments in the Balkans, should actively support Turkey to provide the Muslim societies with secular, true, and modest Islamic teachings. When the grave danger of widespread extremism considered, it is seen that in Balkans prevent radicalisation among Muslim societies needs strict planning. The main actor who could play a catalyst role to balance such extremist propaganda and prevent any development which would make the Balkans a fertile breeding field of radical, extremist teachings is Turkey.

While implementing soft power politics towards the Balkans, both to raise its effect in the region and combat radicalisation Turkey benefits some opportunities while faces with grave challenges. The opportunities are: (1) Turkey has strong historical ties with the Balkans. The Ottoman legacy helps Turkey to enlarge it works throughout the region and reach more people. Balkan people also familiar with Turkish culture mostly welcome such policies; (2) There are Turkish descended, Turkish speaking societies in the Balkans. This strong

balkans/; Nemanja Cabric, Maja Nedelkovska, Donjeta Demoli, Amina Hamzic, *Turks Bewitch the Balkans with their Addictive Soaps*, in <https://balkaninsight.com/2013/05/01/turks-bewitch-the-balkans-with-their-addictive-soaps/> (accessed September 27, 2019).

contact could be erected and empowered throughout those societies; (3) Strong cultural ties smooth Turkey's soft power policies towards the Balkans; (4) Turkey is a secular country alike Balkan societies are familiar to secularism. This fact could foster peaceful coexistence in the region.

Besides opportunities, there are grave challenges also: (1) Turkey is a developing country, could not provide an extensive rate of investment into the Balkans. Radical movements mostly are backed by oil-rich countries and it is economically difficult to compete with them; (2) Ottoman legacy and common historical past are not always positive. Thus Turkey needs to persuade some certain societies that its soft power policy does not veil any irredentism and are peaceful; (3) Democratic fluctuations undermines Turkey's role and effectiveness. EU's policies to keep Turkey in front of its door, but not to take in also weakens soft policies towards the Balkans. Also, the EU's selfish policy on global immigration made Turkey an immigrant container country. That policy risks an immigration wave which firstly would address the Balkans.

Consequently, soft power politics could be effective to leverage combating radicalisation, but the EU should support Turkey's efforts. Democratization of Turkey would contribute modernisation of the Balkan Muslim societies. Yet, the EU prefers to turn blind eyes to this fact. On the side of Turkey, without fostering democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech, modernisation and institutional structure, its soft power policies will not as effective as it is expected.

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THE INFLUENCE OF WAR UPON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS¹

Abstract: *Sir Lawrence Freedman, a Fellow of the British Academy and Emeritus Professor of war studies at King's College in London, analyses the evolution of the most representative conceptions of war in Europe and the United States, from the last quarter of the 19th century to the present day. His analysis is of holistic type, the author using the writings of military authorities, official documents, novels (including the ones in the category "science fiction") or famous films.*

The main concepts analysed by the author in this work, during 25 chapters, are: decisive battle, indecisive battle, total war, nuclear war (with the principles of "the first strike capability" and "mutually assured destruction", i. e. the famous MAD), the wars of "failed states", terrorism, counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, hybrid warfare, war with the help of drones and battle robots. The author achieved a work that could be included in the broad field of polemology but offering a paradigm of Realistic type in the interpretation of international relations.

Keywords: *War, International Relations, Decisive Battle, Indecisive Battle, Failed State, Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Hybrid Warfare.*

Raymond Aron stipulated in 1962, during the Cold War, that the international relations "take place within the shadow of war" (*Paix et guerre entre les nations*, Introduction).

It seemed that Raymond Aron's statement became obsolete after 1989, with the disappearance of the socialist world system, ending with the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991 and accession of the US to the rank of the world's only superpower. The famous Francis Fukuyama spoke of the "end of history" and of the traditional military conflicts, the doctrine of realism was discredited within the Theory of International Relations and several experts believed that geo-economics and geoculture would replace classical geopolitics.

This somewhat idyllic picture of international relations gradually changed, but in-depth, with 2008 Russia's military intervention in Georgia, when Russia and China

¹ Lawrence Freedman, *The Future of War: a History*, 1st edition, New York, Public Affairs, 2017, 400 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

began to challenge in a systematic, but increasingly aggressive way, *Pax Americana* and the international establishment. Also, various opinions have emerged, according to which globalisation would be slowed for the time being and now the “old” secret diplomacy regarding the division of spheres of influence would manifest.

The Realism has returned to the attention of researchers (see especially the present impact of the work of Robert D. Kaplan, an adherent of this school of thought in International Relations Theory). Also, the considerations of John J. Mearsheimer, founder of the “offensive realism”, according to which unbalanced multipolar systems may be more dangerous than the bipolar system during the Cold War, are unfortunately confirmed by Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine and Syria, the new arming race (including nuclear), US-China and US-EU trade wars etc. In short, the post-1991 world became more democratic, more prosperous – in principle, but certainly less stable than it was during the Cold War.

The work analysed in the following lines, written by Lawrence David Freedman, a well-known British expert in Strategic studies, a disciple of Michael Howard, confirms once more the statement as mentioned earlier of Raymond Aron. In the Introduction to this remarkable work, textually he states that “there is no longer a dominant model for future war, but instead a blurred concept and a range of speculative possibilities”.

The 25 chapters of the book are divided into three parts.

The first part, divided into nine chapters, analyses the conceptions and literature on war from the mid-19th century to the end of the Cold War (1990), focusing on such topics as decisive and indecisive battles, “the House of Strife” (basically related to the Pacifism movement), using of cruelty in war, failures of peace, total war and “the balance of terror” (i.e. nuclear terror). The last two chapters (*Stuck in the Nuclear Age* and *A surprise peace*) practically foreshadow the entrance into the post-1990 era, when nuclear weapons guaranteed, as in the previous Cold War period, world peace. Considerations about the nuclear arms race and its famous specific terms: “the first strike capability”, “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) and “flexible response”, are impressive.

The second part, divided into other ten chapters, highlights the attempts to define the “war of the future”, marked by the intervention of Western troops in various failed or semi-failed states, the role of mineral resources and “barbarism” in these wars, terrorism, counter-terrorism, insurgency and counter-insurgency.

The author points out in the chapter *A science of war* that the most important concern of researchers in the field of international relations, the analysis of the risk of war between the great powers, may become irrelevant if civil wars are not taken into account. He shows later that in 1963 was launched in the University of Michigan

“Correlates of War (COW) Project”, financed by Carnegie Foundation. In the frame of this project, a database, i.e. “Militarized Interstates Disputes” (MID), was created. This database is until nowadays used by researches, without them obtain indisputable results, especially in the field of “counting the dead”.

The conclusions of the last chapter (*Cure not prevention*) are quite pessimistic: the post-1990 interventions made by American, British and French troops to stop the violence in the civil wars did not give, generally, the expected results.

The third part of the book contains six chapters and refers to a series of new phenomena that have appeared in the international arena especially after 2008: hybrid and cyberwars, the use of battle robots and drones, violence in mega-cities, new theories regarding the future of war.

The last chapter, *The Future of the Future of War*, contains rather pessimistic conclusions. In principle, Western troops should have easily defeated their opponents by simple firepower and superior military equipment, but have found themselves involved in long and costly “low intensity” conflicts, due to the support of the local population for these insurgents. Also, at present, there are no reasonable possibilities to stop civil wars and even interstate wars.

Analysing the masterpiece of Sir Lawrence Freedman, some conclusions are necessary. Undoubtedly, we have to deal with a scientific approach that goes beyond the frameworks of a classic work of strategy or even of polemology, operating significant introspections in the Theory of International Relations and Security Studies.

The author uses an impressive bibliography (823 titles) that do not lack the titles of military theorists (Giulio Douhet, J. F. C. Fuller, Colmar von der Goltz, Antoine-Henri Jomini, B. H. Liddell Hart, Erich Ludendorff, Mao Zedong), the novels of famous authors (Isaac Asimov, Tom Clancy, Conan Doyle, George Orwell, Jules Verne, H. G. Wells), various official documents, and making a series of references to the Star Wars movie series.

In this context, we are dealing with a holistic approach made by the author, who studies the war seen by war practitioners and military theorists, military historians, experts in geopolitics, international relations theory and security studies, famous authors of utopian, science fiction and futurological writings, film directors. In this respect, as far as we know, Lawrence Freedman’s approach is so far unique in the world.

However, like any pioneering work, it cannot be exhaustive. The author states in the Introduction that he has focused his scientific work preponderantly on the United Kingdom and the USA (i.e. “the focus is largely but not solely on the United Kingdom and the United States”).

In our opinion, the value of the book would have increased exponentially if references had been made to the war conceptions of China, India, Islamic states in the 20th-21st centuries, and there would have been a few more references (in fact, there are some) to war conceptions promoted by the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

The philosophy that dominates this book belongs rather to Realism. The author cites the works of illustrious representatives of this current (E. H. Carr, Robert D. Kaplan, Henry Kissinger, John J. Mearsheimer, Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz), who have dominated or still dominate the debates of ideas regarding the nature and meaning of international relations. There are also quoted liberals (starting with Norman Angell) and, of course, Hedley Bull, a famous representative of the “English School” in International Relations, who tried to achieve (we believe, with great success) a *via media* between Liberalism and Realism. However, Realists and not Liberalists predominantly insist on the inevitability of war, and Lawrence Freedman implicitly defends this thesis in work brought to the readers’ attention.

The Realism is traditionally sceptical about the possibility of elimination of wars between nations, relying in particular on a series of immutable characteristics of human nature, inclined towards gaining power and domination. Or, as stipulated since the 5th century B.C. a famous forerunner of Realism (Thucydides), “human behaviour is always guided by fear (*phobos*), self-interest (*kerdos*), and honour (*doxa*)”.

Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the fundamental predictions in the last chapter of Lawrence Freedman’s work sounds as follows: “War therefore has a future. It can make an appearance wherever there is a combination of intensive dispute and available forms of violence”.

Human nature has not changed practically since the time of Thucydides, so that the fear of leaders of large or small powers of not being surprised unprepared from the military point of view, the own interest of some manufacturers and traffickers of weapons or the “honour” of some political leaders or warlords can easily lead, even in the 21st century, to war.

That is why, unfortunately, the Realistic paradigm remains the most reasonable instrument of analysis of international relations and the work of Sir Lawrence Freedman enriches its arsenal of conclusions and explanations.

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2. Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale în istoria lumii* [International Systems in World History], Iași, Editura Polirom, 2009, p. 62-63.
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8. А. И. Деникин, *Путь русского офицера* [The Way of a Russian Officer], Москва, Современник, 1991, с. 58.

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